Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic by Brodin, Mark S.
MSB// 09/22/04
1
Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic
Mark S. Brodin*
I. Introduction
“Both fields, those of Mental health and Law, … speak two different languages [and] 
have different customs and casts of thought …Diagnoses do not convey legal truth. Legal 
‘truth’ and scientific ‘truth’ may have nothing to do with each other.”1
From its earliest use in American courts, when a Dr. Brown offered his “scientific” 
opinion that the victims had been bewitched by the accused,2 expert testimony has posed
fundamental issues for our system of adjudication.  At its most basic the quandary is: How can 
we utilize specialists to educate a lay jury about matters beyond their ken without at the same 
time intruding upon the jurors’ central role as ultimate fact-finder?  
In recent years courts and commentators have focused considerable attention on one 
dimension of this problem-- assuring some degree of “reliability” regarding the principles and 
methodologies underlying the expert’s testimony before it is heard by the jury. While the Frye3
approach delegated this assessment to the practitioners in the particular field by way of the 
“general acceptance” standard,4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5 and its progeny 
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1
 Lawrence Loeb, “Forensic Testimony: What Judges Want,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 211, 211-212 (2003).
2
 Howell, A Trial of Witches at Bury St. Edmonds, 6 STATE TRIALS 687, 697 (1665), discussed in Moenssens, et. 
al., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 6 (1995), and Jansonius & Gould, Expert 
Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 Baylor L.Rev. 267, 270 
(1998).  “The accused were found guilty and hanged.  No issue seems to have been raised in that case concerning the 
validity of the process for determining whether one was a witch.”  Reed v. State  283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 
370 (Md. 1978).  See generally Jane Campbell Moriarity, “Wonders of  the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome 
and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials,” 26 Vermont L. Rev. 43 (2001).
3
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
4
 Under Frye the “court itself did not have to comprehend the science involved … [it] only had to assure itself that 
among the people involved in the field, the technique was acceptable as reliable.” 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §702.05[1] (2d ed. 1997). “[G]iven the impact 
of the stare decisis doctrine, once a court, relying on Frye, had ruled that a doctrine or principle had attained general 
acceptance, it was all to easy for subsequent courts simply to follow suit. Before long, a body of case law could 
develop stating that a methodology had achieved general acceptance without there ever having been a contested, 
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(as well as revised FRE 702) now assign the trial judge the enhanced role of “gatekeeper,” 
screening expert testimony based on certain reliability criteria. Evidence routinely admitted 
under the pre-Daubert regime—from forensic to epidemiological to economic—is now subject
to close scrutiny and exclusion even before a jury is even impaneled.6 In the age-old contest 
between judge and jury, the balance has shifted dramatically toward the former in this regard.7
Daubert’s measure of reliability clearly reflects a traditional conception of “science,” 
envisioning a model driven by experimentation, replication, and validation.8  In the context of 
the “hard” sciences concerning physical phenomena, “scientific facts” (like the force of gravity) 
can be validated in these ways.9 But applying this model to the “social” (“soft”) sciences, the 
subject of this paper,  is far more problematic. 
The social sciences most often find their way into the courtroom as a tool to account for 
or predict human behavior.10 The evidence usually consists of general assertions about classes of 
persons (such as rape victims) and is offered “to provide a social and psychological context in 
which the trier can understand and evaluate claims about the ultimate fact.”11 Expert testimony 
concerning “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS),” “battered woman 
syndrome,” “learned helplessness,” and “rape trauma syndrome” is offered by prosecutors to 
explain conduct of the alleged victim which appears inconsistent with abuse, such as delay in 
reporting the events, recantation, or remaining in a relationship with the abuser. Battered woman 
syndrome evidence may also be offered by the defense for the purpose of establishing that the 
detailed examination of the underpinnings of that methodology.” U.S. v. Horn, 185 F.Supp.2d 530, 554  (D.Md. 
2002)
5
 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6
 See, e.g., Fradella, O’Neill & Fogarty, “The Impact of Daubert on Forensic Science,” 31 Pepperdine L.Rev. 323  
(2004).
7
 It has been suggested that Daubert  reflected “a fundamental alteration of the relationships between judges, juries, 
lawyers, and experts.” Shuman and Sales, The Impact of Daubert and its Progeny on the Admissibility of 
Behavioral and Social Science Evidence,” 5 Psychol., Pub Pol & L 3, 4 (1999).  In perhaps its most dramatic form, 
the new regime permits the trial judge to exclude a proponent’s expert witnesses before trial, and then grant 
summary judgment against it.  See, e.g, Claar v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994).
8
 For a comeplling argument that this conception of science is “unduly cramped,” see David Crump, “The Trouble 
with Daubert—Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science,” 68 Missouri L. Rev. 1 (2003).  
9
 See Dean Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 Ore L Rev 111, 112 n. 7 (1997). 
10
 For a good overview of the various forms of this evidence, see the recent symposium “Syndromes, Frameworks, 
and Expert Testimony: What Jurists Need to Know” in 24 Pace L.Rev. 187 et.seq. (2003).
11
 Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 133, 135 (1989). See also Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social 
Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987). One writer has conceptualized the role of social science in judicial 
proceedings as “assisted sensemaking”: “the social sciences have been developed to assist and extend natural human 
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defendant believed she was in imminent danger even though the objective circumstances posed 
no apparent immediate threat justifying self-defense (as where the abuser is killed in his sleep).12
“Future dangerousness” testimony is offered during the penalty phase of capital cases13 and in 
proceedings to commit sexual aggressors.14
 Derived not from experimentation but observation, there is serious question as to 
whether much of this behavioral evidence can meet the Daubert definition of reliable science.15
Nonetheless, this evidence continues to be routinely admitted at trial,16 oftentimes with little 
apparent critical analysis on the part of the court and sometimes even after the evidence has been 
discredited in its own field.17 Indeed, researchers tracking Daubert have concluded that it has not 
resulted in significant changes in the admissibility of behavioral and social science evidence.18
abilities to observe, understand, and make judgments about social behavior, organizations, and the like.” Melvin M. 
Mark, “Social Science Evidence in the Courtroom: Daubert and Beyond,” 5 Pychol. Pub. Pol. & Law 175 (1999).
12
 See, e.g., Mass. G.L. 233, §23F; Calif. Evid. Code §1107.
13
 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
14
 See generally Faigman, et. al. MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §36-1-36.26 (1999).
15
  “Science” has been defined as “systematized knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation 
carried on in order to determine the nature or principles of what is being studied.” WEBSTER’S  NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY (current ed).  An eminent social scientist described science as “essentially a method of controlled 
observation and verification for the purpose of reducing human errors of observation, judgment, or logic.  Science 
begins with observation and ends by testing its assumptions against experience.”  Kenneth B. Clark, The 
Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role, 5 VILL.L.REV. 224, 233 (1959).
16
 See Sections B & C, infra.
17
 Munchausen syndrome by proxy, for example, which purports to identify parents (mostly mothers) who feign or 
create illness in their children, “continues to carry weight in the judicial system” although it has been shown to be 
fundamentally flawed. See “The Bad Mother,” The New Yorker , August 9, 2004, at 62, 69. A forensic psychologist 
reports that in courtrooms “they’re treating [this profile] as probative when [it]s not.” Id.  But compare Adoption of 
Keefe, 49 Mass.App. 818,824, 733 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (2000) (Munchausen syndrome inadmissible as profile 
evidence).
Even some long-time staples of psychology like the Rorschach inkblot personality test are being re-
evaluated and rejected in the field. See William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, “Protecting the Integrity of the 
Legal System: The Admissibility of Testimony from Mental Health Experts Under Daubert/ Kumho Analyses,” 5 
Psychol., Pub Pol & L 224, 226-229 (1999); Frederick Crews, Review of “What’s Wrong with the Rorschach?: 
Science Confronts the Controversial Inkblot Test” by James M. Wood, et.al, in The New York Review of Books, 
July 15, 2004, at 22; and “Against Types,”  Boston Sunday Globe, September 12, 2004, at D1. Although some 
psychologists assert the Rorschach  is no more valid than "tea-leaf reading and tarot cards," it continues to be relied 
upon during expert testimony in child custody disputes, sex offender evaluations, civil suits, juvenile delinquency 
cases, and other proceedings. “The Rorschach is routinely relied upon in the forensic realm." Id.
For a scathing indictment of the entire realm of psychological testimony, see Margaret A. Hagen, 
WHORES OF THE COURT: THE FRAUD OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE (1997).
18
 Shuman and Sales, The Impact of Daubert and its Progeny on the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Science 
Evidence,” 5 Psychol., Pub Pol & L 3, 5 (1999). “[B]ehavioral and social science evidence that was admitted before 
Daubert  has been admitted after Daubert.” Id. Professor Slobogin comes to the same conclusion, and even detects 
some increase in admission rates. See Christopher Slobogin, “Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a 
Case Study,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 919, 940 (2000). Part of the explanation may be the “grandfathering in” of 
evidence previously ruled admissible, as discussed below.
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It is submitted here, however, that the recent focus on reliability has distracted us from 
far more basic evidentiary problems with the admission of much behavioral science, particularly 
of the syndrome variety.. These concerns include:
• Whether the behavioral expert’s testimony is “helpful” to the trier-of-fact in the sense 
required by FRE 702. Does the jury need assistance on the matters addressed by the testimony?  
And, if so, does the evidence approach the level of certainty and precision necessary to render it 
of assistance in resolving the case?  
• Whether the expert testimony is truly relevant to the disputed issues in the particular case 
(what Daubert called “fit”) and, if so, whether its probative value is nonetheless outweighed by 
the distinct risk that the jury will be confused, distracted, overwhelmed, or unfairly prejudiced by 
the evidence (the familiar FRE 403 balance)?
• Whether the expert testimony constitutes impermissible vouching for the credibility of the 
complaining witness, or bumps up against the prohibition on character and propensity evidence 
(FRE 404)?
• Finally whether the “costs” of the expert testimony to the parties and the judicial system
outweigh the benefits, and if so what alternatives exist?
Exploration of these issues suggests a fundamental rethinking of the widespread 
admission of behavioral science evidence, a phenomenon which threatens the integrity of the 
fact-finding process. 
II. The Reliability of Behavioral Science Evidence
A. The Daubert Standard
“It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analyses. Yet 
there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest 
for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, 
on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is 
advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for 
those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance.  
Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of reaching 
a quick, final, and binding legal judgment--often of great consequence--about a 
particular set of events in the past. We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for 
the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from 
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is 
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struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic 
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.” 19
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provided the vehicle by which the Court 
reworked the doctrinal structure for weighing the admissibility of scientific20 proof. The decision 
was written against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with the ubiquitous Frye21 standard, which 
pinned admissibility on whether the methodology was "generally accepted" as reliable in the
particular scientific community.22 Frye produced results that were both overinclusive (in 
admitting dubious evidence merely because practitioners in the field rallied to its support) and 
underinclusive (in excluding reliable evidence merely because a consensus had not yet emerged 
accepting its validity). Daubert was portrayed in the popular media as the “junk science” case
after the phrase from Peter Huber’s 1991 book Galileo’s Revenge.23
The Dauberts alleged that their children’s birth defects were caused by the mother’s 
ingestion of Bendectin, an antinausea drug. Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment relying
upon the affidavit of a physician/epidemiologist who had reviewed the 30 published studies
concerning Bendectin, none of which connected the drug to birth malformations. Plaintiffs 
countered with eight experts of their own who connected the causation dots by reference to test 
tube and animal studies, pharmacological comparisons of Bendectin and substances known to 
19
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
20
 A standard treatise observes:
In truth, much of the proof that is presented as “scientific” evidence involves very little science.  Over the 
years, the term has come to be generically applied to a broad spectrum of expert opinion testimony that 
spans the sciences, the arts and all kinds of skilled professions.  Even within a profession that rests on 
scientific underpinnings, in the sense that the discipline has definite rules and fixed concepts that govern its 
workings, the testimony offered by its specialists is frequently couched in terms of opinions, conclusions, 
and evaluations which, themselves, are not scientifically measurable.
Moenssens, Starrs, Henderson & Inbau, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 1 (4th ed. 
1995).  Thus a fingerprint expert who compares a latent crime scene print to the defendant’s is engaged not so much 
in science as in the skill and art of such comparison.  See United States v. Llera Plaza,  188 F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Pa. 
2002).
21
 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
22
 See generally Giannelli, “The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Centry 
Later,” 80 Colum L. Rev. 1197 (1980).  Much of course depended upon identification of the relevant scientific 
community. Astrology may be generally accepted among the community of astrologers, but that would not make it 
reliable science. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cautioned 
that a judge … must not define the “relevant scientific community” so narrowly that the expert's opinion 
will inevitably be considered generally accepted. If the community is defined to include only those experts 
who subscribe to the same beliefs as the testifying expert, the opinion will always be admissible. A relevant 
scientific community must be defined broadly enough to include a sufficiently broad sample of scientists so 
that the possibility of disagreement exists.
Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 314, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1051 (2000).
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cause birth defects, and a “re-analysis” of the previously published epidemiological studies.  The 
district court (affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) discounted plaintiffs’ experts
because their methodologies were not “generally accepted” within the medical and scientific 
communities, and consequently granted summary judgment for Merrell Dow.  
Vacating and remanding, Justice Blackmun’s opinion rejected Frye’s outward-looking
and singular focus on “general acceptance” and concluded that FRE 702 24 imposed upon trial 
judges themselves the task of independently assessing the reliability of scientific proof. “[I]n 
order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge’ [within the meaning of FRE 702], an inference or 
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”25
General acceptance within the scientific community becomes only one of several factors 
for the judge to consider under Daubert. In codifying the new standard in FRE 702, the Advisory 
Committee observed:
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the 
reliability of scientific expert testimony.  The specific factors explicated by the Daubert
Court are: (1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested--that is, 
whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is 
instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for 
reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and 
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when 
applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) the degree 
to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community.26
As David Faigman has described the new concept of evidentiary reliability, 
The key to being a good scientist is, of course, to be self-critical. Thus, Karl Popper and 
the Court in Daubert used the notion of falsification to describe the process of hypothesis 
testing. The underlying point is that only when hypotheses survive myriad attempts to 
falsify them do we gain enough confidence to believe them. Hence, if we believe that 
cross-racial identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications, research 
should rigorously test this hypothesis by subjecting it to tests that would falsify it. The 
23
 See D. Michael Risinger, “Defining the ‘Task at Hand’: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 767, 768 (2000).
24
 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise … .” FRE 702.
25
 509 U.S. at 590. 
26
 Advisory Committee Note to FRE 702, Amendment effective December 1, 2000.
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logic of the null hypothesis is that we should not accept our pet hypothesis - the 
alternative hypothesis - until we have no choice based on our rules of decision.27
Other factors to weigh include whether the testimony grows naturally and directly out of 
research conducted independent of the litigation, or was prepared expressly for purposes of
testifying; whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an 
unfounded conclusion; whether the expert has adequately accounted for alternative explanations; 
whether the expert is being as careful in court as he would be in his regular professional work; 
and whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results.28
Daubert makes clear that the trial judge’s task of screening expert evidence for reliability 
is not limited to novel scientific techniques (such as the systolic blood pressure lie detector 
device in Frye).29 Nor, with Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,30 is it limited to scientific proof
but applies to all expert testimony. Carlson, a mechanical engineer and tire failure expert, opined 
that the right rear tire on plaintiffs’ minivan blew out because of a latent manufacturing or design 
defect. His conclusion was founded upon visual inspection of the tire and exclusion (based on his 
observations and experiences over the years) of other possible causes (what  a physician would
refer to as a differential diagnosis). Certiorari was granted on the question of whether Daubert 
applied to such expert testimony which did not derive from “scientific” principles, and the Court 
answered in the affirmative. While thus expanding the judge’s gatekeeping role to all expert 
testimony,31 Justice Breyer’s opinion cautioned that the standard for measuring reliability must
remain flexible and that “Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case.”32
The premise of Daubert and Kumho Tire is that the expert, unlike an ordinary witness, is 
permitted wide latitude to offer opinions (even absent first-hand acquaintance with the events in 
question) because he or she brings relevant knowledge which will assist the trier of fact to 
resolve facts in dispute. “Knowledge,” Daubert notes, means “more than subjective belief or 
27
 Faigman, “The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations of the Law’s Use of Experts in Year 
Seven of the Revolution,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 661, 673 (2000).
28
 Advisory Committee Note to FRE 702, Amendment effective December 1, 2000.
29
 509 U.S. at 592 n.11.
30
 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
31
 In so doing, the Court answered what has been referred to as the “boundary” question, namely what evidence is 
subject to special scrutiny.  See D.H. Kaye, “Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist, Hummert, and Kumho 
Tire,” 33 Ariz. St.L J 41 (2001). 
32
 526 U.S at 141.
MSB// 09/22/04
8
unsupported speculation” and suggests instead a “body of known facts or … ideas inferred from 
such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.”33 It is the trial judge’s task to assure (before 
the testimony is heard by the jury) that it derives from reliable sources and that the witness is 
employing “the same level of intellectual rigor” he would use outside the courtroom in 
conducting his professional activities.34 Where earlier decisions placed great faith in the ability 
of lay jurors to assess the validity of expert testimony as tested by cross examination and met by 
contrary evidence,35 the judge may now preempt their role.
Yet the laundry list of reliability factors set out in Daubert and Kumho Tire provides little 
concrete guidance to trial judges.36 How much is each factor to be weighed?  What constitutes an 
acceptable error rate? Can general acceptance of a methodology trump negative answers on the 
other factors? That “gatekeeping” is no small burden is reflected in the remarks of Chief Judge 
Kozinski in his opinion on the remand of Daubert (again excluding plaintiffs’ experts, under the 
new standard):
Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a far 
more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.  The judge's task 
under Frye is relatively simple: to determine whether the method employed by the 
experts is generally accepted in the scientific community.  Under Daubert, we must 
engage in a difficult, two-part analysis. First, we must determine nothing less than 
whether the experts' testimony reflects "scientific knowledge," whether their findings are 
"derived by the scientific method," and whether their work product amounts to "good 
science."  Second, we must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is "relevant to the 
task at hand," i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's 
case.  The Supreme Court referred to this second prong of the analysis as the "fit" 
requirement. 
The first prong of Daubert puts federal judges in an uncomfortable position. The 
question of admissibility only arises if it is first established that the individuals whose 
testimony is being proffered are experts in a particular scientific field; here, for example, 
the Supreme Court waxed eloquent on the impressive qualifications of plaintiffs' experts.
Yet something doesn't become "scientific knowledge" just because it's uttered by a 
scientist; nor can an expert's self-serving assertion that his conclusions were "derived by 
the scientific method" be deemed conclusive, else the Supreme Court's opinion could 
33
 509 U.S. at 590.
34
 526 U.S at 152.
35
 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901  n.7 (1983): “We are unconvinced … that the adversary process 
cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, 
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case. … Petitioner’s entire 
argument, as well as that of Justice Blackmun’s dissent, is founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to 
separate the wheat from the chaff.”
36
 See Krauss and Sales, “The Problem of “Helpfulness” in Applying Daubert to Expert Testimony: Child Custody 
Determinations in Family Law as an Exemplar,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 78, 90-94 (1999).
MSB// 09/22/04
9
have ended with footnote two. As we read the Supreme Court's teaching in Daubert, 
therefore, though we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of 
the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine 
whether those experts' proposed testimony amounts to "scientific knowledge," constitutes 
"good science," and was "derived by the scientific method."
The task before us is more daunting still when the dispute concerns matters at the 
very cutting edge of scientific research, where fact meets theory and certainty dissolves 
into probability. As the record in this case illustrates, scientists often have vigorous and 
sincere disagreements as to what research methodology is proper, what should be 
accepted as sufficient proof for the existence of a "fact," and whether information derived 
by a particular method can tell us anything useful about the subject under study.
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's opinion, is 
to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely 
within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and 
what is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it 
was not "derived by the scientific method." Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of 
the federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task.37
As it is playing itself out, the multi-factor approach has both closed the door to some 
evidence previously admitted under Frye, and opened the door to some evidence previously 
excluded. 38 This has led one scholar to refer to Daubert/ Kumho Tire’s “schizoid” character,39
and a federal judge to it’s “competing vectors” of more rigorous scrutiny and more open 
admissibility.40
B. Application of Daubert to Behavioral Science Evidence
“Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who base their testimony … on 
behavioral science information are often, at best, engaging in informed speculation, not 
reporting data obtained through rigorous scientific methods.”41
 “It is meticulous standards that bring respect and credence to scientific testimony.  
When a social psychologist is called to serve as a ‘friend of the court’, he should be able 
to assume our belief that his best friend, his premier loyalty, is always the objective 
truth.”42
37
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,  43 F.3d 1311, 1315-1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
38
 See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1991)) §1-7-1-8.
39
 D. Michael Risinger, “Defining the ‘Task at Hand’: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 767, 768 (2000).
40
 See United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 66 (D.Ma. 1999) (Gertner, D.J.).
41
 Slobogin, “The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert
to Voice,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy & Law 100, 101 (1999).
42
 Edmond Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 30 N.Y.U..L.REV. 150, 167 (1955).
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Daubert, it has been observed, “represents a potential revolution in American expert 
evidence law in that it offers as guidelines rigorous criteria for ascertaining whether testimony 
claimed to be scientific is in fact scientific.”43 Kumho Tire extends the revolution to evidence 
derived from experience and observation, thus answering in the affirmative any question about 
whether Daubert opinion applies to the social sciences.44 What was not answered is the all-
important follow-up: How does a court determine whether an expert opinion grounded in the 
social sciences rests on a valid methodology?45 As the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged in 
understatement, “[s]ocial science in general, and psychological evidence in particular, have 
posed both analytical and practical difficulties for courts attempting to apply Rule 702 and 
Daubert.”46
While Kumho Tire emphasizes the need to be flexible regarding application of the 
Daubert factors to testimony based on experience and observation, it nonetheless insists on some
showing of validation beyond the witness’s own assurance. Can the wide variety of social 
science evidence (described in the introduction) that has customarily been admitted at trial meet 
43
 Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10, 16 (1995). A RAND Institute for Civil Justice study concludes that Daubert has had 
the effect of narrowing the window of admissibility of expert testimony.  See 27 ABA Litigation News, July 2002. 
See also “Less Expert Testimony Since Daubert, Study Says,” Trial  (April, 2001), at 82. But compare Paul R. Rice 
& Neals-Erik William Delker, “Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little 
Consequence,” 191 FRD 678, 703 (2000), concluding that “[i]n fact, since the Daubert decision, admissibility 
decisions of scientific evidence have not been significantly different from pre-Daubert decisions under Frye.” 
44
 It is now clear that in the federal courts the Daubert framework is applicable to social science experts. See  
Margaret A. Berger, “Evidentiary Framework,” in Federal Judicial Center, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 32 (1994);.Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256,263 (7th Cir. 1997) (& 
citations).
45
 Distinguishing between knowledge derived from controlled experimentation and that derived from experience, 
one court offered a helpful analogy:
The distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony is a critical one.  By way  of 
illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aeronautical engineer 
might be a helpful witness.  Since flight principles have some universality, the expert could apply general 
principles to the case of the bumblebee.  Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still 
would be qualified to testify, as long as he was familiar with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the wind, a 
beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a proper foundation 
were laid for his conclusions.  The foundation would not relate to his formal training, but to his firsthand 
observations.  In other words, the beekeeper does not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, 
but he has seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-1350 (6th Cir. 1994).
46
 United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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what the Supreme Court has referred to as the new “exacting standards of reliability”?47 Or has 
the admissibility bar been raised above it?48
1) Social Science in the Courtroom—The Beginnings
It is instructive to consider the most famous example of social science evidence—Dr. 
Kenneth Clark’s doll studies in Brown v. Board of Education49 documenting the injurious effect 
of segregated schools on the self-esteem of black children. The eminent sociologist testified that 
he had presented black and white dolls to sixteen black children attending an at-issue elementary 
school and inquired which doll they liked the best, which was the “nice” doll, which looks bad, 
and which “looks like you.”50 Ten children preferred the white doll and eleven identified the 
47 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).  Not everyone agrees that the new standards are all that 
rigorous.  Some have raised questions about whether judges, untrained in scientific matters, will be able to 
independently assess reliability.  See, e.g., Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, “Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence 191 FRD 678, 703 (2000). Others argue that 
Daubert’s emphasis on peer review publications ignores the reality that the sources of funding for research often 
itself compromises objectivity.  See “Undisclosed Industry Ties of Scientific Authors Undercut Credibility,” Trial 
(July, 2001), at 16, citing “Conflict of Interest in Science and Medical Journals: Ethical Practices and Author 
Disclosures,” 7 Sci. Engineering Ethics 205 (2001); “A Stand for Scientific Independence: Medical Journals Aim to 
Curtail Drug Companies’ Influence,” Washington Post, Sunday, August 5, 2001, p. A1.
48 Writing before Daubert in the context of a statistical study suggesting racial disparity in Georgia’s death-
sentencing process, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned with regard to the “soft” sciences:
The broad objectives for social science research are to better understand mankind and its 
institutions in order to more effectively plan, predict, modify and enhance society’s and the individual’s 
circumstances.  Social science as a nonexact science is always mindful that its research is dealing with 
highly complex behavioral patterns and institutions that exist in a highly technical society. At best, this 
research “models” and “reflects” society and provides society with trends and information for broad-based 
generalizations.  … To utilize conclusions from such research to explain the specific intent of a specific 
behavioral situation goes beyond the legitimate uses for such research. …
The judiciary is aware of the potential limitations inherent in such research: 1) the imprecise 
nature of the discipline; 2) the potential inaccuracies in presented data; 3) the potential bias of the 
researcher; 4) the inherent problems with the methodology; 5) the specialized training needed to assess and 
utilize the data competently, and 6) the debatability of the appropriateness for courts to use empirical 
evidence in decisionmaking.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). Writing after Daubert and Kumho 
Tire, Professor Slobogin observed that “much behavioral science does not fare well under this standard.” 
Christopher Slobogin, “Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 919 
(2000).
49
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  It should be noted that Brown represents the use of social science evidence on legislative
facts (general propositions going to questions of policy) as compared to adjudicative facts particular to the case.  See 
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §15:3 (2d ed. 1980); Dean Hashimoto, “Science as Mythology 
in Constitutional Law,” 76 Ore L Rev 111 (1997); Advisory Committee Note to FRE 201; McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 
F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985), aff’d 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).   This article will focus on the latter use. 
50
 Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F.Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), remanded 342 U.S. 350 (1952), modified 103 F.Supp. 920 
(1952), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  For excerpts of the transcript of the 
testimony and further discussion of the doll tests, see J. Beggs, “Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights 
Litigation,” 45 American U.L.Rev. 1 (1995); Edmond Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 30 N.Y.U..L.REV. 150, 161-163 
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black doll as “bad.” Dr. Clark testified that these were consistent with previous results he 
obtained involving hundreds of black school children that revealed negative stereotypes held by 
them as well as lasting psychological injuries.
The Court’s landmark decision relied on Kenneth Clark’s work to conclude that Plessy v. 
Ferguson was flat wrong in its assertion that “enforced separation of the two races [did not] 
stamp[s] the colored race with a badge of inferiority:”51
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the 
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority 
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. 
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the educational 
and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits 
they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system. [quoting the trial court]
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority [citing in 
footnote 11 the work of Kenneth Clark & others].  Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding is rejected.52
Dr. Clark asserted that his doll tests were “generally accepted as indications of the child’s 
sensitivity to race as a problem,”53 and neither his methodology nor conclusions were seriously 
challenged by defense counsel at trial.54 Yet several attorneys for the plaintiffs (including 
William Coleman, former clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter) reportedly had considerable doubt 
about the test’s validity.55  Moreover, the results of the doll tests in northern schools also
(1955); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES & MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002), at 
185-205.
51
 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). “If this be so,” Plessy continued, “it is not by reason of anything found in the act 
[requiring segregation], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”  
52
 347 U.S. at 494  (citations omitted).  Interestingly the Court did not cite to Dr. Clark’s testimony at trial, but rather 
to an earlier paper. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315-321 (1976). The school board 
defendants in the Virginia case offered their own expert psychologist and psychiatrist who conceded that racial 
segregation harmed black school children’s personalities. Cahn, supra, 30 N.Y.U. L Rev at 160 [citing Trial 
Transcript].
53
 Cahn, supra, 30 N.Y.U.L.REV. at 161 n.25.
54
 Cahn, 30 NYU L Rev at 165: “The doll test was not analyzed in suitable detail by any of the cross-examiners, 
probably because they, too, realized that segregation does degrade and injure Negro school children.” Rather, the 
attack on cross-examination was an “old order” attempt to disparage Clark himself, including his parentage, place of 
birth, skin color, and Northern orientation.  Id. See also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
LAW: CASES & MATERIALS, supra, at 193 (“Confronted with a determined and obviously quick-witted witness 
with expertise in the area that Figg knew relatively little about, the defense attorney did not force the issue.” citation 
omitted).
55
 Kluger, supra, at 321.
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indicated a marked preference for the white dolls, seemingly undercutting any causal connection 
to a formally segregated environment.56
The scientific validity of Dr. Clark’s methodology was subsequently subjected to 
scathing criticism.57 Doubters questioned the adequacy of the sample tested and whether the 
group was a representative cross-section, and noted the absence of both control tests on white 
children and precise standards for interpretation of responses.58 Kenneth Clark himself later 
conceded that his studies could not isolate the effects of segregated schools and thus did not 
provide evidentiary proof that school segregation alone damaged the personalities of black 
children.59 In short, it is highly unlikely that the legendary doll studies would meet the standards 
set by Daubert.60  Having said this, the Court’s long overdue abandonment of Plessy v. Ferguson
stands firmly on it’s own constitutional footing even if Dr. Clark’s evidence (which was, from a 
doctrinal point of view, arguably irrelevant)  is discounted. 61
56
 See J. Beggs, supra, 45 American U.L.Rev. at 13 (citations omitted). See also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, 
supra, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES & MATERIALS at 189-192.
57
 See J. Beggs, supra, 45 American U. L. Rev. at 14-15 (& citations); Cahn, supra, 30 N.Y.U..L.REV.  at 163-165; 
Ernest Van Den Haag & Ralph Ross, THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY 165-166 (1957). The critique of the social 
science evidence, and the Court’s reliance upon it, persists to the present.  See John M. Balkin, ed. WHAT BROWN 
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (2001).
58
 Edgar Cahn also suggested that some of Clark’s interpretations seemed predetermined: “For example, if Negro 
children say a brown doll is like themselves, he infers that segregation has made them conscious of race; yet if they 
say a white doll is like themselves, he infers that segregation has forced them to evade reality.” 30 NYU L Rev at 
163.
59
 Kenneth B. Clark, “The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role,” 5 Vill.L.Rev. 224, 231 
(1959).
60
 In Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), for example, testimony offered by the Boston School 
Department to justify its race-conscious assignment policy was discounted because the sociologist, opining that 
teachers had low expectations for minority students, “conceded that the data he used was not of the quality necessary 
to satisfy the methodological rigors required by his disciple.”  160 F.3d at 805. Among the “shortcomings” noted 
regarding Dr. Trent’s testimony was that the “climate survey” of teacher attitudes and the multiple regression 
analysis connecting low expectations with racial achievement gap were performed in the Kansas City school system, 
not Boston. Unlike the Court in Brown, the First Circuit was unwilling to extrapolate results from one locality to 
another. 160 F.3d at 804. Nor was the court impressed with the witness’ reliance on anecdotal evidence. 160 F.3d at 
805-806.
61
 The “modern authority” referenced in footnote 11 served as a counter to the outrageous assertion in Plessy that the 
stigma of segregation was only in the minds of black citizens. But, as the Court ruled in Brown, legally segregated
schools were inherently unconstitutional (347 U.S. at 495) without regard to the actual effect on black (or for that 
matter white) school children.  The “cruelty” of segregation was so “obvious and evident” that “the Justices of the 
Supreme Court could see it and act on it even after reading the labored attempts by plaintiffs’ experts to demonstrate 
it ‘scientifically’.” Cahn, supra, 30 NYU L Rev at 159.  
Chief Justice Earl Warren himself is reported to have expressed surprise at the attention paid to the Court’s 
social science footnote, stating “It was only a note, after all,” and stressing that it was “merely supportive” and not 
the “substance” of the decision.  Richard Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 706 (1976).. Similarly, E. Barrett 
Prettyman, Jr., law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson at the time of Brown, has remarked:
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2) Syndrome Evidence 
The legal philosopher Edmond Cahn perceptively predicted that Brown would invite 
social scientists into court as expert witnesses with increasing frequency,62 and that indeed has 
been the case. Decades later Judge Teague of the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals would 
observe with regard to the pervasive nature of one form of  behavioral evidence:
Today, we have the following labels: "The Battered Wife Syndrome"; "The Battered 
Woman Syndrome;" "The Battered Child Syndrome;" "The Battered Husband 
Syndrome"; "The Battered Parent Syndrome;" "The Familial Child Sexual Abuse 
Syndrome"; "The Rape Trauma Syndrome"; "The Battle Fatigue Syndrome;" "The Viet 
Nam Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome"; "The Post-Concussive Syndrome"; "The 
Whiplash Syndrome;" "The Low-Back Syndrome;" "The Lover's Syndrome;" "The Love 
Fear Syndrome"; "The Organic Delusional Syndrome;" "The Chronic Brain Syndrome"; 
It's so interesting, this Footnote 11 that became the huge mark of controversy in the opinion he has 
referred to here, which cites Ken Clark's studies and the other social studies, was a throwaway. We never 
paid any attention to it. The Chief I think just told Jerry Gunther or one of his law clerks to add something, 
add a footnote to his sentence here. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the 
time of Plessy this finding is amply supported by modern authority. That is the finding that segregation of 
colored children has a detrimental affect upon them. But he really didn't need anything to cite. He was just 
throwing in something to kind of, you know, bolster it up. It was no big deal at all. And none of the rest of 
us paid the slightest bit of attention to it. We should note that that was very bad judgment on our part 
because Ken Clark alone was a matter of great controversy, and these studies apparently in the sociological 
world were contested, shall we say. And so we were all stunned when that became the focal point of the lay 
dissent, this Footnote 11, that none of us had paid any attention to at all.
Symposium, “Brown v. Board of Education: An Exercise in Advocacy,” 52 Mercer L. Rev. 581, 602  In sum, the 
Court’s references to social psychology seem merely to have been a “convenient face-saver.”  Cahn, supra, 30 NYU 
L Rev at 168.  See also Dean Hashimoto, “Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law,” 76 Ore L Rev 111, 138-
143 (1997).  
Edmund Cahn aptly observed: “I would not have the constitutional rights of Negroes—or other 
Americans—rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records.”  
Jurisprudence, 30 NYU L Rev 150, 157-158 (1955). He lamented the prospect of having
our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological literature. Today 
the social psychologists—at least the leaders of the discipline—are liberal and egalitarian in basic 
approach.  Suppose, a generation hence, some of their successors were to revert to the ethnic mysticism of 
the very recent past; suppose they were to present us with a collection of racist notions and label them 
“science.”  What then would be the state of our constitutional rights?
30 NYU L Rev at 159. More recently, Professor Kathleen Sullivan observed on the 50th anniversary of Brown that 
reliance on the social science “leaves open the possibility that separate education might be permissible in some other 
time, place, or set of social circumstances, if evidence from social science could demonstrate that it had different 
psychological effects, such as empowering minority students or improving their academic performance.” Kathleen 
Sullivan, “What Happened to Brown?,” New York Review of Books, September 23, 2004, at 48.  Evidence of this 
kind is now available. See “Black Children’s Self-esteem: A New Look,” Boston Sunday Globe April 2, 2000, at 
A17.
62
 Cahn, “Jurisprudence,” 30 NYU L Rev 150, 159 (1955). “As the courts’ exclusionary rules of evidence tend to 
relax more and more,” Cahn predicted, “the [social] scientists will appear more frequently to testify as expert 
witnesses.” Id. See also Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role, 5 
Vill.L.Rev. 224  (1959) (advocating greater integration of social science in the judicial process).
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and "The Holocaust Syndrome." Tomorrow, there will probably be additions to the list, 
such as "The Appellate Court Judge Syndrome."63
Another commentator has aptly coined the phrase “forensic abuse syndrome.”64
Syndrome evidence has been and continues to be widely admitted,65 yet it does not come 
close to satisfying Daubert/ Kumho standards.66 The concept of psychological syndromes was 
63
 Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 649 (1986) (dissenting) (citations omitted). Mr. Werner shot and killed another 
motorist following a minor traffic accident. The son of Holocaust survivors, he offered in support of his self-defense 
claim testimony from a psychiatrist asserting that survivors and their families had a heightened sense of fear 
whenever they were threatened in any way; thus what might appear to an outsider as an egregious overreaction 
during a conversation between two drivers was to Werner a reasonable response to perceived danger.  The trial court 
excluded the testimony, and Judge Teague dissented from the appeals court’s refusal to overturn that decision.  For 
more on the proliferation of syndrome evidence, see Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information 
in Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 Psychology, Public Policy & Law 100, 103-104 (1999) 
(& citations).
64
 Freckelton, “When Plight Makes Right—The Forensic Abuse Syndrome,” 18 Crim.L.J. 29 (1994). To this already 
long list we should add Post Traumatic Slavery Disorder, Parental Alienation Syndrome, Compassion Fatigue, 
Secondary Traumatic Stress (STS), and Vicarious Traumatization (VT). See Bombardieri, “Theory links slavery, 
stress disorder,” Boston Globe, Nov. 12, 2002, at B1; Alayne Katz, “Junk Science v. Novel Scientific Evidence: 
Parental Alienation Syndrome, Getting It Wrong in Custody Cases,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 239 (2003); Andrew P. Levin 
& Scott Greisberg, “Vicarious Trauma in Attorneys,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 245 (2003). 
65
 See Giannelli & Imwinkelried, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 427 (3d ed. 1999); Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES  (2002).§§4-1.0, 5-1.0, 6-1.0, 7-1.0; Jane Campbell Moriarity, 
“Wonders of  the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials,” 26 
Vermont L. Rev. 43, 92-98 (2001); Fradella, Fogarty, & O’Neill, “The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
behavioral Science Testimony”, 30 Pepperdine L.Rev. 403  (2003); Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in 
Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 87-88 (1994) (collecting cases admitting 
syndrome evidence).
This is not to suggest that all courts are in accord.  Some notable decisions rejecting the evidence as 
unreliable include Gier v. Educational Service Unit No 16, 845 F.Supp. 1342, 1353 (D.Neb. 1994); State v. Cressey, 
137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993) (“Generally speaking, the psychological evaluation of a child suspected of 
being sexually abused is, at best, an inexact science … [and] does not present the verifiable results and logical 
conclusions that work to ensure the reliability required in the solemn matter of a criminal trial.”); Newkirk v. 
Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).  
It must be noted that profile evidence offered by the prosecution regarding the defendant (unlike syndrome 
evidence regarding the victim) is generally not admissible, as it is viewed as unreliable and runs afoul of the 
character evidence prohibition against painting the defendant as a particular “criminal-type.” See, e.g., Com. v. Day, 
409 Mass. 719, 723, 569 N.E.2d 397, 399 (1991) (reversing conviction because evidence of “child battering profile” 
had been admitted against defendant); People v. Robbie, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 (Ct.App. 2002) (rapist profile).  See 
also State v. Vue, 606 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn.App. 2000) (“By asserting that Hmong men tend to abuse their 
wives, the expert testimony directly implied to the jury that because defendant was Hmong, he was more likely to 
have assaulted his wife. It is self-evident that this is highly prejudicial. It is impermissible to link a defendant's 
ethnicity to the likelihood of his guilt.). Compare Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(expert permitted to testify regarding submissiveness of Hmong, women to explain failure complain of rape by 
government employee). See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002), at 455-465; Liacos, Brodin & Avery, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS 
EVIDENCE §7.8.5, at 437-438 (7th ed. 1999). Testimony offered by the defendant that he did not fit the sex 
offender profile has also been excluded. See Idaho v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (1996).
A few jurisdictions allow testimony as to whether the defendant is the type of personality who would 
commit the criminal act.  See cases collected in Slobogin, “The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in 
Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy & Law 100, 103 (1999).
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originally developed by practitioners for therapeutic, and certainly not truth-detection, 
purposes.67 Mental health professionals are trained to assist patients, not judge their credibility.
“While it may be entirely proper for a clinician to accept a patient report of sex abuse at face 
value and proceed to render treatment on that basis, for forensic purposes, such an assumption 
is,” as one court observed, “utterly inappropriate.”68 It is far from self-evident that methodologies 
useful in choosing a course of psychotherapy are reliable enough “to provide a sound basis for 
investigative conclusions and confident legal decision-making.”69 Indeed the American 
Psychiatric Association’s own Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) warns against using 
these categories for forensic purposes.70
As one  judge put it: 
The [child sexual abuse accommodation] syndrome’s sole function was to start with a 
known child victim of sexual abuse, and then to explain the child’s behavioral reactions 
to the abuse.  The syndrome cannot be used in reverse, which would be to start with the 
66
 See Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10 (1995).
67
 Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10, 13 (1995).  The originator of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome 
(CSAAS) has since described it as “clinical observation” which has become “elevated as gospel.” See Steward v. 
State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492-493  (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted). “The syndrome was not intended as a diagnostic 
device and does not detect sexual abuse. Rather, the syndrome was designed for purposes of treating child victims 
and offering them assistance … .” Id.  (citations omitted). See also Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The 
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 
2039-2040 (1994).
68
 Newkirk v. Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 690, 694  (Ky. 1996).
69
 Gier v. Educational Service Unit No 16, 845 F.Supp. 1342, 1353 (D.Neb. 1994).  See also Spencer v. General 
Electric Co., 688 F.Supp. 1072, 1075-1076 (E.D. Va. 1988) (“Evidence of PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] 
occasioned by rape … is not a scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape occurred. PTSD is simply a 
diagnostic category created by psychiatrists; it is a human construct, an artificial classification of certain behavioral 
patterns.  RTS [Rape Trauma Syndrome] was developed by rape counselors as a therapeutic tool to help identify, 
predict, and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselor’s clients or patients.  It was not developed or 
devised as a tool for ferreting out the truth in cases where it is hotly disputed whether the rape occurred.); State v. 
Chauvin, 846 So.2d 697, 707 (La. 2003) (“the psychiatric procedures used in developing the diagnosis of PTSD are 
designed for therapeutic purposes and are not reliable as fact-finding tools to determine whether sexual abuse has in 
fact occurred.”); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 411, 628 A.2d 696, 702 (1993) (“The child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome was not intended to be a diagnostic device capable of detecting whether a child has been 
sexually abused.  Rather, it proceeds from the premise that a child has been sexually abused and seeks to explain the 
resulting behaviors and actions of the child.” citation omitted); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1995) 
(child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome helps to explain reactions--such as recanting or delayed reporting--of 
children assumed to have experienced abuse); Newkirk v. Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ken. 1996) (“Neither 
CSAAS syndrome nor the symptoms that comprise the syndrome have recognized reliability in diagnosing child 
sexual abuse as a scientific entity.”)
70
 DSM-IV xxxii-xxxiii (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) (“When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual
descriptions are employed in making legal judgments, there are significant risks that diagnostic
information will be misused or misunderstood.”)
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behavioral reactions identified by the syndrome, check off the ones that the child 
exhibits, and conclude that, on the basis of the checklist, the child was sexually abused.71
The very definition of a “syndrome” itself raises questions about reliability: 
A syndrome is a cluster of symptoms that appear together regularly enough to be 
considered associated. Unlike diseases, syndromes have no specified temporal course, 
nor is a pathological nature necessarily clear. Therefore, syndromes vary in the certainty 
with which they allow inferences about etiology.72
Although sometimes confused with one another, syndromes must be distinguished from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a generally recognized anxiety disorder (with more precise 
contours) that has been in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders since 
1980.73 Syndromes are not recognized in the DSM.74
Characterized by one court as “vague psychological profiles and symptoms, and 
unquantifiable evaluation results,”75 there has been substantial criticism of the endeavor to 
compile a checklist that could serve as an accurate indicator of whether abuse has occurred: 
There are no symptoms or behaviors that occur in every case of child abuse, nor are there 
symptoms or behaviors that are found exclusively in child abuse cases. … The symptoms 
… are far from establishing a clear profile by which an abused child can be accurately 
identified.  Many of the symptoms considered to be indicators of sexual abuse, such as 
nightmares, forgetfulness, and overeating, could just as easily be the result of some other 
problem, or simply may be appearing in the natural course of the children’s 
development.76
71
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 384-385, 537 N.W.2d 857, 873 (1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).  The 
syndrome identifies five behavioral reactions commonly observed in victims: 1) secrecy, 2) helplessness, 3) 
entrapment and accommodation, 4) delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure, and 5) retraction.  These 
responses are equally consistent with other experiences, including poverty  or psychological abuse.  Id.  (citations 
omitted). “Because children’s responses to sexual abuse vary widely, and because many of the characteristics 
identified by CSAAS, or by similar victim behavior groupings, may result from causes unrelated to abuse, 
diagnostic use of syndrome evidence in courtrooms poses serious accuracy problems.” Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 
490, 493  (Ind. 1995).
72
 Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10, 11 n. 3. (1995).   See generally David McCord, Syndromes, “Profiles and Other Mental 
Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,” 66 
OREGON L. REV. 19 (1987).  Even some courts that admit expert testimony in this area reject the use of the term 
“syndrome” because of its misleading nature.  See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 362-363, 537 N.W.2d 
857, 863 (1995).
73
 See generally Thornton, “State v. Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome 
Diagnosis as Substantive Evidence of Sexual Abuse,” 78 Tulane L.Rev. 1743 (2004) (& citations).
74 Donna A. Gaffney, “PTSD, RTS, and Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-
Finding Aids,” 24 Pace L.Rev. 271, 284 (2003).
75
 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 408, 628 A.2d 696, 700 (1993) (& citations).
76
 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. at 408, 628 A.2d at 700.  See also People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 381-382, 537 
N.W.2d 857, 871 (1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“the behavioral ‘symptoms’ of child sexual abuse are too varied 
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When, as is the case, the checklist includes behavioral reactions that may be caused by traumatic 
events unrelated to sexual abuse, we do not have a reliable diagnostic tool.77 Indeed, testimony 
from syndrome “experts” often identifies such commonplace symptoms as poor self-esteem, 
family problems, association with an older peer group, depression, withdrawal, leaving home 
without permission, and problems with school behavior and performance.78
In order to establish the clinical reliability of a syndrome identification, it would have to 
be shown first that its particular symptoms are distinguishable from those found associated with
other syndromes or disorders, and second that different clinicians would agree on a diagnosis for 
the same patient.79 Neither has not been demonstrated,80 and instead we have what one forensic 
psychiatrist concedes is “some fuzziness in the diagnosis.”81 One might ask whether syndrome 
testimony (as has been suggested in the context of the “psychological autopsy” used to determine 
and too unreliable to be used as accurate detectors of sexual abuse.”). “Research findings related to Child Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome are limited and do not support sexual abuse syndrome or a CSAAS. These syndromes 
are [exploratory] and meet neither Frye nor Daubert.” Donna A. Gaffney, “PTSD, RTS, and Child Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-Finding Aids,” 24 Pace L.Rev. 271, 284 (2003) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). See also David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New 
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OREGON L. REV. 
19, 41 (1987) (& citations) (“Researchers have been unsuccessful in their attempts to find common reactions that 
children have to sexual abuse. In fact, research has indicated that children react in incredibly diverse ways to sexual 
abuse.”); Brett Trowbridge, “The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Washington on Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Related Trauma Syndromes: Avoiding the Battle of the Experts By Restoring the Use of Objective 
Psychological testimony in the Courtroom,” 27 SeattleU.L.Rev. 453 (2003).
77
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 383, 537 N.W.2d 857, 872 (1995) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).  See also Com. 
v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 174, 602 A.2d 830, 832 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1992) (“The difficulty with identifying a set of 
behaviors exhibited by abused children is that abused children react in a myriad of ways that may not only be 
dissimilar from other sexually abused children, but may be the very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not 
abused.”)
78
 See, e.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 1995); Com. v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 175, 602 A.2d 830, 
833 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1992).  
79
 See Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, “Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma 
Evidence in Court,” 12 Law & Human Behavior 101, 117  (1988); Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The 
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2029 
(1994). As one court put it in regard to standard field sobriety testing (SFST): “R]eliability means the ability of a test 
to be duplicated, producing the same or substantially same results when successively performed under the same 
conditions. Thus, for the SFSTs, if reliable, it would be expected that different officers, viewing the same suspect 
performing the SFSTs, would reach the same conclusion regarding the level of the suspect's impairment or 
intoxication. Alternatively, the same officer re-testing the same suspect with the same BAC as when first tested 
would reach the same conclusion.” U.S. v. Horn, 185 F.Supp.2d 530, 539  (D.Md. 2002).
80
 In the case of CAAS, for example, “it is difficult to determine whether delayed disclosure is a direct result of the 
abusive situation, a completely different stressful event, or the child's age and natural development.” Lisa R. 
Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2040 (1994).
81
 Michael Welner, “Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How  Courts Get Shortchanged,” 24 Pace L. 
Rev. 193, 204 (2003) (referring to battered women syndrome).
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whether a suspicious death was a suicide) is just “another opportunity for social scientists to 
cloak an investigation concerned with the soft-data of attitudes and feelings in the mantle of 
exactitude conveyed by medical and physical science?”82
While the literature is somewhat more persuasive in identifying common characteristics 
among victims of rape83 and battering84 than of child sexual abuse, serious questions of 
evidentiary reliability persist. As Professor Jane Moriarity has put it, syndrome evidence 
essentially “requires a belief in the meaningful relationship between the criminal activity (the 
cause) and the observable behaviors or symptoms in the victims (the effect).”85 But the 
“empirical pillars” of that belief rest, in the words of one standard treatise, “on less than sound 
foundations.”86 To the extent the conclusions are based on anecdotal evidence, the reliability 
82
 David Ormerod, “Psychological Autopsies: Legal Applications and Admissibility”, 5 International J. Evid. & 
Proof 1, 2 (2001). See also State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401 (S.D. 2001) (suicidologist’s testimony on risk factors 
for suicide was properly admitted, but not his conclusion that based on profile victim did not commit suicide).
83
 See McCord, “The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions,” 
26 B.C.L.Rev. 1143, 1199-1202 (1985); Robert R. Lawrence, “Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: 
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings,” 70 Virginia L. Rev. 
1657, 1667-1680 (1984).
84
 U.S .Dept. of Justice, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and its Effects in Criminal Trials 
(1996), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/. Although this report concludes that “[e]xpert 
testimony on battering and its effects can be based on and supported by an extensive body of scientific and clinical 
knowledge on the dynamics of domestic violence and traumatic stress reactions,” it nonetheless rejects the simplistic 
notion of a “battered woman syndrome”: “A singular construct, such as the term ‘battered woman syndrome’ is not 
adequate to encompass the scientific and clinical knowledge about battering and its effects that is germane to 
criminal cases involving battered women.  The term ‘battered woman syndrome’ portrays a stereotypic image of 
battered women as helpless, passive, or psychologically impaired, and battering relationships as matching a single 
pattern, which might not apply in individual cases.”  
85
 Jane Campbell Moriarity, “Wonders of  the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the 
Salem Witchcraft Trials,” 26 Vermont L. Rev. 43, 45 (2001).
86
 Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES §4-1.0, at 172 (referring 
to battered woman syndrome).  “No court or commentator has defended the methodology used to develop [battered 
woman] syndrome or has suggested that adequate research methods were employed in it development.  
Unfortunately, courts have almost uniformly failed to examine in any detail whatsoever the empirical support, or 
lack thereof, for battered woman syndrome. [B]attered woman syndrome remains little more than an unsubstantiated 
hypothesis that … has yet to be tested adequately or has failed to be corroborated when adequately tested.”  Id., §4-
1.5 at 203-204. See also Faigman & Wright, “The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science”, 39 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 67 (1997).
Regarding the reliability of the research methods underlying battered woman syndrome, the following 
candid remarks of its originator, Dr. Lenore Walker, are cause for concern:
Lawyers, in cross-examination, said “She is biased because she starts with a premise that a woman 
who say’s she’s battered is a battered woman.  She should start with a premise of neutrality.”  First of all, 
that is not appropriate using the scientific method.  But, it is also important to know that you can’t be 
neutral when dealing with somebody who has been abused and still collect reliable and valid data.  The 
psychology of an abuse victim tells us that one of the most significant damages that happens, at least to a 
woman but I think for men as well, I that victims lose the capacity to understand neutrality and objectivity.  
Because of the need to protect oneself from further abuse, the abuse victim learns to judge that you are 
either “with” her or you are considered “against” her.  If you are not observably “with” her, then she needs 
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problems are self-evident-- such broad generalizations about social phenomena, without 
empirical confirmation, have been rejected when asserted by social scientists in court in other 
contexts.87
As noted above, a key factor in the Daubert formulation is the ability to verify or 
disprove a theory: “Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing 
them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from 
other fields of human inquiry.”88 Behavioral science constructs such as psychological syndromes 
obviously do not lend themselves to testing upon patients and control groups.89 Unlike at least 
some of the predictions and assumptions of economists,90 syndrome theory cannot usually be 
validated in retrospect.91 Even the recognition of a condition such as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) gives no assurance of scientific reliability in the Daubert sense of empirical 
validation.92
A second Daubert factor, computation of the known or potential error rate (including 
calculation of false positives and negatives), is equally problematic when applied to syndrome 
to protect herself from you, and she’ll use whatever methods that she has developed to cope with repeated 
danger and repeated abuse to make sure you have less of a chance to cause her harm.
Now, what I have described is not bias to the psychologist.  I would be biasing the information I 
gather if I did not recognize the way a battered woman reacts to an interview.
Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Law Symposium: Women and the Law, 20 Pepperdine L Rev 1170, 1171-
1172 (1993).
87
 Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 806-807  (1st Cir. 1998), discussed above at n. 60.
88
 509 U.S. 579, 593 (citation omitted). 
89
 See generally Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological 
Syndrome Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10 (1995) (& citations).  See also Gier v. Educational Service Unit No 16, 845 
F.Supp. 1342, 1348 (D.Neb. 1994); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993); Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael 
H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 2027, 2040 (1994) (scientists cannot “recreate or control [sexual abuse] for scientific experiment.”).
90
 See, e.g., Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F.Supp.2d 141, 148 (D. Ma. 1999) (“Many of the predictions or 
assumptions of economists in damages testimony can be validated in retrospect, if not otherwise. For instance, 
predicted rates of inflation, predicted salary escalations, average life expectancies, average work life expectancies, 
average interest rates, can all be looked at years down the line to determine if we were correct in allowing expert 
estimates of economic loss .... No such retrospective validation is possible ... [with] hedonic damages. Speculative 
assumptions remain speculation.” citation omitted). 
91 Similarly, empirical research on the theory of “repressed memory,” the notion that memories of abuse or trauma 
may be suppressed and later can be revived during therapy or hypnosis, has not progressed to the point where the 
concept realistically can be tested.  See Richardson et.al., supra, 79 Judicature at 13-14; Elizabeth Loftus, The Myth 
of Repressed Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (1994).
92
 Richardson et.al., supra, 79 Judicature at 14 (& citations). “Many mental disorder categories contained in the 
DSM also lack reliability, such that two psychiatrists or psychologists can diagnose the same client as suffering from 
two different disorders.”  Id.   
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and other social science evidence.93 The question posed by Kumho Tire-- how often has the 
expert’s methodology produced an erroneous result94-- is usually unanswerable in this context. 
Even if the two other factors enumerated in Daubert (existence of a peer review literature 
and general acceptance among people in the field) were satisfied with regard to certain types of 
syndrome evidence, neither assures evidentiary reliability under the new standard. Where, for 
example, a discipline itself lacks reliability as in the case of astrology, general acceptance among 
practitioners carries little weight.95
The Court has emphasized that “the test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert's list of 
specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, 
the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability 
as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.”96 Yet syndrome evidence has not 
been shown reliable under any meaningful scientific or legal standard.
Syndrome evidence must be distinguished from other forms of psychological testimony 
admitted where the subject’s state of mind is directly in issue. Qualified psychiatrists routinely 
testify on the issue of a criminal defendant’s insanity or diminished mental state (where the 
defendant opens the door by raising the defense). Their opinions are based upon psychiatric
examination of the subject and reflect years of scientific investigation (including epidemiological 
studies and biomedical research) of the major psychotic disorders, the clinical course of which 
have been charted with some precision and generally accepted in the fields.97
In pondering the admissibility of syndrome testimony it is instructive to look at another 
form of behavioral “science” which, although of even more dubious reliability, is regularly 
admitted in the trial of capital cases.98 Thomas Barefoot was sentenced to death (and ultimately 
93
 Richardson, supra,, 79 Judicature at 14 –15 (& citations).
94
 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 151.
95
 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 151.  
96
 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 141.
97
 See generally Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, SCIENCE IN THE LAW (2002) §1-2.0-1-2.1.3;.David McCord, 
“Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional 
Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,” 66 Oregon L. REV. 19, 35-38 (1987). Professor Slobogin advocates 
admission of such evidence as a matter of necessity, there being no better method for exploring criminal 
responsibility. See Christopher Slobogin, “Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study,” 57 Wash. 
& Lee L.Rev. 919, 922-923 (2000).
Similalrly, in civil cases psychological experts testify as to the emotional distress damages suffered by the 
plaintiff. See, e,g,  Jansonius & Gould, “Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in 
Assessing Admissibility,” 50 Baylor L.Rev. 267, 287-290  (1998).
98
 See generally Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill, “Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent 
Behavior in a Post-Daubert World,” 24 Cardozo L.Rev. 1845 (2003); Eugenia T. LaFontaine, “A Dangerous 
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executed) for the murder of a Texas police officer after two psychiatrists called by the State 
during the penalty phase told the jury that he would commit further acts of violence and 
represented a continuing threat to society. Dr. Grigson testified that there was a “one hundred 
percent and absolute” chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence.99
Neither witness had examined (or requested to examine) Barefoot; each merely responded to 
hypothetical questions about him posed by the prosecutor.
In its amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle100 the American Psychiatric Association roundly 
debunked the accuracy of such predictions, asserting that “[t]he unreliability of psychiatric 
predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the 
profession.”101 Studies acknowledged by the Court indicated that these predictions were wrong 
two out of three times.102 The best that Justice White could come up with to support the holding
that admission of the evidence did not violate Barefoot’s constitutional rights was (what Justice 
Blackmun described as the “remarkable observation”103) that “[n]either petitioner nor the 
Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, 
only most of the time;” and thus the Court was “not persuaded that such testimony is almost 
entirely unreliable … .”104
Preoccupation With Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are 
Unconstitutional,” 44 B.C.L.Rev. 207 (2002).
99
 463 U.S., at 919. One of the witnesses, James Grigson, was dubbed “Dr. Death” because of his testimony for the 
prosecution in over 100 death-penalty cases.  In every one, he had diagnosed the defendant as an untreatable 
antisocial personality bound to commit further violence; and the jury invariably agreed.  Alan Stone, LAW, 
PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY 107 (1984) (quoted in D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 276 (1997).  The 
Barefoot jury deliberated for one hour before returning with answers requiring a death sentence.  463 U.S., at 919.  
In 1995 Dr. Grigson was expelled from both the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of 
Psychiatric Physicians because of his unprofessional and unethical testimony in death cases.  See Flores v. Johnson, 
210 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, C.J. concurring).
100
 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
101
 463 U.S., at 920.
102
 463 U.S. at  901 n. 7; 920—921. See generally Grant H. Morris, “Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous 
Definition,” 10 J.Contemp.Legal Issues 61, 85 (1999).
103
 463 U.S., at 928 (Blackmun, dissenting).. For Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall this was simply too much to 
swallow: “In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by 
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself.” 464 U.S., at 916 
(dissenting).  
104
 463 U.S. at 899-901 (italics added). For a recent critique of the decision, see Thomas Regnier, “Barefoot in 
Quicksand: The Future of ‘Future Dangerous’ Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and 
Kumho,” 37 Akron L. Rev. 469 (2004). See generally John Monahan, “Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific 
Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 901 (2000).
The Barefoot Court did distinguish the narrow constitutional question before it from what it saw as the 
separate matter of reliability under evidence doctrine.  463 U.S. at 899 n.6. See also D.H. Kaye, “Choice and 
Boundary Problems in Logerquist, Hummert, and Kumho Tire,” 33 ARIZ.ST.L J 41, 58 (2001). Moreover, the 
decision may reflect the pragmatic reality that where the jury is required by statute to determine dangerousness, 
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“Future dangerousness” evidence continues to be admitted even after Daubert in capital 
cases,105 civil commitments,106 and proceedings to commit “sexually dangerous persons.”107
Psychiatrists routinely testify in Texas courts (without even the benefit of an examination of the 
defendant or his psychological records) that in their unequivocal “expert opinion,” the convicted 
murderer poses a future danger.108 Yet nothing in the years since Barefoot v. Estelle has even 
remotely established the reliability of this evidence,109 which “virtually compels” juries to 
choose the death penalty.110
Ironically, the form of social science evidence which is most solidly founded in “hard” 
empirical science has met with perhaps the most resistance in the courts. Expert testimony 
concerning the limitations and weaknesses of eyewitness identification111 is firmly rooted in an 
experimental foundation, deriving from decades of psychological research on human perception 
and memory as well as an impressive peer review literature.112 Like syndrome evidence, this 
testimony purports to educate the factfinder about reasons a witness at trial should be believed or
expert testimony no matter how unreliable may be all that is available to assist them.  See People v. Murtishaw, 29 
Cal.3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 469 (1981 ).
105
 See generally Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, SCIENCE IN THE LAW (2002) §2-1.1 et.seq; 3-1.1, et.seq; 
Thomas Regnier, supra, “Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of ‘Future Dangerous’ Predictions in Death Penalty 
Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho,” 37 Akron L. Rev. at 501-502.
106
 See generally Alexander Scherr, “Daubert & Danger: The ‘Fit’ of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments,” 55 
Hastings L.J. 1 (2003).
107
 See generally Robert F. Schopp, Mario J. Scalora, & Marc Pearce, “Expert testimony and Professional Judgment: 
Psychological Expertise and Commitment as a Sexual Predator After Hendricks,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy & 
Law J. 120 (1999).
108
 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, C.J. concurring) (affirming denial of habeas 
relief on other grounds).  The “expert,” Dr. Griffith, “is frequently the state’s star witness,” testifying (at that time) 
in 97 capital murder trials.  210 F.3d, at  462. 
109
 Judge Garza wrote in Flores: “Such testimony lacking objective scientific testing or personal examination defies 
scientific rigor and cannot be described as expert testimony. It is simply subjective testimony without any scientific 
validity by one who holds a medical degree.” 210 F.3d, at 458. Citing Daubert and Kumho Tire, Judge Garza 
observed: “The inadequacy of the science underlying Dr. Griffith’s testimony become[s] strikingly apparent when 
considered relative to scientific evidence generally admissible at trial.” Id., at 464.  Indeed “it appears that the use of 
psychiatric evidence to predict a murderer’s ‘future dangerousness’ fails all five Daubert factors.”  Id.   See also 
Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, SCIENCE IN THE LAW §2-1.1, at 78 (“This area of the law thus presents a 
paradox in which judges seemingly take the most lenient approach toward scientific evidence involving some of the 
most controversial science to enter the courtroom.”)
110
 Flores v. Johnson , supra, 210 F.3d, at 458.
111
 By far the most common error found by researchers studying exonerations after wrongful convictions is faulty 
eyewitness identification testimony. See Connors, Lundregan, Miller & Mcewen, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); Sheck, Neufield & Dwyer, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000)., 
112
 See Giannelli & Imwinkelried, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed) §9.2, at 428-430 (& citations); G. Wells & E. 
Loftus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1984); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. 
Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 160-
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disbelieved. The expert is prepared to testify about the factors that adversely affect accuracy 
(such as stress, “weapon focus,” and confusion of post-event information) and to contradict 
assumptions likely to be shared by jurors, such as the equation of the witness’ level of certainty 
with the accuracy of the identification.113
Despite its clearly “scientific” (in the Daubert sense) foundations, expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification is very often excluded at trial.114 Courts rejecting it typically conclude
it is unnecessary because an unassisted jury is perfectly capable of weighing the weaknesses of 
an eyewitness’ testimony after cross examination by defense counsel,115 a conclusion belied by 
the empirical data,116 or that it invades the exclusive province of the jury to assess the credibility 
of witnesses.117
166 (1989). For recent decisions making the case for reliability, see Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 305-307 
(7th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 71 (D. Ma. 1999) (& citations).
113
 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. 
Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 161-
162 (1989).
114
 See generally Giannelli & Imwinkelried, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1999) 9.2(C), at 434-439 (& citations); 
Faigman, Kaye, Saks, & Sanders, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES (2002) 
370 n. 3. See also United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (such evidence is strongly disfavored); 
United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1052-1053 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Until fairly recently, most, if not all, courts 
excluded expert psychological testimony on the validity of eyewitness identification. But, there has been a trend in 
recent years to allow such testimony under circumstances described as narrow.” citation omitted); Com. v. Francis, 
390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983) (collecting state and federal cases). There has been somewhat more judicial 
receptivity to this evidence in recent years. See Faigman, et. al., supra,  at 369. 
The research into eyewitness identification has had its impact outside the judicial forum, most notably in 
the promulgation of  reform guidelines by the U.S, Dept. Of Justice (adopted in New Jersey and other jurisdictions). 
See Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (1999).  .
115
 See Faigman, et. al., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 8-1.3.1, at 375-379 
(cases collected); State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000); Com. v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 
(1983).  But compare United States. v. Smithers, 212 F3d306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Today, there is no question that 
many aspects of perception and memory are not within the common experience of most jurors, and in fact, many 
factors that affect memory are counter-intuitive.”); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 72 (D. Ma. 1999) 
(“While jurors may well be confident that they can draw the appropriate inferences about eyewitness identification 
directly from their life experiences, their confidence may be misplaced, especially where cross-racial identification 
is concerned.”). 
116
 See Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, “Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification Cases,” 12 Law & Human 
Behavior 41 (1988), concluding that laypersons are not knowledgeable or critical about the variables that influence 
eyewitness memory such as stressfulness of the confrontation, time delay, and level of confidence of the witness. 
See also Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 305-307 (7th Cir. 2003).
117
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (“By testifying that confidence bears little or no 
relationship to accuracy in identifications, Dr. Lieppe would effectively have inserted his own view of the officers' 
credibility for that of the jurors, thereby usurping their role. Indeed, by our estimation, the added aura of reliability 
that necessarily surrounds expert testimony would have placed the officers' credibility here in jeopardy. As a result, 
we find Dr. Lieppe's proposed testimony intrudes too much on the traditional province of the jury to assess witness 
credibility); U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (“the credibility of eyewitness testimony is generally 
not an appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function of the jury--
determining the credibility of witnesses.”). But compare United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 72 (D.Ma. 1999) 
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In any event the frequent exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification
despite its scientific reliability, contrasting sharply with the widespread admission of evidence of 
such dubious reliability as “future dangerousness” and the various syndromes discussed above,
strongly suggests that factors other than reliability are playing the determinative role. We will 
turn to those matters in section III, below.
C. Judicial Rationales for Admission of Behavioral Science Evidence
“If courts allow the admission of long-relied upon but ultimately unproven analysis, they 
may unwittingly perpetuate and legitimate junk science.” 118
Despite heightened reliability standards, courts persist in admitting much behavioral 
science evidence.119 In explaining this paradox, it has been suggested that media attention and 
public sentiment surrounding certain kinds of cases, particularly those involving abuse of 
children and women, have influenced courts in this regard.120 Researchers in the fields may have 
failed to critically test their hypotheses for fear of being labeled politically incorrect.121 Also 
(“All that the expert does is provide the jury with more information with which the jury can then make a more 
informed decision.”).                        
118 U.S. v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 554 (S.D.W.Va. 2002)
119
 See n. 65, supra. 
120
 Richardson et.al., supra, 79 Judicature at 11. Referring to battered woman syndrome, Faigman et al observe: “The 
reasons for this positive reception lie more in the policies and values implicit and explicit in the law, rather than the 
quality or force of the science.  In particular, courts have been justly outraged at the rate of domestic violence, and 
the very poor record of the legal system in responding to this violence.” SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES, supra, at 172. See also Slobogin, “The Admissibility of Behavioral Science 
Information in Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy & Law 100, 
117-118 (1999) (arguing that continued admission of battered woman syndrome evidence, despite its suspect 
reliability, may be necessary to “avoid damage to the political viability of the [criminal justice] system.”). 
As one forensic psychiatrist put it recently, “[i]f they make a play out of a case, that is a clear indication of 
how much political pressure can be attached.” Michael Welner, “Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How  
Courts Get Shortchanged,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 193, 197 (2003). Certainly the notorious child care center abuse cases of 
the 1980’s and the accompanying public hysteria played a role in encouraging courts to admit evidence of 
questionable validity from children and “experts.”. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of 
Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2028-2029
(1994).
In an apparent example of the power of media attention, U.S. District Judge Lewis Pollak reconsidered and 
vacated an order excluding fingerprint identification evidence as unreliable only two months after he issued it, after 
an avalanche of national coverage. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 492, vacated 188 F.Supp. 549 
(E.D.Pa. 2002). 
121
 David Faigman has observed that “[i]n our time, the rape trauma syndrome, the battered woman syndrome, 
repressed memories, post-traumatic stress disorder, and child abuse accommodation syndrome all represent 
accession to holy writ.” Faigman, “The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations of the Law’s Use 
of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 661, 674 (2000).
More direct and transparent political pressure on and within Congress produced the controversial 
amendments that appear as FRE 413, 414, and 415, which suspend in sexual assault and child molestation cases both 
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playing a part is the reluctance122 or inability123 of trial judges to conduct the critical analysis 
envisioned in Daubert and Kumho Tire, a problem anticipated by Justices Rehnquist and 
Stevens.124 And in cases like Barefoot v. Estelle,125 the courts seem willing to skirt the reliability 
question in order to permit statutory schemes like Texas’ death penalty, premised on future 
dangerousness, to operate. 
It is also important to note the prevalence, despite the renewed focus on reliability, of
“grandfathering in” evidence previously admitted in the jurisdiction under less stringent 
standards. As one court put it (apparently without seeing the irony), “[t]he fact that handwriting 
comparison analysis has achieved widespread and lasting acceptance in the expert community 
gives us the assurance of reliability that Daubert requires.”126 This circular reasoning,127 which 
the usual prohibition against “bad act” evidence and the trial judge’s power under FRE 403 to exclude such proof 
when unfairly prejudicial. See generally Joseph A. Aluise, “Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault 
and Child Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415?,” 14 J.Law & 
Politics 153 (1998).
122
 In large part because of their sympathy towards battered women who kill their abusers, “courts have almost 
uniformly failed to examine in any detail whatsoever the empirical support, or lack thereof, for the battered women 
syndrome.” Faigman, Kaye, Saks & Sanders, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 
ISSUES (2002).§4-1.5, at 203-204  
123
 Richardson, supra, 79 Judicature at 15; Margaret Kovera,, “The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on 
Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?,” 85 J.Appl.Psychol .574 (August, 
2000) (concluding untrained judges had difficulty rating the validity of scientific studies); Margaret Kovera, Melissa 
Russano, & Bradley McAuliff, “Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying Daubert,” 8 Psychol. 
Pub. Pol’y & L. 180 (2002).  
124
 “I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that 
the scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”  Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).
125
 463 U.S. 880 (1983), discussed above at n. 100 et.seq.
126
 U.S. v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir. 2003). Another federal judge admitted the testimony of a pediatrician 
who had examined the alleged victim and was prepared to testify that her behavior was consistent with abuse:  
“Well, I'm not going to hold a Daubert hearing. I've had this testimony before in trials, and it's not new and novel...."
United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2000). In an influential opinion, Supreme Judicial Court 
Justice Greaney opined that “in the absence of specific, concrete evidence suggesting unreliability, Lanigan
[adopting Daubert analysis] should not be used to revisit areas where we have validated expert testimony based on 
properly conducted personal observations and clinical testing applying generally accepted scientific techniques.” 
Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 317, 733 NE2d 1042, 1053 (2000) (concurring). See also Com. v. Frangipane, 433 
Mass 527, 533, 744 N.E.2d 25, 33 (2001).
127
 As has been well documented with regard to fingerprint identification, courts initially admitted the evidence 
without any meaningful consideration of reliability and then, having been judicially accepted, it was welcomed by 
other courts.  See Simon A.Cole, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (    ); Robert Epstein, “Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint 
‘Science” is Revealed”, 75 S.Cal.L.Rev. 605, 615-617 (2002)
A more enlightened view suggests “a court faced with the present task of deciding the admissibility of 
scientific evidence must exercise care to consider whether new developments or evidence require a reevaluation of 
the conclusions previously reached by courts that did not have the benefit of the more recent information. In short, 
neither science and technology may rest on past accomplishments-- nor may the courts.” Untied States v. Horn, 185 
MSB// 09/22/04
27
directly contradicts the entire thrust of Daubert and Kumho Tire, nonetheless has supported the 
admission of much evidence which could not survive contemporary scrutiny.
Several other judicial rationales have been invoked to avoid meaningful reliability testing 
of social science evidence.128 Some states continue to follow Frye and admit such evidence 
under the more lenient “general acceptance” standard.129 Others have concluded that expert 
testimony concerning syndromes is not novel science and thus need not be specially 
scrutinized.130 Still other decisions except from screening expert testimony that is based on 
observation and experience.131 Finally, some courts have held that where the social science 
evidence is not offered as direct proof of what happened, but only as explanation of victim’s 
behavior, a reliability showing is not necessary.132
The Supreme Court of Arizona relied upon several of these rationales in an influential 
opinion regarding testimony on “repressed memory.”133 Plaintiff Kim Logerquist called a clinical 
psychiatrist to support her belated claim that she was sexually abused by her pediatrician as a 
child, but had developed amnesia and only recovered the memories years later as an adult. The 
witness had conducted studies on the effect of trauma on memory, a nd was conversant with the 
extensive literature in the field of repressed memory. In moving to exclude the testimony, the 
defendant doctor presented a research psychologist who testified that there were “serious flaws” 
in many of the studies relied upon by plaintiff’s expert.  The trial judge excluded Logerquist’s 
expert on the grounds that his evidence did not meet the Frye general acceptance test, pointing to 
the cautionary note in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, relied upon 
F.Supp.2d 530, 536 n.15 (D.Md. 2002).  See also Wright & Gold, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 
§6266: “Daubert’s focus upon multiple criteria for scientific validity compels lower courts to abandon long existing 
per se rules of admissibility or inadmissibility grounded upon the Frye standard.”
128
 For an inventory of the various state’s approaches, see Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 495-498  (Ind. 1995).
129
 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588-589 (Dis.Col.Ct Appls. 1999) (methodology in diagnosis of 
battered women based on work of Dr. Lenore Walker is generally accepted in community of mental health experts); 
State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192 (1993) (“PTSD is generally accepted by psychologists and 
psychiatrists as a valid technique for evaluating patients with mental disorders. The existence of DSM III-R and its 
general acceptance in psychology indicate that PTSD has been exposed to objective scientific scrutiny and empirical 
verification.”).
130
 See, e.g., State v. Vumback, 68 Conn. App. 313, 327-332, 791 A.2d 569, 578-580 (2002), aff’d on other grnds
262 Conn. 215, 819 A.2d 250 (2003); Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 475, 1 P. 3d 113, 118 (2000).
131
 See, e.g., Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 317, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1053 (2000) (Greaney, J. concurring); 
.Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 477, 1 P.3d 113, 120 (2000).
132
 See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 721, 456 N.W.2d 391 (1990).
133
 Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113 (2000).  For a critique of the court’s reasoning, see D.H. Kaye, 
“Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist, Hummert, and Kumho Tire,” 33 Ariz.St.L J 41 (2001) and  Tomika 
Stevens, “The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Repressed Memories of  Childhood Sexual Abuse in 
Logerquist v. McVey: Relibaility Takes a Backseat to Relevancy,” 46 Vill.L.Rev. 385 (2001).
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by the expert, that “[t]here is currently no method for establishing with certainty the accuracy of 
such retrieved memories in the absence of corroborative evidence.”
Reversing, the Supreme Court of Arizona exempted observational and experience-based 
expert testimony from reliability screening. Rejecting the “judge-as-gatekeeper” model, the court 
opted instead to leave it to the jury to weigh the expert’s testimony.134 Rejecting both Daubert
and Kumho Tire, Logerquist asserts that the we need only be concerned about reliability where 
the testimony is based on a “scientific” principle, process, theory, or formula; and only then 
when it is also “novel.”135 In those limited situations we distrust the jury’s ability to evaluate the 
evidence because they are out of their element and may be unduly impressed with  “the 
infallibility” of the science.  But no similar obstacles prevent the jury from assessing an expert 
who is relying merely on observations and experience. Overriding its own “skepticism” about the  
plaintiff’s repressed memory claims, the Arizona Supreme Court chose to rely on the adversary 
system (particularly cross examination) to expose the flaws in the psychiatric expert’s
testimony.136
Logerquist relied on an earlier decision holding that a dog handler’s opinion on the ability 
of his tracking dog to identify human scent long after it was laid down was admissible without 
pre-screening under Frye:
The evidence here was not bottomed on any scientific theory. In fact, it appears that no 
one knows exactly how or why some dogs are able to track or scent, or the degree to 
which they are able to do so. No attempt was made to impress the jury with the 
infallibility of some general scientific technique or theory. Rather, this evidence was 
offered on the basis that it is common knowledge that some dogs, when properly trained 
and handled, can discriminate between human odors. Preston's testimony was premised 
upon this simple idea and was not offered as a product of the application of some 
accepted scientific process, principle, technique or device. It was offered as Preston's 
opinion of the meaning of his dog's reaction; that opinion was based upon Preston's 
training of and experience with the dog. The weight of the evidence did not hinge upon 
the validity or accuracy of some scientific principle; rather, it hinged on Preston's 
credibility, the accuracy of his past observation of the dog's performance, the extent of 
the training he had given the dog, and the reliability of his interpretations of the dog's 
reactions. It was not the theories of Newton, Einstein or Freud which gave the evidence 
weight; if so, the Frye test should have been applied. It was, rather, Preston's knowledge, 
experience and integrity which would give the evidence weight and it was Preston who 
134
 1 P.3d at 119.  
135
 1 P.3d at 119, 121. Quoting decisions in other jurisdictions, the court noted that "testimony concerning general 
characteristics of child sexual abuse victims is not 'new, novel or experimental scientific evidence' and therefore 
does not require the additional screening provided by Frye."  Id. at 121 (citations omitted0.
136
 1 P.3d at 134.
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was available for cross-examination. His credentials, his experience, his motives and his 
integrity were effectively probed and tested. Determination of these issues does not 
depend on science; it is the exclusive province of the jury.137
Michael Saks has described this reasoning as follows: “Because [such testimony] flunks 
Daubert, it is not science. Because it is not science, it need not pass the Daubert test. [T]he 
weakest fields, with the most tenuous commitment to real science, recategorize themselves as
nonsciences to remain expert witnesses in a post-Daubert world.”138 And the Logerquist court 
seemed oddly unperturbed by its own admission that the witness presenting the dog-scent 
evidence in the case it relied on as it turned out to be a “charlatan” who had been permitted to 
give false testimony in several criminal cases before he was exposed.139 Was that not the natural 
consequence of exempting such testimony from reliability screening?.
Logerquist also relied on another Arizona precedent which rejected a DNA expert’s 
opinion based on probability and statistics (because they were not found to be generally accepted 
by scientists in the field) but permitted him to testify to his own “personal opinion” (based on 
his experience) that the two samples matched.  Because no scientific principle was invoked in the 
latter testimony, no reliability showing was required.140  Yet as Justice McGregor noted in his 
dissent in Logerquist, it is hard to see how the truth-finding function of the trial is served by 
permitting an expert to expound an opinion, not shown to be based on reliable science, simply 
because he expresses it as his “personal” opinion.141
Kumho Tire142 rejects the notion that expert testimony based upon observation should be 
immunized from judicial scrutiny. In explaining its own ruling to the same effect, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts wrote: 
There is no logical reason why conclusions based on personal observations or clinical 
experience should not be subject to [reliability] analysis. That a person qualifies as an 
expert does not endow his testimony with magic qualities. Observation informed by 
experience is but one scientific technique that is no less susceptible to [reliability] 
analysis than other types of scientific methodology.  The gatekeeping function … is the 
same regardless of the nature of the methodology used: to determine whether "the process 
or theory underlying a scientific expert's opinion lacks reliability [such] that [the] opinion 
137
 1 P.3d at 120, quoting State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 219-220, 700 P2d 1312, 1319-1320 (1984). 
138
 Michael J. Saks, “The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence,” 40 Jurimetrics 
229, *** (2000) (elipses omitted).
139
 1 P3d at 120.  
140
 State v. Hummert, 188 Ariz. 119, 124-125, 933 P.2d 1187, 1192-1193 (1997).  
141
 1 P3d at 142.
142
 See n. 30, et. seq., supra.
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should not reach the trier of fact."  Of course, even though personal observations are not 
excepted from [reliability] analysis, in many cases personal observation will be a reliable 
methodology to justify an expert's conclusion.  If the proponent can show that the method 
of personal observation is either generally accepted by the relevant scientific community 
or otherwise reliable to support a scientific conclusion relevant to the case, such expert 
testimony is admissible.143
A final rationale courts have articulated for admitting social science evidence without 
reliability screening concerns the role played by the evidence at trial. “Frye-ing,” the argument 
goes, is necessary only when the evidence is “likely to have an enormous effect in resolving 
completely a matter in controversy.”144  When the expert gives testimony that “only helps a trier 
to interpret the evidence … it will be received on a lesser showing of scientific certainty.”145
Since testimony from behavioral experts regarding the various victim syndromes is “not offered 
as direct proof that sexual abuse occurred but as an explanation of behavior that would help the 
jury understand the evidence and determine whether the charge was true,” the protection against 
misuse lies in cross examination and not exclusion.146  Whether reliability screening should turn 
on this distinction, which may have more significance to the legal professional than the lay juror, 
is open to serious question.147
143 Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 313-314, 733 NE2d 1042 (2000) (citations & internal quotes omitted)  (personal 
observations and clinical experience of a physician regarding patient’s “multiple chemical sensitivity”). In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Greaney sought to distinguish “the so-called ‘soft’ sciences, such as psychology and 
sociology, which are highly dependent on information derived from such sources as personal observations, clinical 
assessments, and statistical data. It is here, more than anywhere else, that an appellate court will defer to a trial 
judge's exercise of discretion, once the judge makes a decision as to the reliability of the process or theory 
underlying the proffered opinions and the relevance of the opinion to a matter in issue.” 432 Mass at 317, 733 
N.E.2d at 1053.  
144 Logerquist, 1 P3d at 121.
145
 1 P3d at 121. See also People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 365, 537 N.W.2d 857, 864 (1995) (“as long as the 
purpose of the [syndrome] evidence is merely to offer an explanation for certain behavior, the Davis/Frye test is 
inapplicable.”); Frenzel v. Wyoming, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo.1993) (although CSAAS is not generally accepted, 
testimony based on the syndrome may be admitted to explain the behavior of an alleged victim such as delayed 
reporting); Wilson v. Philips, 73 Cal.App.4th 250, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, 206 (1999) (refusal to apply Frye or Daubert
to screen expert’s opinion that plaintiffs’ behavior was “consistent with other individuals who had repressed their 
memories of childhood sexual abuse.”); 
146
 1 P3d at 121.
147
 Indeed, in ruling admissible testimony about the “typical” behavior of sex abuse victims, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court blurred the distinction by explaining: “If a complainant suffers from PTSD symptoms, it indicates 
that she might have been sexually abused. Thus, testimony regarding a complainant's PTSD symptoms has the 
tendency to show that she might have been sexually abused.”  State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 173, 861 P.2d 192, 
209 (1993) (emphasis added).  
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Even if these various rationales for admitting social science evidence without (or with 
minimal) scrutiny were persuasive, it is submitted that the evidence runs afoul of the threshold 
requirements for admission of expert testimony, as set out in the next section. 
III. Threshold Foundational Issues Regarding Behavioral Science Evidence
As a witness permitted to expound opinions in court,148 the expert holds great potential 
sway over factfinder. The trial judge has always (long before Daubert) served as gatekeeper to 
assure that the expert is “qualified” by virtue of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education;” that the subject matter to be addressed concerns “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge;” and that the testimony will “will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FRE 702. It is also of course the judge’s responsibility 
to determine that the expert’s evidence is  relevant, FRE 401, and that its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed “by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.” FRE 403.
A survey of federal district judges recently conducted by the Federal Judicial Center 
determined that the reasons most often cited for exclusion of expert testimony have to do with 
these basic foundational requirements for admission, and not concerns about reliability.149 The 
most frequent ground for exclusion was that the evidence is not relevant (47%), followed closely 
by the conclusion that the proffered testimony would not assist the trier of fact (40%).  21% of 
the exclusions were based on FRE 403 concerns that the prejudicial nature of the testimony 
outweighed its probative value. Reliability concerns accounted for approximately 20% of the 
exclusions.
It is submitted below that behavioral science evidence does not fare well measured 
against these threshold requirements for admission150
148
 Lay witnesses are of course allowed some limited opportunity to state an opinion.  See FRE 701.
149
 Johnson, Krafka, & Cecil, “Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials: A Preliminary Analysis” (Federal Judicial 
Center  2000) (www.fjc.gov.). 
150
 For the contrary conclusion see Walker & Monahan, “Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in 
Law,” 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) and Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85 (1989).
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A. “Helpfulness” and “Fit”
“[T]he separate fields of behavioral science and criminal justice are different 
enough in their foundations and goals that what may be considered helpful information 
in one may not be so valued in the other.” 151
A prime consideration with regard to the admissibility of expert testimony is, as Wigmore 
put it, whether "[o]n This subject can a jury receive from This person appreciable help?"152
While the traditional formulation required the subject matter to be beyond the ken of average 
juror, the federal standard of “helpfulness” is more lenient.153 Although the matter is one not 
wholly outside the jury’s knowledge, an expert may still be permitted to testify if it will “assist” 
in resolving the disputed issues. Moreover, as one court explained in a case involving testimony 
regarding defendant’s susceptibility to making a false confession, “[e]ven though the jury may 
have had beliefs about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs were correct. Properly 
conducted social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs are in error.”154
On the other hand, if the jury is in as good a position to resolve the disputed issues as the 
expert, the testimony should not be admitted.155 When the lay juror would be able to make a 
common sense determination of the issue without the aid of an expert, the testimony is 
superfluous.156 Indeed, too pessimistic a view of the jury’s capabilities would lead to substitution 
of professional “expertise” for common community wisdom.157
151
 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 407, 628 A.2d 696, 699 (1993).
152
 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).  As Prof. Ronald Allen has put it, “Does the expert in fact 
possess knowledge useful to this trial that is being brought to bear upon it in a way that increases the probability of 
accurate outcomes?” Ronald J. Allen, “Expertise and the Supreme Court: What is the Problem?, 34 Seton Hall. 
L.Rev. 1, 8  (2003)
153
 See generally Krauss and Sales, “The Problem of ‘Helpfulness’ in Applying Daubert to Expert Testimony: Child 
Custody Determinations in Family Law as an Exemplar,” 5 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 78 (1999 and Robert 
P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework 
Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85, 96-97 (1989) (& citations).
154 United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 
256, 263 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Social scientists in particular may be able to show that commonly accepted explanations 
for behavior are, when studied more closely, inaccurate. These results sometimes fly in the face of conventional 
wisdom. The court below erred insofar as it assumed that only evidence completely inaccessible to the jury could 
come in under Rule 702. [A] trial court is not compelled to exclude expert testimony just because the testimony 
may, to a greater or lesser degree, cover matters that are within the average juror's comprehension."); United States. 
v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 64 (D.Ma. 1999) (“even if the inferences may be drawn by the lay juror, expert testimony 
may be admissible as an ‘aid’ in that enterprise. For example, the subject looks like one the jury understands from 
every day life, but in fact, the inferences the jury may draw are erroneous.”).
155
 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn. 1982).
156
 See Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 702.
157
 See Melvin M. Mark, “Social Science Evidence in the Courtroom: Daubert and Beyond,” 5 Pychol. Pub. Pol. & 
Law 175, 179 (1999).
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Courts have allowed expert testimony concerning the “typical” conduct of abuse victims 
on the assumption that jurors need assistance in understanding why a battered woman does not
leave the abusive relationship, or a rape victim fails to report the crime or tell anyone about it, or 
a child represses the memory of the traumatic sexual encounter. State v. Lindsay is a 
representative example:
  The trial judge has discretion to allow such expert testimony where it may assist 
the jury in deciding a contested issue, including issues pertaining to accuracy or 
credibility of a witness' recollection or testimony. The trial judge may exercise this 
discretion where there is a reasonable basis to believe that the jury will benefit from the 
assistance of expert testimony that explains recognized principles of social or behavioral 
science which the jury may apply to determine issues in the case.   Testimony of this type 
is not to be permitted in every case, but only in those where the facts needed to make the 
ultimate judgment may not be within the common knowledge of the ordinary juror.
[T]he court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting ... testimony on general patterns of behavior.   We cannot assume 
that the average juror is familiar with the behavioral characteristics of victims of child 
molesting. Knowledge of such characteristics may well aid the jury in weighing the 
testimony of the alleged child victim. Children who have been the victims of sexual 
abuse or molestation may exhibit behavioral patterns (e.g. recantation, conflicting 
versions of events, confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which jurors might attribute to 
inaccuracy or prevarication, but which may be merely the result of immaturity, 
psychological stress, societal pressures or similar factors as well as of their interaction.158
158
 149 Ariz. 472, 473-74, 720 P.2d 72, 74-75 (1986) (citations omitted).   In a similar vein, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts has ruled that testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children 
may be admitted because the behavioral and emotional characteristics of these victims is beyond the jury’s common 
knowledge:
While jurors may be capable of personalizing the emotions of victims of physical assault 
generally, and of assessing witness credibility accordingly, tensions unique to the trauma experienced by a 
child sexually abused by a family member have remained largely unknown to the public. As the expert's 
testimony demonstrates the routine indicia of witness reliability-- consistency, willingness to aid the 
prosecution, straightforward rendition of the fact-- may, for good reason, be lacking. As a result jurors may 
impose standards of normalcy on child victim/witnesses who consistently respond in distinctly abnormal 
fashion.
Com. v. Dockham, 405 Mass 618, 630, 542 NE2d 591, 598 (1989). See also Mindombe v. U.S., 795 A.2d 39, 46 
(D.C. Ct Appeals 2002) (“We believe there is a difference, however, between an adult witness narrating his or her 
story of abuse and a young child recounting and expressing his or her recollection of abuse. There are special 
cognitive issues that relate to children who are victims of sexual abuse that usually are not at issue when the witness 
is an adult.”); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 411-412, 628 A.2d 696, 702-703 (1993) (several common behaviors, 
such as child’s delayed disclosure of abuse, recantation, and inconsistent statements “may be puzzling or appear 
counterintuitive to lay observers” and may present a defendant an opportunity to “superficially attack the testimony 
of a child victim witness during cross-examination or to argue against the child’s credibility in closing statements 
before the jury.  Therefore, expert testimony explaining the peculiar behaviors commonly found in sexually abused 
children [without offering an opinion as to whether a certain child has been sexually abused] may aid a jury in 
accurately evaluating the credibility of a child victim witness.”); People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 352, 537 
N.W.2d 857, 859 (1995) (“an expert may testify in the prosecution's case in chief regarding typical and relevant 
symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior that might be 
incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an actual abuse victim”); Com. v. Richardson, 423 
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Most jurisdictions allow testimony based on child abuse accommodation syndrome to 
explain the child complainant’s apparently self-impeaching conduct such as delayed reporting or 
recantation.159 Testimony concerning both battered woman and rape trauma syndrome is 
admitted on the same rationale—to “dispel common myths and misunderstandings about 
domestic violence that may interfere with the factfinders’ ability to consider issues in the 
case.”160
But how valid is this nearly universal (but untested161) assumption that the jurors need
assistance because they are not sophisticated enough to recognize that victims sometimes recant, 
Mass 180, 667 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1996) (police officer qualified as expert to testify that it was highly unusual for 
child victim to remember dates, times, and sequences). 
 In an involuntary servitude prosecution, the First Circuit made the same assumption of juror ignorance in 
ruling that a “victimnologist” was properly allowed to testify as an expert to refute the principal defense—that the 
victim had many opportunities to escape:
Based on her general research and her personal interaction with hundreds of victims of sexual 
abuse, Burgess testified that Gedara's behavioral response to the non-sexual abuse administered by the 
Alzankis was consistent with the behavior of abuse victims generally. It seems to us that expert testimony 
on this subject--which the defense was free to contradict--was "reasonably likely" to assist the jury in 
understanding and assessing the evidence, in that the matter at issue was highly material, somewhat 
technical, and beyond the realm of acquired knowledge normally possessed by lay jurors.
United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1006 (1st Cir. 1995).
159
 Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2040 (1994).  
160
 U.S. Dept. of Justice Report, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal 
Trials, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 590 
(Dis.Col.Ct.Appls. 1999) (“Actions sometimes speak louder than words, and a lay juror might well wonder whether 
Ms. Boyd's actions (and inaction) at the time of the alleged abuse were consistent with the narrative which she 
provided in the courtroom long after the events occurred. Dr. Dutton's testimony was designed to apprise the jurors 
of certain repeated patterns of behavior on the part of many battered women. With that information, the jurors were 
in a better position to determine whether these patterns of behavior might explain any perceived discrepancy 
between Ms. Boyd's words and her deeds. This court and other courts have held that testimony of the type provided 
by Dr. Dutton may assist the jury in understanding the evidence and is ‘beyond the ken’ of the average lay juror.); 
State of Minnesota v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Sup.Ct. Minn. 1997) (& cases collected) (“expert testimony 
on battered woman syndrome would help to explain a phenomenon [staying with the batterer, recantation, 
inconsistent stories, delayed prosecution] not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.”); State v. Jensen, 
147 Wis.2d 240, 252, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (1988) (“Because a complainant's behavior frequently may not conform 
to commonly held expectations of how a victim reacts to sexual assault, courts admit expert opinion testimony to 
help juries avoid making decisions based on misconceptions of victim behavior.”); Pratt v. Wood, 210 A.D.2d 741, 
620 N.Y.S.2d 551, 553  (App.Div. 1994) (child custody case) (“[I]t has come to be recognized  that expert testimony 
in the field of domestic violence is admissible since the psychological and behavioral characteristics typically shared 
by victims of abuse in a familial setting are not generally known by the average person.”).
For the admission of similar evidence in civil actions alleging sex harassment, see See Donna Shestowsky, 
“Where Is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment 
Trials,” 51 Stan.L.Rev. 357, 380-383 (1999).
161
 “[C]ourts do little more than cite the recurring fear that juries hold these ‘common myths’ about battered women.
They do not cite any research indicating that such myths are commonly held, nor do they express chagrin that such 
research does not exist.”  Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 
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give conflicting versions of the event, fail to report promptly, forget details, etc.?162 Serious 
question must be raised about the willingness of courts to take for granted that jurors, left 
unaided, will misinterpret such behavior.163 Should we not take into account the increasing 
sophistication of lay people regarding abuse and its victims due to constant news accounts, 
movies, TV shows, and other information sources?164 Is there any real doubt that the general 
§4-1.1.3, at 181. One notable exception is People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288-289, 52 N.E.2d 131 (Ct.App. 
1990):
[R]ape is a crime that is permeated by misconceptions. Society and law are finally realizing that it is an act 
of violence and not a sexual act. … The stigma and other difficulties associated with a woman reporting a 
rape and pressing charges probably deter most attempts to fabricate an incident; rape remains a grossly 
under-reported crime. Studies have shown that one of the most popular misconceptions about rape  is that 
the victim by behaving in a certain way brought it on herself.  For that reason, studies have demonstrated 
that jurors will under certain circumstances blame the victim for the attack and will refuse to convict the 
man accused.. Studies have also shown that jurors will infer consent where the victim has engaged in 
certain types of behavior prior to the incident. … Because cultural myths still affect common understanding 
of rape and rape victims and because experts have been studying the effects of rape upon its victims only 
since the 1970's, we believe that patterns of response among rape victims are not within the ordinary 
understanding of the lay juror. For that reason, we conclude that introduction of expert testimony 
describing rape trauma syndrome may under certain circumstances assist a lay jury in deciding issues in a 
rape trial. (citations omitted).
162
 By way of example is the unannotated assertion in Newkirk v. Com., 937 S.W.2d 690, 698-699 (Sup.Ct.Ken. 
1996): “When a jury of lay adults, hearing the horrible details in a typical child sexual abuse case, is confronted with 
a child victim recanting his or her previous allegations of sexual abuse, it is understandable that they would tend to 
apply an adult standard to the child victim's behavior in an effort to understand what motivates the victim to recant 
his or her allegations.” (Willett, J., dissenting opinion).
Occasionally courts point to the fact that a party is seeking to exploit a perceived misconception to support 
the proposition that jurors must have that misconception. In ruling that the juvenile defendant, convicted of shooting 
and killing his mother, should have been permitted to offer the testimony on “battered child syndrome,” the Supreme 
Court of Ohio reasoned:
Absent corroborating evidence, a trier of fact is likely to believe that the abuse allegations are fabricated in 
response to the charges levied against the child-defendant. The existence and prevalence of such 
misconceptions are evident in the transcript of this trial. The prosecution repeatedly stressed that Brian 
could have left the house again, that he could have gone to his father or grandparents, that he was not in 
actual imminent danger at the time of the killing, and implying that he must have created the allegations of 
abuse after the fact because, otherwise, more people would have known about it.
State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 209, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1337  (1998).
163 Edgar Cahn complained many years ago of social scientists’ “flabby attempt[s] to demonstrate an assertion that 
on its face would seem entirely plausible to the lay mind.” Cahn, 30 NYU L Rev at 166, n. 31.
164
 As Justice Herbert Wilkins has observed, the “line between common experience and knowledge and matters 
known only to experts varies with time and circumstances. At any one time, the transition from one type of 
knowledge to the other is often gradual and cannot be defined precisely.” Com. v. Francis, 390 Mass 89, 99, 453 
N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1983). It was suggested in 1994 that “many of the myths and misconceptions that gave rise to 
the need for expert testimony more than a decade ago have today largely been dispelled or have disappeared 
altogether, perhaps, … in large part due to media attention.” Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The 
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2095 
(1994) (& citations). 
Defense counsel in one domestic violence case argued unsuccessfully that battered woman syndrome was 
“common knowledge … the average laymen in the real world have [been] inundate[d] with a person getting beat up, 
a person ... not being able to leave, they read about [it] every day, they hear about and they know about it." Nixon v. 
United States, 728 A.2d 582, 589 n.15 (Dis.Col.Ct.Appls. 1999). Some courts have recognized, but discounted the 
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public is more knowledgeable today about sexual harassment than they were when Anita Hill’s 
credibility was challenged, during the widely-publicized 1991 Senate confirmation hearing of 
now-Justice Clarence Thomas, because she did not report her allegations and continued to work 
for him?165
Professor Mosteller’s observations in 1989 are even more valid today: “It is hardly 
obvious that jurors would have great difficulty understanding why, for example, a child would 
retract a valid allegation of sexual abuse in the face of the prospect that ‘daddy’ would otherwise 
be jailed. It is equally unclear [why jurors would have trouble] understanding the fact that an 
adult female who claimed to have been raped by an acquaintance did not flee upon the first 
opportunity or delayed reporting the crime.”166 What little empirical data has been developed 
presents at best a mixed picture of jury knowledge vs. ignorance on these matters.167 Even some 
learning curve. See, e.,g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 591 (Dis.Col.Ct.Appls. 1999) (“a great deal of 
information about battered women is reported by the media and has found its way into the public domain.”).
165
 For discussion of the confirmation proceedings from the perspective of evidence doctrine, see Stephan 
Landsman, “Who Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?,”  25 Loyola L.A.L.Rev. 635 (1992).
166
 Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social 
Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85, 125 (1989).
167 There is some empirical evidence from the 1980’s suggesting that potential jurors (particularly males) may hold 
erroneous beliefs regarding abused women.  See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: 
Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 151-154 (1989). Yet the researchers 
conclude:
[S]everal studies on beliefs about the social and psychological contexts in which battered women 
exist suggest that the average juror may have an understanding on some issues that varies from conclusions 
of experts who have studied the phenomenon. However, it appears that jurors may be better informed than 
critics have suggested. Thus, while there are grounds for concluding that jurors might be helped by expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome, the data are not overwhelming.
Id., at 152 (citations omitted). While there were statistically significant differences between the views of experts and 
laypersons regarding rape, the latter were well informed on matters such as the prevalence of acquaintance rape and 
the fact that victims often do not report rapes. Id., at 156. Laypersons were less informed regarding the behavioral 
changes following a rape and were more inclined to be suspicious about delays in reporting. Id., at 157. 
Based on a comparison of responses on a  sexual assault questionnaire between experts and laypersons, two 
researchers in the late 1980’s documented some significant gaps between “common knowledge” and expert 
knowledge regarding the effects of rape as well as the prevalence of certain false myths among the laypersons. They 
concluded (albeit with several caveats) that expert testimony on rape trauma “could be helpful in educating jurors 
about rape and rape victim behavior.”  See Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, “Juror Common Understanding and 
the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Evidence in Court,” 12 Law & Human Behavior 101, 115  (1988). The authors 
conceded, however, that the average score of laypersons (58% as compared to the expert score of  84%) still 
indicated considerable “common knowledge” on the subject. Id., at 116.
 For other empirical studies (also reaching conflicting conclusions) of the ability of the average juror to 
fairly appraise a complainant’s version of events in rape and child abuse cases, see Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal 
Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 85, 116-126 (1989) (& citations); Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The 
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 
2094-2095 (1994) (& citations).
There is probably more empirical basis for concluding that jurors need assistance in understanding the 
limitations of eyewitness identification testimony. See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, “Eyewitness Expert testimony 
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enthusiasts for syndrome evidence concede there is serious question as to whether such 
testimony tells the jurors anything they do not already know,168 or (as some courts have put it) 
"explodes common myths” the jurors may have.169 Yet courts rarely recognize that these may be 
matters of common knowledge.170
We would not need (nor would we allow the prosecution to present) a criminologist to 
inform a jury in a bank robbery case that persons like the defendant, who are in substantial debt 
to bookmakers or loansharks, may commit robbery to pay their debts—this is clearly in the realm 
of “common knowledge.”171  Nor does a jury need an expert to tell them that crime victims 
sometimes recant their testimony or feign forgetfulness on the witness stand.  We leave it to 
them to “sort out the truth”—to determine for example whether the witness changed his
and Jury Decisionmaking,” 52 Law & Contemp. Prob. 45 (1989); John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, “The 
Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications,” 7 Law & Human Behavior 19 
(1983). 
168
 David McCord, “Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of 
Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,” 66 OREGON L. REV. 19, 31 (1987). McCord cites one 
study finding a potential jury pool “surprisingly well-informed about the topic of child sexual abuse.” McCord, 
“Expert Psychological Testimony about Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray in to the 
Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence,” 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1, 35 (1986). For more on the 
question of “helpfulness” of social science testimony, see the discussion of the employment discrimination cases in 
sec. IV.
169 United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
170
 An exception can be found in Com. v. Oliveira, 431 Mass 609, 613, 728 N.E.2d 320, 323 (2000): 
The defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly commented on a subject reserved for expert 
testimony: "There's a variety of reasons why, social and economic reasons why women stay with men who 
abuse them and abuse their children." However, the judge observed: "It is a matter of common knowledge 
that men and women remain bound in abusive relationships." Thus, in the context of this case, the argument 
was grounded in common sense, not expertise.
See also State v. Vue, 606 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn.App. 2000) (“Both sides addressed [the victim’s] delay in 
bringing the allegations. The prosecutor offered the testimony of a park policeman to bolster M.V.'s story by 
‘explaining’ why a Hmong immigrant who had been raped by her husband would be reluctant to go to the police. 
There is little in this record suggesting cultural testimony was necessary. The complainant was a grown woman; she 
was bilingual and educated; and she had been in the United States for many years. A lay jury would not have had 
trouble understanding or believing her testimony simply because she was Hmong. It is patronizing to suggest 
otherwise.”).
171
 As the Seventh Circuit has observed: “Because the fields of psychology and psychiatry deal with human behavior 
and mental disorders, it may be more difficult at times to distinguish between testimony that reflects genuine 
expertise-- a reliable body of genuine specialized knowledge-- and something that is nothing more than fancy 
phrases for common sense.” United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Courts have allowed experts to testify on more esoteric matters, such as that gun owners often conceal their 
firearms in the engine compartment of their car to avoid detection, see United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 
1997) and that street gangs usually impose a code of silence on members. See United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 
1160 (9th Cir. 2000). But experts have been deemed unnecessary to educate New York jurors “in today's climate, 
flush with daily news of the latest drug bust, … as to such elementary issues as the function of a scale or index card 
in a drug deal,” United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1991), or the sharing of proceeds from illegal 
kickback schemes. United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 702 (2d Cir. 1990).
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testimony out of fear or an honest reappraisal of the facts.172  The rules of evidence are designed 
to facilitate this decision by permitting counsel to confront the witness with his previous 
statement and explore the discrepancies on cross-examination.173 And jurors certainly need no 
expert to educate them that people sometimes lie to protect family or friends.174
Structurally it is unclear how trial judges are to make the call that jurors do or do not need 
expert guidance concerning the conduct of an abuse victim. Is it a determination to be made per 
individual case or more generically (i.e., by venire panel, by region, etc).  Should jurors be asked 
on voir dire what they believe about abuse victims?  In holding that the prosecution may present 
experts to explain the “common postincident behavior of children who are victims of sexual 
abuse,” the Supreme Court of Michigan gave the following “guidance” to trial judges:
This expert testimony, however, may be introduced only if the facts as they develop 
would raise a question in the minds of the jury regarding the specific behavior. The 
behavior must be of such a nature that it may potentially be perceived as that which 
would be inconsistent with a victim of child sexual abuse, i.e., delay in reporting, 
recantation, accommodating the abuser or secrecy.  The court must determine whether the 
particular characteristic is one that in fact calls for an expert explanation. MRE 702. The 
expert is then only allowed to testify regarding the behavior at issue and may not testify 
regarding CSAAS characteristics that are not at issue.175
The court went on to create what appears to be a presumption in favor of admissibility by 
adding: “It is a logical argument that the jurors would have made an improper inference upon 
learning [during direct examination] that the victim failed to report the sexual assault for five or 
six years.”176
A few courts departing from the herd have refused to simply assume the ignorance of 
jurors regarding these matters.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has concluded that it is 
“[commonly] understood [by lay people] why sexually abused children do not always come 
forward immediately after the abuse: They are afraid or embarrassed; they are convinced by the 
abuser not to tell anyone; they attempt to tell someone who does not want to listen; or they do 
172
 See, e.g., “Recanted testimonies not unusual,” Boston Globe, September 27, 2002, B1, B4.  In the assault trial 
reported, several witnesses for the prosecution recanted their prior grand jury identifications of defendant at trial.  
The prosecutor argued in closing: “What’s different is this-- The grand jury is a secret proceeding.  The difference is 
[defendant] was seated 5 feet away from the witness at trial.  I suggest you don’t need a road map to figure out 
what’s going on here (emphasis added).” Boston Globe, October 3, 2002, at B4. 
173
 See FRE 613, 801(d)(1).
174
 See State v. MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198 (Me. 1998) (excluding proffered testimony on “adult children of 
alcoholics syndrome”).
175
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 374, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868 (1995).
176 Id, 450 Mich. at 379-380.
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not even know enough to tell someone what has happened.  [Such conduct is] “easily understood 
by lay people and [does] not require expert analysis.”177
A second equally dubious assumption (in addition to that of juror ignorance) underlies 
the admission of behavioral science evidence, namely that the factfinders can receive meaningful 
assistance from it.  In order to be helpful to a jury deliberating whether this complaining witness 
was in fact abused by this defendant, an expert would have to bring to bear knowledge
sufficiently definitive to be readily applicable to the particular case. As the Court observed in 
Kumho Tire:
[T]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the reasonableness in general of a 
tire expert's use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had 
caused the tire's tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass. Rather, it was the 
reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson's particular method of 
analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter 
to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.  That matter concerned the likelihood 
that a defect in the tire at issue caused its tread to separate from its carcass. … The 
relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of this tire's 
separation.178
Daubert similarly emphasizes (as did Wigmore long ago) the need to assure that the testimony 
“is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute,” 
what the Court refers to as “fit.”179
But as the Minnesota Supreme Court observed twenty years ago, syndrome evidence 
(there referring to rape trauma syndrome) is
not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has 
occurred.   The characteristic symptoms may follow any psychologically traumatic event.   
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 236 (3d ed. 1980). At best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that occur 
with some frequency, but makes no pretense of describing every single case.  The jury 
must not decide this case on the basis of how most people react to rape or on whether 
Fuller's reactions were the typical reactions of a person who has been a victim of rape.   
177
 Com. v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 181, 602 A.2d 830, 836-837 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1992) (reversing conviction because 
expert was permitted to testify about the behavior patterns of sexually abused children). See also State v. Saldana, 
324 N.W.2d 227, 230-231 (Minn. 1982) (rape trauma syndrome expert’s testimony concerning complainant’s story 
was improperly admitted because the subject matter was not beyond the ken of the jury). 
178
 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999).  “[T]he question before the trial court was 
specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized 
knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues in the case.”Id., at 156  (citations and internal quotes 
omitted).
179
 509 U.S., at 591. “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry 
as a precondition to admissibility.”  Id
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Rather, the jury must decide what happened in this case, and whether the elements of the 
alleged crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.180
The court concluded that the “scientific evaluation of rape trauma syndrome has not reached a 
level of reliability that surpasses the quality of common sense evaluation present in jury 
deliberations.”181 Indeed, the non-specific nature of their “symptoms” led the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to conclude that syndrome evidence did not even meet the minimal threshold for 
relevance.182
Syndrome theory lacks the precision necessary to truly assist the trier of fact in 
determining what happened on the occasion in question.  Illustrative are the following examples 
of testimony at trial:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: You’ve testified regarding the number of actions that you 
believe illustrate post-traumatic stress disorder.  And one of those that you emphasized I 
recall was, that it is not inconsistent with that disorder to try to act normally?
WITNESS (Psychologist): That’s correct. Rape trauma victims will often try to appear 
normal so that other people’s suspicions won’t be aroused and they won’t have to bear 
the shame and humiliation.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  It would also be consistent for them to act upset, wouldn’t it?
WITNESS: It could be.  If they…
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Sure.
WITNESS: I think I described the expressed versus the controlled way of reacting in the 
acute phase of rape trauma syndrome.  So yes, both of those are consistent.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY:  Both would be consistent?
WITNESS: Right.  Not in the same person.  But, both modes of behaving would be 
consistent.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would be consistent with that disorder to actively pursue 
conversations and meetings with the other person?
WITNESS: Could you clarify, do you mean with the assailant?
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: With the accused assailant, yes.
WITNESS: Yes.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would also be consistent to avoid that person?
WITNESS: Yes, it would.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And it would be consistent to mask the symptoms, and go to a 
party?  Yes?
180
 State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-230  (Minn. 1982) (citations omitted).  The Department of Justice Report 
concludes more recently that “battered woman syndrome” is an oversimplification of a much more complex set of 
phenomena.  U.S.Dept. of Justice, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and its Effects in 
Criminal Trials (1996),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/.
181 Id., at 230.   See also State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1993) (“The symptoms of the syndrome are 
not like a fingerprint in that it can clearly identify the perpetrator of a crime.”).
182 Com. v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 177, 602 A.2d 830, 834  (1992).
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WITNESS: Let me explain that. It’s more consistent with rape trauma syndrome, where 
in the case of an acquaintance rape, to mask those symptoms, to pretend as if the 
relationship hasn’t changed, as if there hadn’t been the trauma of the sexual assault.  
Certainly, that’s much more often the case with a sexual assault that’s with an 
acquaintance.  With a stranger, of course, there isn’t the opportunity for that.183
_____________________________________________________________________
WITNESS (Director/ caseworker of group residential treatment facility)
(Asked whether, based on his experience, kids who have experienced sexual abuse 
exhibit certain traits or characteristics or behavior patterns):
Yes. Anything for medical reasons, from bladder infections to abnormal medical 
problems, and more of the characteristics, the girls can be anything from promiscuous, 
they can be very timid, they can come in with extremely low esteem.  Almost 
exclusively, that is going to be a major characteristic.  Some of the different cues can 
range in areas from being really over timid to different kind of touches and approaches, 
where you would approach them in different directions or from different manners or 
methods. You might even put your hand on their shoulder and that might freak them out 
or something. There is a lot of different areas where just working with them it becomes 
really quite evident. You can see that behavior demonstrated quite plainly.184
Q. And why would a child delay reporting of sexual abuse.
A. Well, there’s a multitude of reasons and it depends on several variables, depending on 
the relationship between the child and the perpetrator, the relationship between them, the 
living arrangements between them. There’s a lot of contingencies.185
_______________________________________________________________________
The state proceeded with the direct examination of Mr. Bosman, as follows: 
"Q: In your opinion, based on your experience, and based upon your training, are the 
kinds of acting out behavior that the teachers described to you that they were seeing in L 
consistent with children who were victims of sexual abuse? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: The answer is yes? 
"A: Yes. One of the, we call them in the workshops that I have attended, in the seminars 
that I have attended we call them red flags, they are indicators. 
"Q: Of a problem? 
"A: Of a problem. Dealing with sexuality, because it's an abnormal thing for a 11 or 12-
year old student. 
"Q: Is it also your experience, or you also know, you also have an opinion, I guess I 
should ask you, based on your experience and training that some children who are 
victims of sexual abuse do not tell anyone about it for a long period of time? 
"A: Correct. 
On cross-examination, witness Bosman further testified: 
"Q. So those things led you to conclude that she may have been--
"A. (Interposing) Not conclude, suspicion and belief. 
183
 Schallock v. Heinz, a sex harassment civil action tried in Arizona state court in 1995, transcribed from Court TV 
Video.
184
 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Sup.Ct.Ind. 1995).
185
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 360, 537 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1995).
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"Q. Those are red flags? 
"A. Yes. And particularly the time that we were talking about protective behavior in the 
classroom. 
"Q. Were you in the classroom? 
"A. Yes, I was. 
"Q. And let me ask you a couple of questions. You indicated that children who had been 
victims of sexual abuse commonly or frequently exhibit the types of characteristics that 
you were aware of in L, is that right? 
"A: In not [sic] all cases. Frequently in cases you will see that type of person, withdrawn 
behavior, you will see oppressive behavior, you will see preoccupation with what you 
would call sexual type. 
"Q: You also had occasion to see that in children who have not been sexually abused, 
however, is that true? 
"A: Correct. 
"Q: It is also true that the awareness of a child or the curiosities of a child about sexual 
matters does not indicate necessarily that she was a victim of sexual abuse? 
"A. I suppose that would be true. 
"Q. One more question. There are other avenues for children to become aware of sex than 
by the parents? 
“A. Absolutely. 
"Q. Among those would be experimentation with other children, is that true? 
"A. Yes."186
_______________________________________________________________________
Dr. Ornelas then testified that L. had a "normal" physical exam, which was, she opined, 
"consistent with what [L.] said happened." Dr. Ornelas testified that a normal exam is 
"the most common physical findings for a child who has been sexually abused." This is 
so, Dr. Ornelas opined, because "the type of contact that most commonly occurs between 
adults and children that's sexual is oral kinds of contact, touching, and what's called labial 
coitus."
Dr. Ornelas also testified that "L.'s behavior of withdrawing from her family, staying 
inside of her room, not being communicative, not being her regular bubbly, running-
around kind of self, and ... waking up at night and touching her mother to make sure that 
her mother was there in bed with her, ... having sleep disturbances and some behavioral 
changes," was "consistent with child sexual abuse." Finally, she testified as follows: 
Q. Doctor, if you had those symptoms or some of those symptoms and a report by a child 
of sexual abuse, are you comfortable forming a diagnosis of child sexual abuse in such a 
case? 
A. I would base that diagnosis on the child's statements about what had happened to 
them.187
It is submitted that evidence of this character suffers from the very same subjectivity and 
imprecision that condemned Dr. Carlson’s testimony in Kumho Tire.188 Adding to the problem is 
186 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis.2d 240, 246-248, 432 N.W.2d 913, 916-917 (1988).
187 United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000).
188 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 155:
MSB// 09/22/04
43
the fact that most courts (as discussed in sec. B, below), in order to avoid the perception that the 
expert is vouching for the credibility of the complaining witness, carefully limit the behavioral 
expert to testimony about the general nature of the syndrome and preclude testimony about the 
particular victim witness. But at that level of generality, the testimony is singularly unhelpful in 
resolving the fact issues in dispute.189 Again, a look at a representative sample of the testimony is 
instructive:
Q. [To abuse expert] You mentioned that [she] appeared angry to you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is anger a typical response in adolescents for someone who has been subjected to 
sexual molestation? 
A. Yes, it is. They carry their anger on their shoulder like a flag. 190
Can it be seriously contended that anger in an adolescent is a forensic “red flag” of anything 
other than adolescence?
On the question of whether expert testimony on the weaknesses of eyewitness 
identification would be helpful to a jury, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that
the knowledge of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists, is probabilistic, couched in 
terms of averages, standard deviations, curves, and differences between groups. A court, 
however, is not concerned with the average eyewitness' reliability but with the reliability 
of the specific eyewitness before it, who may vary from the average in probabilistic but 
ultimately unknown ways. It is not the research behavioral social scientist who is in a 
position to assess a specific witness' reliability; the jury, which views the witness as an 
individual, is best able to collectively determine, on the basis of common human 
experience as yet unsurpassed by laboratory research, how to weigh what an individual 
The court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of visual and tactile 
inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse-related significance of minute 
shoulder/center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently precise to tell "with any certainty" from 
the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.  And these concerns 
might have been augmented by Carlson's repeated reliance on the "subjective[ness]" of his mode of 
analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between 
a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it had been. 
See also State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 409-410, 628 A.2d 696, 701-702 (1993) (court troubled by the interpretive 
and subjective steps involved in psychological profile testimony).
189
 “Expert testimony that does not add either precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach conclusions about [a] subject 
which is within their experience does not meet the helpfulness test and the trial court is within its discretion to exclude it.”
State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (expert testimony on the coercive 
effects of certain interrogation procedures).
190 State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383 n.5, 728 P.2d 248, 253 n.5 (1986). The testimony was deemed properly 
admitted to give the jury an alternative explanation for the victim’s anger, which the defense claimed was prompted 
by parental discipline. The “good common sense of jurors will discern that which is true from that which is false,” 
the court concluded.  151 Ariz. at 254, 728 P.2d at 384.  But why was that “good common sense” not adequate to 
resolve the credibility question without the “experise” of the prosecution’s witness?
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witness has to say.191
These observations are equally applicable to syndrome evidence, which at best (and 
without the empirical foundations of the eyewitness identification experts192) describes patterns 
of behavior applicable to some, but certainly not all or perhaps even most, victims of abuse. Dr. 
Lenore Walker (who in 1979 originated the theory of battered woman syndrome) concluded that 
only about half the victims studied actually exhibited BWS.193 In her later writings she conceded 
that not all relationships follow the pattern and that inconsistencies and variations can be 
found.194 In fact victim conduct defies characterization as common or typical, and the 
considerable research that has been conducted in the past decades has failed to provide support 
“for a single profile that captures the impact of abuse on a woman.”195 The originator of child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome has criticized its use by prosecutors in a similar vein:
There has been some tendency to use the CSAAS as an offer of proof that a child 
has been abused.  A child may be said to be suffering from or displaying the CSAAS, as 
if it is a malady that proves the alleged abuse.  Or a child's conspicuous helplessness or 
silence might be said to be consistent with the CSAAS, as if not complaining proves the 
complaint. Some have contended that a child who retracts is a more believable victim 
than one who has maintained a consistent complaint.196
Expert testimony must achieve a requisite level of certainty in order to provide assistance
to the factfinder.  In the medical context this means the physician must testify “to a reasonable 
191
 State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494, 432 N.W.2d 503, 520 (1988). In a  similar vein, see State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 
831, 837-838 (Tenn. 2000):
  [W]e find that expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification simply offers generalities and is not 
specific to the witness whose testimony is in question.   Moreover, we are of the opinion that the subject of 
the reliability of eyewitness identification is within the common understanding of reasonable persons.   
Therefore, such expert testimony is unnecessary. It may mislead and confuse, and it could encourage the 
jury to abandon its responsibility as fact-finder. Such responsibility is a task reserved for and ably 
performed by the jury, aided by skillful cross-examination and the jury instruction promulgated in Dyle
when appropriate. For these reasons, we find that general and unparticularized expert testimony concerning 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony, which is not specific to the witness whose testimony is in question, 
does not substantially assist the trier of fact. Thus, we hold that such testimony is inadmissible under 
Tenn.R.Evid. 702 and that the trial court, therefore, properly excluded Johnson's testimony.
See also  Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 F.Supp.2d 141, 150 (D. Ma. 1999) (excluding plaintiff’s hedonic 
damages expert because his testimony was derived from broad generalizations and was “simply not sufficiently 
plaintiff-specific to make it helpful to the jury”).
192
 See text accompanying n. 111, et.seq.
193
 See Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES §4-2.1.1, at 212 (& 
citations).
194
 See Lenore E.A. Walker, “Psychology and Law Symposium: Women and the Law,” 20 Pepperdine L Rev 1170, 
1184 (1993).  See also See Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 
§4-2.1.1, at 213-234.  .
195
 See Faigman, et al, SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES §4-2.1.1, at 233.
196
 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1995)  (citation omitted).
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degree of medical certainty.”197 Courts have similarly required scientific experts to be able to 
testify “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.”198 Syndrome theory, however, defies such 
exactitude both because it operates at a level of meaningless generality and makes contradictory 
claims.  
By way of example, indicia of abuse include such commpnplace behavior as 
biting lips, clenching fists, tapping fingers, and biting nails,199 stomachaches and nightmares,200
and “fatigue, poor sleep and headaches, emotional changes including anxiety, irritability, 
depression and hopelessness, and behavioral manifestations including aggression, cynicism, and 
substance abuse, leading to poor job performance, [and] deterioration in interpersonal 
relationships.”201
197
 See, e.g., Klein v. Vanek, 86 F.Supp.2d 812, 818 (N.D.Ill. 2000); Rotman v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 
41 Mass App 317, 320 (1996) (medical expert must testify that causation is probable, not merely possible, 
conceivable, or reasonable); Resendes v. Boston Edison, 38 Mass App 344, 352 (1995). See generally Jeff L.Lewin, 
“The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About ‘Reasonable Medical Certainty’”, 57 Maryland L.Rev. 380 
(1998).
198
 See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 11 Mass L Rptr 40, 47-48 (Super. Ct. 1999) (level of certainty must be 
greater than merely “more likely than not”).
199
 See Donna A. Gaffney, “PTSD, RTS, and Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-
Finding Aids,” 24 Pace L.Rev. 271, 285 (2003).
200
 Com. v. Hudson, 417 Mass. 536, 631 N.E.2d 50 (1994).
201
 See Andrew P. Levin & Scott Greisberg, “Vicarious Trauma in Attorneys,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 245, 248 (2003).
The following is a checklist for diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome:
Subjective: 







• Loss of self-esteem 
• Helplessness 
• Powerlessness 
• Nightmare and sleep disturbances 
• Change in relationships 
• Sexual dysfunction 
• [Changes in lifestyle (change in residence; seeking family support; seeking social network support)]
Objective: 
• Physical trauma (e. g., bruising, tissue irritation) 




• Inability to make decisions 





If a child is calm during a genital examination, that may be taken as evidence that she is 
used to being handled in that way; but a child who resists during the exam may also be viewed as 
having experienced sexual trauma.202 A victim’s relating of conflicting versions of the events is 
considered a sign of abuse,203 but so is the consistency of the victim’s story over time. 204 Even 
courts that admit rape trauma syndrome concede that “the behavior exhibited by a rape victim 
after the attack can vary. While some women will express their fear, anger and anxiety openly, 
an equal number of women will appear controlled, calm, and subdued.”205 Behavioral response 
checklists include such opposites as increased or decreased eating or smoking,206 and







• Substance abuse 
• Suicide attempts 
• Dissociative disorders
NURSING DIAGNOSES: DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS (as quoted in Donna A. Gaffney, “PTSD, 
RTS, and Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-Finding Aids,” 24 Pace L.Rev. 271, 
290 (2003).
202
 Richardson, Ginsburg, Gatowski, & Dobbin, “The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence,” 79 Judicature 10, 13 (1995).  
203
 One jurist complains that there is “something fundamentally strange about saying that since the story is 
inconsistent, it must be true.” Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (Teague, dissenting).
204
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 383 n.2, 537 N.W.2d 857, 872 n.2 (1995) (Cavanagh, dissenting) (& 
citations).   
205
 People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 285, 552 N.E.2d 131 (Ct.Appeals 1990). The court continued: “We realize that 
rape trauma syndrome encompasses a broad range of symptoms and varied patterns of recovery. Some women are 
better able to cope with the aftermath of sexual assault than other women. It is also apparent that there is no single 
typical profile of a rape victim and that different victims express themselves and come to terms with the experience 
of rape in different ways. “ Id., at  286. Summarizing the numerous studies of rape victims that have been conducted 
over the years, one writer concludes they: 
fail to establish any specific psychological sequelae for rape victims. Instead, the studies find that rape 
victims experience psychological reactions similar to victims of other crimes, or they find that RTS varies 
significantly from individual to individual, thus indicating that there is no syndrome unique to rape. These 
problems question the reliability of RTS as circumstantial evidence that a rape occurred.
Robert R. Lawrence, “Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings,” 70 Virginia L. Rev. 1657, 1673  (1984).
206 Donna A. Gaffney, “PTSD, RTS, and Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Therapeutic Tools or Fact-
Finding Aids,” 24 Pace L.Rev. 271, 285 (2003).
207
 Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2068-2069 (1994) (& citations).
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This “have-it-both-ways”208 nature of syndrome evidence distinguishes it from well-
recognized medical diagnostic techniques such as that used to determine whether a child’s
physical injuries are inconsistent with a claim of accidental harm.209 Instead syndromes look 
more like drug courier profiles, which have a "chameleon-like way of adapting to any  particular 
set of observations."210
Even assuming that behavioral evidence may sometimes aid the jury in understanding 
conduct that may appear inconsistent with abuse (especially where the defense has pressed the 
late reporting or retraction to undermine the witness’s credibility),211 such testimony remains 
problematic. First, expert opinions that "merely tell the jury what result to reach" (like that abuse 
occurred) are, for obvious reasons, neither “helpful” nor appropriate.  See Fed.R.Evid. 704 
Advisory Committee's Note.212  Second, where the expert’s opinion is based largely or solely on 
the alleged victim’s statements and the testimony therefore translates into a reassertion of the 
victim’s story, the testimony should not be admitted.213 Third, syndrome evidence may simply 
208
 Judge Teague has complained that Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome “is whatever the particular expert wants it to 
be, based upon elements he himself has created or manufactured, or has plagarized from other's works.” Duckett v. 
State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 925  (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (dissenting).
209
 In State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 384 n.6, 728 P.2d 248, 251, 254 n.6 (1986), the court contrasted 
syndrome evidence with “expert testimony [like battered child syndrome] as to the occurrence of an event when that 
testimony is based on physical findings rather than psychological evaluation” and “medical testimony that certain 
observable physical facts indicate penetration.” A radiologist may, for example, testify that the victim’s injuries 
were of a type most likely inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally, or that the infant victim died as a result of 
severe shaking. See Martha Coakley, “Child Abuse and the Law II: The Radiologist in Court,” in Kleinman, Paul K. 
DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING OF CHILD ABUSE  (2d ed. 1998). See also Com. v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 724, 569 
N.E.2d 397, 400 (1991); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 493-494 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).; Com. v. 
Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 179-180, 602 A.2d 830, 835-836 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1992).
210
 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The justices cited cases in 
which opposite characteristics were considered suspicious, including being the first passenger to deplane, the last to 
deplane, and deplaning in the middle of the crowd; holding a round-trip ticket and holding a one-way ticket; 
traveling nonstop and changing planes; carrying no luggage and carrying luggage; traveling alone and traveling with 
companions; acting too nervously and acting too calmly. See also Jane Campbell Moriarity, “Wonders of  the 
Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials,” 26 Vermont L. Rev. 
43, 88-92 (2001).
211
 See, e.g.,  Steward v. State,  652 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted). 
212
 State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 861 P.2d 192, 211 (1993) (excluding testimony that alleged rape victims 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder consistent with sexual abuse because “When the only evidence consists 
of the victim's accusation and the defendant's denial, expert testimony on the question of who to believe is nothing 
more than advice to jurors on how to decide the case.”).
213
 U.S. v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-786 (8th Cir. 1993) (doctor could not base his diagnosis solely on victim’s 
allegations of abuse); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir.1987) (doctor's opinion based solely 
on patient's oral history is nothing more than patient's testimony "dressed up and sanctified"); Loudermill v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.1988) (expert opinion lacking objective factual support cannot help jury and 
thus is inadmissible under Rule 702); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 407, 628 A.2d 696, 699-700 (1993) (“Expert 
psychological evidence can only be admissible in a [prosecution for child abuse] if it is at least partly based on 
factors in addition to and independent of the victim’s accounts.  Otherwise, the expert’s conclusions are of no value 
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and (ironically) substitute one set of stereotypes (e.g., abused women are all passive and 
helpless) for another (e.g., abused women do not stay with their abusers).214
It has been recognized that “helpfulness is a matter of degree, and expert evidence 
involves costs and risks--too obvious to need recounting--that distinguish it from lay evidence 
about ‘what happened here.’”215 One such risk is the topic of the next section: syndrome 
testimony’s tendency to  infringe on the jury’s exclusive role to assess credibility of witnesses.
B. Vouching for Credibility and Invading the Province of the Jury
[E]xpert testimony ... is not, as some current practice suggests, a mechanism for having someone 
of elevated education or station engage in a laying on of hands, placing an imprimatur, upon the 
justice of one's cause.... Experts are not, in theory, called to tell the jury who should win. They 
are called, instead, to provide knowledge to the jury to permit the jury rationally to decide the 
case before it.216
It is axiomatic that assessing the credibility of witnesses is the sole prerogative of the 
jury. Indeed, its has been said that the genius of the jury trial system is to have twelve 
laypersons, bringing their common sense and experience, weigh the evidence, rather than a 
single judge. 
It is thus universally recognized that expert testimony directly vouching for (or attacking) 
the credibility of another witness at trial is inappropriate.217 Courts vigilantly guard against 
to the jury because they present no new evidence and are merely vouching for the credibility of the child victim 
witness.”).
214
 DOJ Report, The Validity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Is Effects in Criminal Trials, at text 
accompanying footnotes 65-75, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/.
215
 U.S. v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277  (1st Cir. 1995)  (excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification, given 
the “risks of confronting the jury with battles of experts on areas within the common-sense competence of jurors”).
216 State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385 n.7, 728 P.2d 248, 255 n.7 (1986) (citation omitted).
217 U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (eyewitness identification expert); U.S. v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 
884 (8th Cir. 1996) (eyewitness identification testimony) ("It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the 
believability of a witness.... An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of a 
victim's story."); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 815 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1168 (excluding 
testimony of two defense witnesses in field of forensic anthropology who were to have testified about their analyses 
of the bank surveillance photographs: "[E]xpert testimony can be properly excluded if it is introduced merely to cast 
doubt on the credibility of other eyewitnesses, since the evaluation of a witness' credibility is a determination usually 
within the jury's exclusive purview."); U.S. v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-340 (8th Cir. 1986) (& citations) 
(pediatrician and child abuse expert's testimony that story of victim was believable and that expert could see no 
reason why victim was not telling truth was not admissible); Com. v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830, 836-837 
(Sup. Ct. Pa. 1992) (expert should not  have been permitted to explain why sexually abused children might delay 
reporting or omit details of abuse because such testimony infringes on the jury’s right to determine credibility).  As 
one federal judge put it in excluding the testimony of a defense psychiatrist to the effect that the plaintiff suffered 
from a mixed personality disorder causing him to blame others when something goes wrong and to  lie to explain 
their failures, we cannot “allow trials to degenerate into swearing contests between opposing psychiatrists claiming 
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invading the province of the jury on matters they are capable of resolving without the benefit of 
expert opinion,218 and the credibility of witnesses is such a matter. Thus an expert generally may 
not testify to the damaging effects on perception and memory caused by prolonged use of drugs 
when the testimony is offered to attack the credibility of a witness.219 Even an eminently 
qualified expert conversant with the literature will not be permitted to render an opinion that a 
child is likely to falsely accuse a parent of sexual assault when the subject of a stressful custody 
dispute.220 Experts have been precluded from testifying that children rarely lie about sexual 
to have insight into whether a particular person is telling the truth.” Klein v. Vanek, 86 F.Supp.2d 812, 817 (N.D.Ill. 
2000). See generally Michael W. Mullane, “The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility,” 43 
Me.L.Rev. 53 (1991); David McCord, “Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the 
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,” 66 Oregon L. Rev. 19, 45-46  (1987) 
(& cases collected).
While FRE 608(a) allows evidence “in the form of opinion or reputation” on the credibility of a witness, is 
limited to general character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and the rule envisions lay, not expert, testimony. FRE 
608(a) does not allow opinion as to whether the witness spoke truthfully on a specific occasion.  See United States. 
v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986);  State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 610 n.14,  645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (& 
citations)  (1982).
There are only  rare exceptions to the prohibition against testimony on credibility. In the 1949 perjury 
prosecution of Alger Hiss two defense psychiatrists were permitted to render an opinion (based on his writings and 
courtroom demeanor) that Whittaker Chambers, the prosecution’s chief witness, was a psychopathic personality type 
disposed to making false accusations. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). See Alistair Cooke, A GENERATION ON TRIAL: U.S.A. V. 
ALGER HISS 304-313 (1950); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to 
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra, 66 OREGON L. REV. at 46. 
And in United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1 st Cir. 1995), the court permitted a defense psychiatrist to testify that 
defendant suffered from a mental disorder (pseudologia fantastica) that had caused him to make grandiose but false 
statements implicating himself in a bomb plot. See also United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (district 
court erred in excluding expert psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's personality disorder which made him 
susceptible to giving false confession). On the related issue of voluntariness of a confession, see Com. v. Crawford, 
429 Mass. 60, 706 N.E.2d 289 (1999) (defendant entitled to present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome 
and PTSD to support claim she was incapable of resisting police interrogation).
218
 See, e.g., Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (ceramics expert 
erroneously allowed to testify that safety warnings were inadequate, when jurors could read them for themselves).
219
 See, e.g., Com. v. Perry, 432 Mass 214, 733 N.E.2d 83, 103 (Sup Jud Ct 2000) (& citations).  But see Com. v. 
Lord, 45 Mass App 931 (1998) (suggesting that defense counsel might have been permitted to offer expert testimony 
to explain the effects of Prozac on the memory of the victim).
220
 See Com. v. Ianello, 401 Mass 197, 199-203 (1987). The testimony had been offered by the accused, who argued 
unsuccessfully that mental health professionals had been able to document the phenomenon of false allegations in 
this context and that this subject mater was beyond the common knowledge of the average jury.  The Supreme 
Judicial Court viewed the testimony as “no more than the expert’s over-all impression of the truthfulness of 
members of a class (children in custody disputes) of which the specific complainant was a member,” noting that 
“[w]hile the proposed testimony fell short of rendering an opinion on the credibility of the specific child before the 
court, we see little difference in the final result.” 401 Mass at 201-202.  “It would be unrealistic to allow this type of 
expert testimony and then expect the jurors to ignore it when evaluating the credibility of the complaining child.  
Since we believe that Dr. Sacco’s opinion ultimately would have been applied to the child alleging sexual abuse, we 
rule that the judge was correct in excluding the expert testimony.  If the testimony had erroneously been allowed, 
Dr. Sacco would have impermissibly intruded upon the vital function of the jury.”  401 Mass at 202.  See also Com. 
v. Montanino, 409 Mass 500, 504, 567 NE2d 1212 (1991) (commanding officer of police department sexual assault 
unit should not have been permitted to testify that most victims reveal details of the assault only gradually over the 
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abuse,221 or women about rape.222 And virtually all jurisdictions prohibit a behavioral expert 
from testifying to the ultimate issue that a rape or assault occurred, whether based on consistency 
with a syndrome or interviews with the alleged victim.223
course of several interviews: “[T]here is little doubt that [the officer’s ]comments relating to the credibility of ‘most’ 
sexual assault victims would be taken by the jury as [his] endorsement of [the victim’s] credibility.”); Com. v. 
Bougas, 59 Mass App 368, 795 NE2d 1230 (2003) (exclusion of testimony that children embroiled in family 
controversy often fabricate allegations of sexual abuse).
State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982) permitted a child psychiatrist who had interviewed the 
thirteen-year-old complaining witness in a statutory rape case to testify that her conduct, account of the incident, and 
mental and emotional condition approximated that of other child rape victims he had interviewed.  Dr. Mann, 
qualified as an expert in pediatrics and child psychiatry, interviewed the complainant, her mother, and the accused, 
and testified as follows:
Q Based upon your experience, Dr. Mann, have you had an opportunity to-- in the past-- to assess the 
credibility of reported rape cases by children involving family members? 
  A Yes. 
  Q Approximately how many times have you done this? 
  A I would say about 70 times, 70 cases. 
  Q And, as a result of your interviews and examinations of these witnesses, have you arrived at conclusions 
with respect to the truthfulness of these reported rape cases involving family members? 
A Yes. 
  Q Upon what do you base your conclusions as to the credibility of such claims? 
  A There are several factors. One is the consistency of the account of the alleged sexual abuse. There are 
some common emotional reactions we frequently find in victims, which consists of a fear of safety, fear of 
future sexual abuse, feelings of depression or anxiety, embarrassment to have the alleged happenings 
known to peers or other people around them, a negative view of sex, some doubts that one parent might be 
strong enough to protect further sexual abuse. It's also important to see whether the mental status is
basically normal. That means there is no disturbing thinking. That memory functions are intact, and that 
there is a good sense of right or wrong or fairness and no excessive fantasizing. 
  Q Now, as a result of your experience and training in this area, did you come to the conclusion as to the 
truthfulness of the rape case reported by (the complainant) regarding the incident of July 2nd or 3rd, 1979? 
  A Yes. I found her account to be believable. 
  Q And was this a result of your interviewing not only (the complainant) but also the defendant and Mrs. 
Kim in this case? 
  A Yes. 
Q Now, in arriving at that conclusion, what factors did you consider? 
  A Many of the factors I listed before. I found (the complainant's) account quite consistent. She was very
much preoccupied with a fear of safety, which took on some almost phobic dimensions, telling me that she 
locked herself in her room and shut the windows when she was alone out of fear that the alleged might 
come back and she might be re-abused. She was quite depressed, showed a negative attitude to sex and 
seemed somewhat naive in sexual matters, which made it very unlikely that she would have fantasized acts 
in that specific manner.  Also sense of fairness, I think, made it unlikely that she would make up a story just 
to get back at somebody.
64 Hawaii at 600-601, 645 P.2d at 1333-1334.  But the court renounced Kim eight years later when it reversed a 
conviction where the clinical psychologist had been permitted to testify implicitly that the complainant was 
believable and had been abused.  State v. Batangan, 71 Hawaii. 552 (1990) (“[C]onclusory opinions that abuse did 
occur and that that child victim’s report of abuse is truthful and believable is of no assistance to the jury, and 
therefore, should not be admitted.”)  
221
 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 375-376, 537 N.W.2d 857, 869 (1995) (testimony that children lie about 
sexual abuse at a rate of only two percent, and that their veracity rate is eighty-five percent, was deemed improper 
vouching).
222
 State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Sup.Ct.Vt. 2000) (improper to permit expert to testify that false reporting rate for 
rape was only two percent).
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Even some of its strongest proponent’s concede that syndrome evidence potentially runs 
afoul of the prohibition against vouching for the credibility of another witness.224 Sometimes it is 
patently obvious, as in the trial where the following exchange occurred:
Q. Doctor, if you had those symptoms or some of those symptoms and a report by a child 
of sexual abuse, are you comfortable forming a diagnosis of child sexual abuse in such a 
case? 
A. I would base that diagnosis on the child's statements about what had happened to 
them.225
But many courts have recognized that syndrome and similar behavioral science evidence 
is likely to be perceived by the jury as underwriting the credibility of the witness in question
even when not so obviously presented. In fact, that is precisely the relevance of such 
testimony—“Unless the evidence is probative of credibility, it is utterly immaterial to any aspect 
of the case.”226 A few courts exclude syndrome evidence for the very reason that it may lead the
jury to abdicate responsibility and defer to the expert’s judgment on whom to believe.227 And 
psychotherapists, “who purport to know the workings of the human psyche, pose an even greater 
risk than other experts of jeopardizing the independent decision-making functions of the jury 
when they comment on witness credibility.”228 The concern (as the Vermont Supreme Court put 
it) is “that the psychological expert [may] be perceived by the jury as a ‘truth detector’—
223
 See, e.g., Com. v. Federico, 425 Mass 844, 849 (1997); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La. 1993); State v. 
Saldana, 324 N.W.3d 227, 230-231 ( Minn. 1982).  See also Pamela K. Sutherland and Delia J. Henderson, “Expert 
Psychiatrists and Comments on Witness Credibility,” TRIAL (July, 1998), at 83 (cases collected).    
224 See, e.g., David McCord, “Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility 
of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,” 66 OREGON L. REV. 19, 32-34 (1987). McCord, 
however, dismisses such concerns as “legal bromides [that] have diverted the legal system from a complete and 
correct analysis of the admissibility of [syndrome] evidence,” referring specifically to the phrases “invades the 
province of the jury” and “improper comment on witness credibility.”  In light of the centrality of the jury in our 
judicial system and our  rules  of evidence, this dismissal is perplexing.
For some empirical data suggesting that the risk of prejudicing the jury may be more potential than actual, 
see Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 133, 174-176 (1989).
225 United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). As the Tenth Circuit observed, an expert who 
bases her conclusion on the alleged victim’s allegations is merely vouching for the complainant’s credibility, which 
is impermissible. Id., at 1210. A clinical psychologist who had interviewed the child and her mother had also been 
allowed to testify that the child’s nightmares, bed-wetting, and angry outbursts were “consistent with” sexual abuse, 
and that she found no evidence that the child “was subject to either lying or overexaggerated fantasizing in her life.” 
Id., at 1211. The Tenth Circuit reserved judgment on this testimony as it remanded it for a reliability determination.
226
 Newkirk v. Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Sup.Ct.Ken. 1996) (excluding CSAAS testimony).
227
 See, e.g., State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tenn. 1993). 
228
 Pamela K. Sutherland and Delia J. Henderson, Expert Psychiatrists and Comments on Witness Credibility, 
TRIAL (July, 1998), at 83.  The writers continue that it “has not been demonstrated that the art of psychiatry has yet 
developed into a science so exact as to warrant such a basic intrusion into the jury process.”  Id. (citation omitted).
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someone who, by application of scientific method, determines whether the victim is telling the 
truth about whether the abuse occurred and the abuser’s identity.”229
Nonetheless, we have seen that syndrome evidence is widely admitted.  A few courts like 
the Supreme Court of Michigan admit it explicitly because it aids the jury resolve the credibility 
question (especially where the complaining witness has recanted her testimony): “To a jury 
recognizing the awesome dilemma of whom to believe, an expert will often represent the only 
seemingly objective source, offering it a much sought-after hook on which to hang its hat.” 230
Nearly all courts permit expert testimony about the common patterns of victim behavior
to serve a rehabilitative purpose when defendant seeks to impeach the complaining witness by 
showing delay in reporting, recantation, and the like.231 Some allow elaborate testimony on the
229
 State v. Wetherbee, 594 A.2d 390, 393 (Vt. 1991).  Sometimes the expert testimony operates overtly as a lie 
detector.  In State v. Pizzillo, 2002 WL 75936 (Ohio App. 2002), the court reversed a conviction after a trial in 
which a social worker who had interviewed the alleged minor victim was permitted to testify regarding the child’s 
initial denial that any abuse had occurred:
Ms. Cross then went on to explain how she managed to divine that the victim had been lying on June 16, 
2000: 
  "A. [The victim] was very difficult. She uh, her body language. She turned her back to me most of the 
time. Uh she was silent on a lot of the questions that I asked. Uh she was figidity. (sic) She just wanted me 
outa there, uh and eye contact was just awful. It was down. Uh never wanted to look at me. Just very angry 
that I was there and I knew by that she knew something, something was happening to her that she wanted to 
tell but she wanted me outa there because I was pressing." (Tr. p. 184). 
  While her ten years as a social worker may have allowed Ms. Cross to develop many skills, mind reading 
is not one of them.
2002 WL 75936, at 6.
230
 People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 721-722, 456 N.W.2d 391 (1990).  The characterization of a witness called by 
the prosecution, or indeed any litigant, as “objective” appears somewhat disingenuous.  And the court was 
apparently untroubled that when “the only evidence consists of the victim's accusation and the defendant's denial, 
expert testimony on the question of who to believe is nothing more than advice to jurors on how to decide the case.” 
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383, 728 P.2d 248, 253 (1986).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was similarly candid in ruling that expert testimony concerning 
battered woman syndrome was properly admitted in a sexual abuse trial precisely because it went to the veracity of 
the complaining witness:
A jury naturally would be puzzled at the complete about-face she made, and would have great 
difficulty in determining which version of Brave Bird's testimony it should believe. If there were some 
explanation for Brave Bird's changed statements, such explanation would aid the jury in deciding which 
statements were credible.
Maicky's expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome provided that explanation to 
the jury. As the witness told the jury, the syndrome is a psychological condition, which leads a female 
victim of physical abuse to accept her beatings because she believes that she is responsible for them, and 
hopes that by accepting one more beating, the pattern will stop. Maicky's testimony provided the jury with 
information that would help it to determine which of Brave Bird's testimony to credit. If the jury concluded 
that Brave Bird suffered from battered woman syndrome, that would explain her change in testimony--her 
unwillingness to say something damaging against her husband.
Arcoren v. U.S.,  929 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1991). 
231 See Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social 
Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85, 119-120, 130  (1989) (such evidence is universally 
admitted). See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 18 P.3d 1164, 1172 (Wy. 2001); People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 373-
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characteristics of “typical” abusive relationships, including the statistical national average for the 
number of times a woman goes back and forth before ultimately leaving.232 But not all 
jurisdictions limit admissibility to situations where the defendant opens the door by way of 
attempted impeachment, or to use for rehabilitative purposes only. Some will admit it as 
substantive evidence during the prosecution’s case-in-chief if the trial judge determines the 
victim’s conduct may be misinterpreted, notwithstanding defendant’s strategy.233
The Massachusetts’ courts struggle to define the “narrow”234 line between proper use of 
an expert and impermissible bolstering of credibility is representative. A qualified witness may 
testify to the general behavioral characteristics and common clinical phenomena of sexually 
abused children235 or other victims,236 but may not directly or indirectly refer to or compare the 
behavior of the specific complainant because that intrudes on the jury’s province of assessing 
credibility.237 The decisional law emphasizes that:
It is one thing to educate the jury to understand that child abuse victims may act in 
counter-intuitive ways, and that excessive weight should not be given to factors such as 
failure to disclose when the child victim's credibility is weighed. It is quite another to 
suggest to the jury that the events and feelings expressed by the child witnesses are the 
same as those experienced by other victims of abuse. That this has the effect of 
buttressing the witnesses' credibility seems impossible to deny.238
374, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868 (1995); State v. Cressey 137 N.H. at 412, 628 A.2d at 702-703 (1993) (& citations); State 
v. Jensen, 147 Wis.2d 240, 251-252, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (1988).  But compare Newkirk v. Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 
690, 693 (Sup.Ct.Ken. 1996) (expert testimony that it is common for children to report sexual abuse and then retract 
such allegations was not admissible as rebuttal evidence to respond to defendant's evidence that alleged ten-year-old 
victim had recanted accusations against defendant).  
232
 See State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 245 (Iowa 2001). The witness, a supervisor in the Sexual Assault and 
Domestic Violence Abuse Advocacy Program, told the jury that abused women try seven times before finally 
leaving, and that statistically she is in the most danger when she tries to leave. Id.
233
 See, e.g., Mindombe v. U.S., 795 A.2d 39, 44-48 (D.C. Ct Appeals 2002) (& cases collected); People v. Peterson, 
450 Mich  349, 373-374, 537 N.W.2d 857, 868 (1995); Minnesota v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Sup.Ct. 
Minn. 1997) (battered woman syndrome testimony can come in during prosecution’s case-in-chief).  For civil cases 
see S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 920-922 (9th Cir. 2001); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.Supp. 1055 (E.D.Mich. 
1995).
234
 Com. v. Rather, 37 Mass App 140, 148  (1994).
235
 See  Com. v. Dockham, 405 Mass 618 (1989).
236
 See Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass App 163, 175-176 (1983) (rape trauma syndrome testimony that it would 
“not necessarily” be remarkable for a rape victim to return to the scene with her attacker or to feel safe in his 
company after the event).
237
 See Com. v. Federico, 425 Mass 844, 849 (1997) ( & citations); Com. v. Rather, 37 Mass App 140, 147-148 
(1994). See also Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We think Dr. B***’'s testimony may have crossed the 
line in commenting upon the plaintiff's credibility. Dr. B*** did not limit her testimony to psychological literature 
or experience or to a discussion of a class of victims generally. Rather, she came perilously close to testifying that 
this particular victim/witness could be believed.”); United States v. Rosales, 19 F.3d 763, 766 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Dr. 
Slicner's testimony sent an implicit message to the jury that the children had testified truthfully, and this might 
therefore have interfered with the jury's function as the sole assessor of witness credibility.).
238
 Com. v. Deloney, 59 Mass. App. 47, 59, 794 NE2d 613, 623 (2003) (citations omitted).
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The witness must not have actually examined or treated the child because the risk of 
impermissible vouching is obviously highest there.239 And when the expert is asked to respond to 
hypothetical questions, care must be taken not to suggest that the expert has concluded that the 
complainant is telling the truth.240
239
 In Com. v. McCaffrey, 36 Mass. App. 583, 591-592 , 633 N.E.2d 1062, 1067-1068 (1994), the  psychologist 
first testified that she counseled sexually abused children and that such children exhibit certain general 
behavioral characteristics. She then was permitted to testify, over McCaffrey's objections, that Erin was 
currently her patient; that she had been treating Erin for about a year; that at the beginning of the therapy 
Erin had revealed that she had been sexually abused by her father; and that Erin had been placed in therapy 
groups for sexually abused children. The expert further described Erin's conduct during the early course of 
treatment in terms that the jury could not have failed to note resembled the behavior the expert had earlier 
testified to as characteristic of sexually abused children. … 
Allowing the psychologist here to testify as both behavioral expert and treating therapist may well have 
approached too closely the forbidden issue of the victim's credibility. The fact that she had accepted Erin as 
a patient to be treated as a sexually abused child could easily give rise to the jury's inference that she had 
accepted Erin's allegations against her father as true and was providing her professional services as a result, 
thereby endorsing Erin's credibility as a victim of parental sexual molestation.
See also Com. v. Rather, 37 Mass App 140, 148 (1994). For a similar approach in other jurisdictions, see Nixon v. 
United States, 728 A.2d 582, 592 (Dis.Col.Ct Appls. 1999) (collecting cases). Some courts have merely cautioned 
judges to “carefully scrutinize the treating professional’s ability to aid the trier of fact” given the inevitable 
“emotional inclination toward protecting  the child victim.”  People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 1990).  
240
 The following questions posed by the prosecution to its psychiatric expert were found to create an unacceptable 
risk of vouching for the credibility of the complaining witness:
Q.: "I would ask you to assume for purposes of this hypothetical, Doctor, that two sisters living with their 
mother and stepfather had sexual relations with the stepfather on a regular basis since the ages of twelve 
and nine. Further assume that neither sister disclosed those relations for six years while it was ongoing. I 
would ask you further to assume that at age fifteen the younger sister disclosed the sexual activity to her 
mother the following day on which the stepfather had intercourse with her in the afternoon and in the 
evening scolded her, yelled at her, and lectured her for failing to fold towels and finish dishes in the sink. 
  I would ask you further to assume that the morning after that incident, the fifteen-year-old girl became 
upset and told her mother the Defendant had been having sexual relations with her for years. Do you have 
an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to whether or not those assumed facts are 
consistent with the girl who had been having sexual relations with an adult since the age of approximately 
nine-and-a-half?"
Based on that hypothetical question, Dr. B*** opined as follows: 
  "Well, I have described the circumstances in which the sexual relations can be maintained as a secret for a 
very long time. Then, comes the question about what the circumstances are under which a child who has 
had ongoing sexual relations will tell someone about it. 
  Those circumstances can include, first of all, a child growing up and growing into adolescence and having 
a changed awareness of what their situation is, that more and more they might have wishes to have 
relationships outside the family. To the extent that they are limited in doing that and having sexual 
relationships within the family, that can become more and more bothersome to a child and create more 
conflict. 
  It is often in the context of a family argument and anger that a child will, for the first time, tell someone 
about what has happened. Also, I think that what you described in terms of the child having sexual 
relationships at one point in time and then being reprimanded for not folding clothes in the proper sort of 
way, I think there can be a lot of strong feelings, a lot of conflict about, on the one hand, being treated in a 
more adult fashion; on the other hand, being reprimanded as a child or a servant, that can give rise to anger. 
The anger in some way can counteract the fears that have led a child to keep the sexual relations secret. 
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Some courts discount the danger of intruding on the jury’s prime function where the 
expert is limited to testimony that the alleged victim exhibited symptoms and behavior 
“consistent with” those of abused children.241 But others see no meaningful difference between 
this and testimony that, in the expert’s opinion, the children were sexually abused.242  “Where a 
  I think that by virtue of the argument, the anger, a child going into adolescence, that those are the kinds of 
circumstances in which it is very typical that a child might for the first time disclose a secret that they have 
been keeping for many years."
Com. v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 853, 683 N.E.2d 1035, 1041-1042. Similar testimony was found to have crossed 
the line in Com. v. Rather, 37 Mass App 140, 143-145 (1994):
"Q. Ms. Tempesta [Therapist called by the defense to contradict the victim’s testimony about the 
specific alleged abuse. On cross-examination by the prosecutor:]
I would like you for the following three questions to make an assumption. Assume that you have a 
child under the age of ten who has been sexually abused, physically abused, and threatened with 
severe bodily harm if the child discloses that abuse. My first question is, do you have an opinion 
to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty as to whether it is uncommon for such a child to 
fail to disclose that abuse for a substantial period of time?
"A. I think a child who has been sexually abused and who has been threatened with bodily harm 
would have a very difficult time disclosing the abuse at all. And quite often children who have 
experienced that type of abuse and those types of threats very often do not disclose. When they do 
disclose they normally disclose in stages.
241
 In State v. Jensen, 147 Wis.2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988), for example, the complainant’s school guidance 
counselor (who happened to be the first person told of the alleged assault) was permitted to testify, as an expert on 
sexually abused children, that the “acting out behavior” of the victim was “consistent with children who are victims 
of sexual abuse” and a “red flag” or “indicator” of abuse. 147 Wis.2d at 246, 432 N.W.2d at 916. See cases collected 
at Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir.1992); State v. Chauvin, 846 So.2d 697, 704-706 (La. 2003); 
State v. Steward, 652 N.E.2d 490, 495-498 (Ind. 1995).. See also United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1006 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("victimologist" allowed to testify that alleged victim’s behavior in not seeking to escape was consistent 
with someone held in involuntary servitude).
242 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 407, 628 A.2d 696, 699-700 (1993). See also State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 385, 
728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986) (“the [impermissible] inference offered the jury is that because this victim’s personality 
and behavior are consistent with a molest having occurred, the crime must have been committed.”). See also People 
v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 376, 537 N.W.2d 857, 869 (1995); State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 582, 617 A.2d 1196 
(1993).  The Massachusetts courts have detected no meaningful distinction in a related context. See Com. v. Day, 
409 Mass. 719, 725, 569 N.E.2d 397, 400 (1991) (“The fact that Dr. Newberger did not specifically state that the 
defendant fit the profile is not significant, since a reasonable jury could have inferred that the Commonwealth was 
implying that the defendant fit the ‘child battering profile,’ and, as a result, that the defendant was responsible for 
the child's fatal injuries.”).
In his dissent in People v. Peterson, supra, Justice Cavanagh argued for use of the phrase that the child’s 
behavior was “not inconsistent with” sexual abuse instead of the familiar affirmative “consistent with” testimony:
 “C]onsistent with" testimony is fundamentally different from testimony that a given set of behavioral 
reactions are not inconsistent with child sexual abuse. "Not inconsistent" is rebuttal-type testimony; it 
merely states that it could be true. "Consistent with" is positive testimony that it is true. "Not inconsistent" 
testimony can convey to the jury all the information that it needs to assess the issues in the case.
 To illustrate, suppose the facts of the case indicate that the child has withdrawn, is exhibiting severe 
depression, initially reported the abuse to a school counselor, but has now recanted her story in fear that her 
stepfather- abuser will be taken away from the family, and her mother will be very sad. This information 
will be placed before the jury by the child's own testimony or through witnesses with personal knowledge 
of the child's behavior. If the defense then focuses on the recantation and argues that her initial allegations 
were made in retaliation or rebellion to house rules, an expert could testify that child sexual abuse victims 
have been known to withdraw, become depressed, and recant their allegations when they realize that the 
family may be torn apart. If appropriate, the prosecutor could pose a hypothetical question to the expert 
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jury is confronted with evidence of an alleged child victim's behaviors, paired with expert 
testimony concerning similar syndrome behaviors, the invited inference-- that the child was 
sexually abused because he or she fits the syndrome profile-- will be as potentially misleading 
and equally as unreliable as expert testimony applying the syndrome to the facts of the case and 
stating outright the conclusion that a given child was abused.”243  As another court summed it up:
An expert witness may not testify that a defendant is guilty. When, as in this case, an 
expression of opinion as to credibility is the equivalent of an opinion as to guilt or 
innocence, it is of no consequence that the testimony was presented in a general manner 
rather than as specific to the case or on rebuttal rather than as evidence in chief.244
Syndrome and other behavioral science evidence clearly presents us with a quandary. The 
more general the expert’s testimony, the less intrusive into jury’s traditional role, but also the 
less helpful in resolving disputed facts.  Conversely, the more specific the testimony the more 
helpful, but the greater the risks the jury will defer to the expert’s judgment. Resolving this
dilemma against the admission of such testimony, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
concluded:
In the final analysis, the reason for the delay [in reporting by the victim] must be 
ascertained by the jury and is based on the credibility of the child and the attendant 
circumstance of each case. We believe that the evidence presented through the fact 
witnesses, coupled with an instruction to the jury that they should consider the reasons 
why the child did not come forward, including the age and circumstances of the child in 
the case, are sufficient to provide the jury with enough guidance to make a determination 
of the importance of prompt complaint in each case. Not only is there no need for 
testimony about the reasons children may not come forward, but permitting it would 
infringe upon the jury's right to determine credibility.245
Various devices have been proposed over the years to determine the truthfulness of a 
subject’s account, ranging from “truth serum” to polygraphs that measure blood pressure and 
pulse to counting the rate of eye blinks.246 But even if we were satisfied with the scientific 
reliability of a particular method, it is inconceivable that we would permit its use at trial to test 
paralleling the facts of the case, and ask whether such testimony is "inconsistent with" sexual abuse 
behavioral reactions. The expert could reply, "No, it is not inconsistent." At that point, the jury has all of 
the information that it needs to evaluate the child's credibility. 
450 Mich. at 388-389, 537 N.W.2d at 874-875.
243
 Steward v. State, 652 NE2d 490, 499(1995). 
244 Newkirk v. Com., 937 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Sup.Ct.Ken. 1996).
245
 Com. v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 183, 602 A.2d 830, 837 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony.  As Judge Easterbrook explained (in a case excluding 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification):
Jurors may believe that witnesses who hesitate, perspire, or fidget during cross-
examination are hiding the truth. This is the view that underlies polygraph examinations, 
but without the precision of measurement. Is it true? Calm and collected liars deceive 
polygraph examiners (and thus jurors too); other witnesses grow restless or testy although 
they have nothing to hide. Suppose one of the litigants offers an expert in physiology to 
explain to jurors the (weak) correlation between lying and the appearance of discomfort 
on the stand. Or an expert in group dynamics to explain to a potential dissenter on the 
jury how to resist the pressure of the majority to go along-- or for that matter how to see 
through lawyers' rhetorical tricks. Because trials rest on so many contestable empirical 
propositions, including those about eyewitness recollection, it always would be possible 
to offer expert evidence along these and related lines.
Yet a trial about the process of trials not only would divert attention from the 
main question (did Hall kill Jessica Roach?) and substantially lengthen the process but 
also would not do much to improve the accuracy of the outcome. Social science evidence 
is difficult to absorb; the idea of hypothesis formulation and testing is alien to most 
persons. That's one reason why the training of social scientists is so extended. Delivering 
a graduate level statistical-methods course to jurors is impractical, yet without it a barrage 
of expert testimony may leave the jurors more befuddled than enlightened. Many lawyers 
think that experts neutralize each other, leaving the jurors where they were before the 
process began. Many lawyers think that the best (= most persuasive) experts are those 
who have taken acting lessons and have deep voices, rather than those who have done the 
best research. Perhaps that is too pessimistic a view; but then the effect of experts is itself 
a question open to empirical inquiry, which might be added to the agenda for trial.247
Easterbrook’s astute observations should give equal pause regarding the admission of 
syndrome evidence.
C. Probative Value and Prejudicial Harm: The FRE 403 Calculus
“The teaching of the evidence doctrine is that unreliable scientific testimony creates a 
serious and unjustifiable risk of an erroneous verdict, and that the adversary process at 
its best does not remove this risk.”248
The potential risks of expert testimony have been widely acknowledged.  The Daubert
Court noted: 
246
 See “Blinking Indicates Stess,” NEWSWEEK October 21, 1996  (reporting on work of Boston College 
Proefessor Joseph Tecci).  A summary of Professor Tecce’s work can be found in  McGraw-Hill Yearbook of 
Science & Technology (6th ed. 1992), at 375-377.
247
 U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119-1120 (7th Cir. 1999)  (Easterbrook, concurring).
248
 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by he danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury … .”  Judge Weinstein has explained: “Expert evidence can be both powerful and 
quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of this risk, the judge 
in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules 
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”249
As discussed above, the probative value of behavioral science evidence (especially 
syndrome testimony) is often questionable, and a few courts have even excluded it on grounds of 
relevancy “for failure to make the existence of any fact of consequence more probable or less 
probable than it would have been without the evidence.”250 If the symptoms associated with a 
particular syndrome also appear with frequency in the population generally, the testimony adds
little to the resolution of the dispute.251 Moreover, since the diagnosis of disorders like PTSD and 
CSASS is based in part on the victim’s version of events, there is a troubling circularity to the 
logic of this evidence.252 Someone once warned that “low probative worth can often be 
concealed in the jargon of some expert."253
On the other side of the FRE 403 balance, the risk of jury overvaluation (which the 
common law handled clumsily by operation of the now discredited “ultimate issue” rule254) 
pervades the evidentiary rules controlling opinion testimony. The concern is particularly acute 
for testimony carrying a scientific aura,255 but has been identified as well in the case of non-
scientific clinically-based testimony.256 Moreover the very terminology used by the witness such 
249
 509 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted).  See also Usher v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 413-414 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (federal courts have enhanced authority under Daubert to exclude expert opinion under 403).
250 Newkirk v. Com., 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Sup.Ct.Ken. 1996).
251 Id.
252
 Thornton, “State v. Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome Diagnosis as 
Substantive Evidence of Sexual Abuse,” 78 Tulane L.Rev. 1743, 1751-1752 (2004) (& citations). Battered women 
syndrome, for example, is a “history-driven diagnosis,” depending on the accuracy of perception of the very person 
who was abused. Michael Welner, “Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How  Courts Get Shortchanged,” 
24 Pace L. Rev. 193, 205 (2003). Similarly the behavioral characteristics of CSAAS “assume abuse rather than 
provide evidence of it.” Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological 
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2039-2040 (1994).
253
 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5217, at 295 (1978).
254
 See FRE 704 and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes.
255
 “[A] certain patina attaches to an expert’s testimony unlike any other witness; this is ‘science,’ a professional’s 
judgment, the jury may think, and give more credence to the testimony than it may deserve.”  U.S. v. Hines, 55 
F.Supp.2d 62, 64 (D.MA. 1999).  See also U. S. v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979) (excluding proffered 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification because, inter alia, it would raise a substantial danger of unfair 
prejudice given the aura of reliability that surrounds scientific evidence).
256
 See Krauss & Sales, The Problem of “Helpfulness” in Applying Daubert to Expert Testimony: Child Custody 
Determinations in Family Law as an Exemplar,” 5 Psychol., Pub. Poli. and Law 78, 87 (1999). Justice Blackmun 
referred to “the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words” in the eyes of an impressionable jury. 
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as rape trauma syndrome or battered woman syndrome may itself unfairly prejudice the 
defendant’s case.257
In excluding expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification despite its impressive 
scientific foundation,258 courts have worried that the "minimal probative value of the proffered 
expert testimony is outweighed by the danger of juror confusion."259 Such testimony has the 
potential to confuse and mislead the jury and create “prolonged trials by battles of experts.”260
Several courts have similarly concluded regarding syndrome testimony: 
Permitting a person in the role of an expert to suggest that because the 
complainant exhibits some of the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the complainant 
was therefore raped, unfairly prejudices the appellant by creating an aura of special 
reliability and trustworthiness. Since jurors of ordinary abilities are competent to consider 
the evidence and determine whether the alleged crime occurred, the danger of unfair 
prejudice outweighs any probative value. To allow such testimony would inevitably lead 
to a battle of experts that would invade the jury's province of fact-finding and add 
confusion rather than clarity.261
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (dissenting).  He continued: “Indeed, unreliable scientific evidence is 
widely acknowledged to be prejudicial. The reasons for this are manifest. The major danger of scientific evidence is 
its potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to 
accept it without critical scrutiny. Where the public holds an exaggerated opinion of the accuracy of scientific 
testimony, the prejudice is likely to be indelible.”  Id., at 926-927 (citations & internal quotations omitted).
257
 Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 133, 143 (1989) (& citations).
258
 See text accompanying n. 111, et.seq.
259
 See U.S. v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996). 
260
 U.S. v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, *277  (1st Cir. 1995).
261
 State v. Saldana, 324 NW2d 227, 230 (Minn.1982).  See also State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 561-562 (Tenn. 
1993) (“This 'special aura' of expert scientific testimony, especially testimony concerning personality profiles of 
sexually abused children, may lead a jury to abandon its responsibility as a fact finder and adopt the judgment of the 
expert.”); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 405, 628 A.2d 696, 698 (1993) (“The reliability of evidence is of special 
concern when offered through expert testimony because such testimony involves the potential risks that a jury may 
disproportionately defer to the statements of an expert if the subject area is beyond the common knowledge of the 
average person, and that a jury may attach extra importance to an expert’s opinion simply because it is given with 
the air of authority that commonly accompanies an expert’s testimony.”); State of Minnesota v. Grecinger, 569 
N.W.2d 189, 198 (Sup.Ct. Minn. 1997) (Stringer, J, concurring) (“The admission of the expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome could have a profound influence on the jury in its determination as to whom to believe on the 
basic issue of whether the battering occurred at all-- even though the court prohibited the expert witness from 
testifying as to whether the complainant was in fact a battered woman. The right to a presumption of innocence 
would soon be an empty epithet unless the trial court exercises extraordinary vigilance in applying Rule 403 under 
circumstances such as we have here, where guilt or innocence turns solely on which of two accounts to believe, and 
expert testimony, that arguably implies that the criminal conduct charged actually did occur, is offered to explain 
inconsistent conduct by the complainant. Careful inquiry must be made under Rule 403 as to all aspects of the need 
for, and value of, the expert testimony as rehabilitative of the witness' credibility and its helpfulness to the jury, and 
these factors must be balanced against the clear potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.”).
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The concern is that the expert’s credentials will displace the jury’s own common sense and 
intuition about the way people behave in certain circumstances.262
The danger of jury overvaluation is particularly acute where the expert  presents his or 
her testimony with great confidence and assurance. In the notorious trial of John Hendrickson, 
convicted of murdering his wife Maria in Albany, N.Y. in 1853, the crucial evidence of guilt 
came from three young doctors who testified they had devised a method of identifying the 
presence of a poison previously undetectable by medical science. The evidence was ultimately 
discredited by practitioners, but unfortunately for Hendrickson not until after he was convicted 
and hanged.263 A prominent pathologist observed at the time that the “confident and positive“
demeanor of the prosecution witnesses carried more weight with the jury than the more 
considered and scientifically reliable testimony of the defense experts: “foolhardy confidence 
seemed to triumph over professional caution.”264
It has been argued that the risk of overestimation of psychological testimony has been 
exaggerated, particularly since human behavior (unlike the opaque box of DNA science) is not a 
subject foreign to jurors.265 And certainly some of the risk can be addressed in obvious ways, as 
262
 See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law 
& Contemporary Problems 133, 142 (1989). Social framework evidence is also likely to have some “spillover 
effects” on all the other evidence heard by the jury, causing jurors to credit the complainant’s credibility and moral 
character. Id., at 148, 160. See also Robert R. Lawrence, “Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings,” 70 Virginia L. Rev. 1657, 
1700-1702 (1984).
263
 James C. Mohr, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 122-139 (1993).
264 Id., at 134 (citation omitted). Mock jurors have similarly been found more willing to convict on basis of confident 
eyewitnesses than fingerprint evidence. See Elizabeth Loftus, “Psychological Aspects of Courtroom Testimony,” 
347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 27, 32-33 (1980).
265
 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond conclude that “[e]mpirical data do not support a view that juries are 
passive, too-credulous, incompetent, and overawed by the mystique of the expert.” See “Juries and Expert 
Evidence,” 66 Brooklyn L.Rev. 1121, 1180 (2001). They reviewed the research on the various forms of social 
framework evidence and found that jurors used it “by incorporating the information into their decision-making 
processes. However, the jurors were not seduced by it. They critically evaluated the information and did not accord 
it an unwarranted aura of trustworthiness and reliability or allow the expert's opinion to substitute for their own 
judgment. In addition, the accumulated data from the studies showed only a very modest spillover effect on the way 
the jurors evaluated other evidence in the case, including judgments about the credibility or character of other 
witnesses.” Id., at 1166. See also Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social 
Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 166-176 (1989) (reviewing studies of the impact 
of expert testimony on jurors, several concluding they do not generally suspend judgment in deference to expert 
testimony); Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 2095-2096 (1994) (& citations). More generally see 
Imwinkelreid, “The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique form the Perspective of Juror 
Psychology,” 28 Vill L Rev 554, 566-68 (review of studies showing jurors are not overly influenced by scientific 
proof); Scott Sundby, “The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay 
testimony,” 83 Va.L.Rev. 1109 (1997); American Bar Association Report of a Special Committee of the ABA 
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for example by not referring to witness as “expert” in front of the jury.266 Nonetheless, as Justice 
Blackmun noted in his dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle,267 there is considerable evidence that 
suggests that juries “are not effective at assessing the validity of scientific evidence.”268
Boilerplate instructions to the jury regarding the assessment of expert testimony could very well 
exacerbate the problem.269
Moreover, the adversary system cannot be counted on to reveal the defects in behavioral
testimony because it rests on “psychiatric categories and intuitive clinical judgments not 
susceptible to cross-examination and rebuttal.”270 Even skilled opposing counsel may have 
difficulty exposing the flaws because as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized, the 
methodology used in psychological evaluations often puts the evidence “effectively beyond 
reproach.”271  The conclusions of the expert 
do not rest on one particular indicator or symptom, but rather on [the] interpretation of all 
the factors and information before her. So even though the defendant may be able to 
discredit several of the indicators, symptoms, or test results, the expert’s overall opinion 
is likely to emerge unscathed. An expert using this methodology may candidly 
acknowledge any inconsistencies or potential shortcomings in the individual pieces of 
evidence she presents, but can easily dismiss the critique by saying that her evaluation 
relies on no one symptom or indicator and that her conclusions still hold true in light of 
all the other available factors and her expertise in the field. In such a case, the expert’s 
conclusions are as impenetrable as they are unverifiable.272
Chief Justice Warren Burger observed nearly forty years ago: 
The very nature of the adversary system ... complicates the use of scientific opinion 
evidence, particularly in the field of psychiatry. This system of partisan contention, of 
Litigation Section, Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases 40-43 (1989) (noting examples where juries rejected 
expert testimony as hired gun evidence). For a brief survey of the empirical studies on juror comprehension of 
expert proof, see Imwinkelreid & Schleuter, “Evidentiary Tactics: Selecting the ‘Best’ Evidence to Simplify the 
Case,” Criminal Justice, Summer, 2004, at 24-25. 
266
 See Charles R Richey, “Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word “Expert” Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials,” 154 F.R.D. 537 (1994).
267
 See text accompanying n. 98, et.seq.
268
 463 U.S. 880, 929 (citation omitted). 
269
 By way of example: 
Your power with regard to an expert witness is exactly the same as it is with regard to a lay witness. You 
may accept what an expert witness says, you may accept the opinion of an expert witness, you may reject 
the opinion of an expert witness, you may accept it in part and reject it in part. It's entirely up to you to deal 
with that evidence as you are persuaded to deal with it. But it is offered because, in the general run of 
things, you would not be expected to have the special knowledge that the expert has.
Com. v. Rather, 37 Mass App 140, 146-147  (1994) (emphasis added).
270 Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, 463 U.S. at 931 (dissenting).
271
 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 409-410, 628 A.2d 696, 701-702 (1993).
272
 State v. Cressey, supra, 137 N.H. at 409-410, 628 A.2d at 701-702.
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attack and counterattack, at its best is not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait 
or profile of the human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior. 
Although under ideal conditions the adversary system can develop for a jury most of the 
necessary fact material for an adequate decision, such conditions are rarely achieved in 
the courtrooms in this country. These ideal conditions would include a highly skilled and 
experienced trial judge and highly skilled lawyers on both sides of the case, all of whom 
in addition to being well-trained in the law and in the techniques of advocacy would be 
sophisticated in matters of medicine, psychiatry, and psychology. It is far too rare that all 
three of the legal actors in the cast meet these standards.273
In certain trials expert testimony is obviously essential in order for the factfinder to reach 
a rational decision on the issues in dispute.  Neither a lay jury nor judge untrained in medicine 
could determine whether a highly sophisticated surgical procedure had been performed 
competently or negligently, or whether a nurse had deliberately killed her patients by injections 
that sent their hearts into “accelerated ideo-ventricular rhythm.”274 But in many trials in which 
social science evidence is offered it serves a collateral role, such as explaining the behavior of a 
witness which (it is feared) may otherwise be misinterpreted by the jury. Given this more 
tangential function there is serious question about whether its probative value outweighs the 
downside risks, including distraction from the actual issues in dispute to a focus on the expert’s 
pedigree, poise and presentation.  As Justice Cavanagh observed:
The marginal probative value of allowing the [behavioral] expert to further testify with 
respect to the particular complainant is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice that the jury will misuse the testimony. It invades the province of the jury to 
assess credibility.  It invites the jury to give undue weight to testimony that is 
foundationally and fundamentally unreliable merely because it is cloaked with the 
273
 Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 Fed.Prob. 3, 6 (June 1964).  See also Stephen J, Morse, “Carzy 
Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law,” 51 S.Cal.L.Rev.527, 626 (1978) (“Many of the 
cases are not truly adversarial; too few attorneys are skilled at cross-examining psychiatrists, laypersons overweigh 
the testimony of experts, and, in any case, unrestricted use of experts promotes the incorrect view that the questions 
are primarily scientific.”).
274 See “Life, Death, and Uncertainty to the Judge in Charge, the Murder Trial of Kristin Gilbert,” by Hon. Michael 
A. Ponsor, Boston Sunday Globe, July 8, 2001, p. D2  (2001 WL 3941573). As the Seventh Circuit has explained:
Suppose, for example, it were relevant for a jury to decide whether a person's use of foul or abusive 
language was intended to harm another person. Most of the time, the jury would be able to assess the 
circumstances without the need for expert testimony, since foul language is an unfortunate part of everyday 
life. In some cases, however, the individual might be suffering from Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, 
which is a rare disorder manifested by grimaces, grunts, and in about half of all cases, episodes of the use 
of foul language. A defendant wishing to explain his behavior by showing that he had Tourette's syndrome 
would need expert testimony both on the condition itself and his own affliction. In other cases, the question 
whether a person has voluntarily joined certain activity may be central. If a possible explanation is that the 
person is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, the jury would need expert testimony to allow it to 
take this possibility into account.
United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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expertise of an expert. It also invites the jury to believe that the expert knows more than 
he is telling, by letting the jurors infer that the expert, who works with sexually abused 
children every day, must believe this child's story or else the expert would not be 
testifying.275
Since abuse cases often come down to a credibility contest between the accused and the 
alleged victim, it is acknowledged that expert behavioral testimony presented by the prosecution 
may very well be determinative,276 and its impact has been empirically documented as producing 
significantly more guilty verdicts (particularly where the testimony refers specifically to the 
victim in the case, and where no opposing defense expert is presented).277 And admitting social 
science evidence of dubious reliability on the untested assumption that it is necessary to 
counteract jurors’ false beliefs about victims may, ultimately, result in the substitution of another 
set of false beliefs, this time coming from the “expert.”278
Where the defendant himself has initiated a significant attack on the credibility of the 
complaining witness by emphasizing behavior like delayed reporting or recantation,279 the 
275 People v. Peterson, 450 Mich. 349, 391, 537 N.W.2d 857, 875-876  (1995) (dissenting). See also United States v. 
Kime, 99 F3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
276 See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, “The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,” 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2028 (1994); Mary Ann Dutton, “Impact of Evidence 
Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials Involving Battered Women” (1994) and Janet Parrish, 
“Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases “(1994), at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid/.
In ruling that the admission of expert testimony from two prosecution witnesses was not harmless error, 
one circuit recognized that where there is little evidence beyond than that of the victim’s allegations, such testimony 
is likely to have a substantial effect on the trial’s outcome. See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1212  (10th
Cir. 2000).  Along similar lines, the court in Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th
Cir. 2002), amended 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003), observed: “Dr. Wellman drew the inference of discrimination for 
the jury in a case otherwise based entirely on less-than-convincing circumstantial evidence. Thus, it is hard for us to 
see how Dr. Wellman's testimony, which addressed the central issue of Elsayed's case, was harmless; rather it ‘more 
probably than not was the cause of the result reached.’" 299 F.3d 1068.
277
 See Margaret Kovera, Robert Levy, Eugene Borgida, & Steven Penrod, “Expert Testimony in Child Abuse 
Cases,” 18 Law & Human Behavior 653 (1994); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: 
Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 158-160 (1989) (rape trauma syndrome); 
Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social 
Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85, 91 (1989). See also Regina A. Schuller, “The Impact 
of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence on Jury Decision Processes,” 16 Law & Human Behavior 597 (1992) 
(defense offer of such evidence in support of self-defense leads to moderate increase in favorable defendant’s 
verdicts).
278
 See Robert P. Mosteller, “Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social 
Framework Evidence,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 85, 92  (1989).
279
 In Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582 (Dis.Col.Ct Appls. 1999), for example, defense counsel persistently 
argued that the complainant’s testimony was not credible because for a long period she failed to report, and even 
denied, the alleged abuse, and that this conduct belied her allegations. He pursued this line during his opening, cross 
of the complainant, and closing. 728 A.2d at 590.
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balance may shift in favor of allowing testimony explaining in general terms why such behavior
is not inconsistent with abuse. Even in this situation, however, the testimony should meet 
minimal Daubert/ Kumho Tire standards, and great care must be taken to avoid expert 
pronouncements about the particular victim.280 Given that FRE 403 protects a litigant only from
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, reliable rebuttal evidence from a qualified expert restricted
to educating the jury regarding the behavior of abuse victims would not appear to fall into that 
category.281 In all other contexts, FRE 403 should generally screen out syndrome testimony.
IV. Costs and Benefits of Admitting Behavioral Science Evidence
One might ask: Even if there are troubling issues regarding the use of social science in 
the courtroom, what is the harm in admitting it for whatever value it has to the factfinder?
In this regard it is instructive to note that the Federal Judicial Center survey282 of judges 
and attorneys found that the problem most frequently cited by both groups regarding expert 
testimony was that “experts abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired 
them,” followed closely by the “excessive expense” of expert witnesses. Other recurrent 
observations were that the conflict among the experts at trial often “defies reasoned assessment,” 
and the “disparity in level of competence of opposing experts.” All of these concerns should 
inform our assessment of social science evidence in the courtroom.
Illustrative of the cost/benefit issues are several employment discrimination cases in 
which social science evidence was utilized.283  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,284 Ann Hopkins 
But as one judge has aptly warned, “simple cross-examination will disclose some inconsistencies in the 
child's testimony. This leaves the defendant the dubious decision of either not cross examining the child witness or 
cross examining the child witness, thereby allowing the State to pull its ‘expert’ out of the hat to testify that each 
inconsistency the child gave is typical of a sexually abused child.”  Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 923 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (Teague, dissenting).
280
 “Once the jury has learned the victim's behavior from the evidence and has heard experts explain why sexual 
abuse may cause delayed reporting, inconsistency, or recantation, we do not believe the jury needs an expert to 
explain that the victim's behavior is consistent or inconsistent with the crime having occurred.” State v. Moran, 151 
Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (1986).
281 As one court put it, “[syndrome] evidence may harm defendant's interests, but we cannot say it is unfairly
prejudicial; it merely informs jurors that commonly held assumptions are not necessarily accurate and allows them 
to fairly judge credibility.” State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 728 P.2d 248, 251 (1986). See also  Steward v. State, 
652 NE2d 490, 499 (Ind. 1995). But compare State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 576, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984)  
(marginal benefit of child abuse expert testimony is insufficient to outweigh substantial prejudice to defendant).
282
 Johnson, Krafka, & Cecil, Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials: A Preliminary Analysis (Federal Judicial 
Center  2000) (www.fjc.gov.), at  p.6.
283
 See generally Jane Goodman & Robert T. Croyle, “Social Framework Testimony in Employment Discrimination 
Cases,” 7 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 227 (1989).
284
 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  
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asserted that her accounting firm employer had denied partnership because of gender. Her 
evidence established what the Court characterized (in understatement) as “clear signs” of gender 
bias—to wit, comments from the partners’ evaluations that described Hopkins as “macho,” as  “a 
lady using foul language,” as someone who needed to take “a course at charm school” and who 
had “matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, 
formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr candidate.”285  An influential partner had advised 
Hopkins that she could improve her chances for promotion if she would “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
jewelry.”286 Together with the statistical picture-- 662 partners at the firm, only 7 of whom were 
women; of the 88 persons proposed for partnership that year, only plaintiff was female-- and 
Hopkin’s very impressive record of success at the firm (including a $25 million contract with the 
Department of State that she had secured), this made for a compelling case of discrimination.
Yet the centerpiece of Hopkin’s case was the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a social 
psychologist, who had reviewed the partners’ comments and opined that the promotion process 
at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.287 Fiske explained that since 
Hopkins was the only woman in the pool of candidates, even gender-neutral remarks (she is 
“consistently annoying and irritating”) were probably the product of gender bias (although Fiske 
admitted she could not identify which particular of these comments were sexist.) Dr. Fiske 
testified that although she had not met any of the people involved in the decision-making 
process, it was commonly accepted practice for social psychologists to base their opinions on a 
review of documented comments in this kind of employment context.288
Price Waterhouse surprisingly did not object to Fiskes’ testimony at trial,289 relieving the 
courts from having to rule on its admissibility. Justice Brennan’s opinion nonetheless discounts
the evidence as “merely icing on Hopkin’s cake:” 
285
 490 U.S. at 235.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id., at 236.  Dr. Fiske also provided key testimony in a highly-publicized sex harassment case (Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D.Fla. 1991)) alleging that the prominent display of pictures of 
nude women at a shipyard created a hostile work environment for the few female employees. See Donna 
Shestowsky, “Where Is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual 
Harassment Trials,” 51 Stan.L.Rev. 357, 370-371 (1999).
289 Id., at 255. See also Jane Goodman & Robert T. Croyle, “Social Framework Testimony in Employment 
Discrimination Cases,” 7 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 227, 235 (1989).
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It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 
aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at charm school." Nor, turning to 
Thomas Beyer's memorable advice to Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to 
know that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be corrected by a soft-hued 
suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal 
skills that has drawn the criticism.290
The dissenters (Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia) questioned how Fiske could discern 
stereotyping in comments that were gender neutral, like "overbearing” and “abrasive," without 
“any knowledge of the comments’ basis in reality and without having met the speaker or 
subject.”291 And there is of course the question of the reliability of Fiske’s methodology
(although the decision predates Daubert and Kumho Tire). But more to the point, did her 
testimony meet the “helpfulness” and “fit” standards of FRE 702-- was the factfinder292 really in 
need of specialized assistance to determine the import of the “walk more femininely”-type 
comments before them in evidence? And could a social psychologist who has merely read the 
comments herself provide them meaningful assistance?293
Addressing this very question in an age discrimination case the district court in Flavel v. 
Svedala Industries, Inc.294 answered in the affirmative, refusing to bar the testimony of plaintiff’s 
industrial psychologist concerning age stereotypes allegedly contained in company documents.  
Defendant argued that the proposed testimony would “not be helpful to the jury, which is capable 
of identifying age discrimination without expert opinion.”  Disagreeing, the court ruled that 
“[e]xpert testimony on age stereotyping would make the jurors aware of [the fact that age 
discrimination may arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped notions of ability rather 
than from a deliberate desire to remove older employees from the workforce] in evaluating the 
evidence.  Moreover, in a pattern and practice case, evidence of discriminatory conduct is often 
290 Id., at 256.
291 Id., at 293 n. 5. They added that the  “plaintiff who engages the services of Dr. Susan Fiske should have no 
trouble showing that sex discrimination played a part in any decision.” Id.  (emphasis added).  
292
 The Hopkins case was tried to the district judge without a jury, pre-dating the 1991 amendments to Title VII 
providing for jury trials in actions filed under that statute (now codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981a(c)).
293
  Dr. Fiske’s evidence must be contrasted with the kind of statistical evidence routinely admitted to prove or 
disprove discriminatory patterns and practices, based on the established devices of binomial distribution, standard 
deviation, and multiple regression. See ZIMMER, SULLIVAN, & WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 210-251 (6th ed. 2003); Jansonius & Gould, “Expert Witnesses in 
Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility,” 50 Baylor L.Rev. 267, 282-286 (1998). 
294
 875 F.Supp. 550, 557-558 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
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widely-dispersed and difficult to evaluate; expert testimony as to age stereotyping may again aid 
jurors in assessing liability.”295
Where the issue in another trial was whether the plaintiff had been discriminated against 
when denied tenure, the district court in Mukhtar v. California State University, Hayward 296
admitted the testimony of a sociologist who had developed eight criteria for “decoding”297 white 
behavior towards minorities.298 Based on the presence of all eight, Dr. Wellman testified that 
race was a factor in Mukhtar’s tenure denial. Reversing on the ground that the district judge 
failed to make a reliability determination with respect to the testimony, the Ninth Circuit also 
raised the question of whether it was “helpful” in assisting the jury in matters beyond their 
common knowledge.299 Indeed, Dr. Wellman’s “criteria” appear little more than just common 
sense clues to evaluating whether any personnel decision is based on covert illegitimate 
factors,300 and have been incorporated into the structure for circumstantial proof of individual 
disparate treatment cases since McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.301
295
 875 F.Supp., at 558.
296
 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), amended 319 F.3d 1073. For an insightful treatment of this case see Comment, 
“Expert Testimony and ‘Subtle Discrimination’ In The Workplace: Do We Now Need A Weatherman to Know 
Which Way the Wind Blows,” 34 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 37 (2004).
297 Police officers have similarly been permitted to present expert testimony purporting to translate narcotics jargon 
and code for the jury.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).
298
 The criteria include: “a. The University's justification for denying tenure lacked ‘credence;’ b. Tenure criteria 
were applied inconsistently; c. Inconsistent tenure criteria advantaged whites and disadvantaged blacks; d. Tenure 
criteria shifted when challenged; e. Statistical evidence showed disparate treatment; f. Procedural violations 
occurred in the tenure process; g. University officials trivialized and dismissed [plaintiff’s] qualifications and 
accomplishments; and h. University officials failed to follow procedures for reducing racial inequality.” 299 F.3d at 
1061.
299 299 F.3d at 1065 n.9. The trial judge also recognized the risk that the experts would be “substituting their 
judgment for what the jury ultimately has to find, which is whether, in fact, this decision was based on race 
discrimination or based on legitimate academic concerns. … I don't want to hear them each go through all the 
evidence and say ‘this means this and that means that,’ and ‘I read this testimony and that testimony.’ That will take 
too long and it really will invade the province of the jury.” 299 F.3d at 1065.
300
 Compare the expert testimony offered in Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263-264 (7th Cir. 
1997), a Fair Housing Act suit alleging racially discriminatory advertising. Dr. Tarini, a psychologist, statistician, 
and chair of the department of marketing communication at a university, was prepared to testify to how advertising 
sends a message to its target market and how an all-White advertising campaign affects African-Americans. Tarini 
relied upon peer-reviewed articles and a focus group methodology.
301
 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See generally Comment, supra, “Expert Testimony and ‘Subtle Discrimination’ In The 
Workplace: Do We Now Need A Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows,” 34 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
at 45-49; Mark S. Brodin, “The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. 
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the ‘Personality Excuse’,” 18 Berkeley J. Employment & Labor Law 
183 (1997). The jury will usually be instructed regarding this structure of proof. 
For more on the use (and rejection) of experts in employment discrimination cases, see Jansonius & Gould, 




While it might appear that plaintiffs in civil rights cases would benefit from increased 
receptivity of courts to social science evidence,302 in the long run it may very well work to their 
disadvantage.  For one thing, it raises the expectations bar-- a plaintiff who does not have the 
wherewithal to develop and present such evidence may be at a disadvantage in the eyes of judge 
and jury (as has occurred in the prosecution of criminal cases lacking DNA evidence303). Such 
testimony (and the employer’s response to it) may also distract jurors from the more compelling 
factual and statistical foundation of plaintiff’s case And, of course, defendant employers will 
usually have more resources to expend on their own social science experts.
Indeed, it did not take defense counsel long to get into the expert witness game. In EEOC 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.304 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission presented
compelling statistical proof (in the form of regression analyses) that the defendant retailer had 
engaged in systemic nationwide discrimination against women, specifically the concentration of 
female employees in the lower-level sales jobs paid hourly while male employees dominated the 
higher-paying commissions positions. Sears focused its response in large part on several social 
science experts who made out a “lack of interest” defense: American society has socialized 
women with a set of values that sets them apart from men in the workplace; they are less 
competitive, less aggressive, and less willing to accept risk; consequently women generally are 
not attracted to rough-and-tumble commissions sales positions. Sears asserted, and both the 
district and circuit courts accepted, that “lack of interest” and not discrimination was the real 
reason women were underrepresented in the better jobs.305 The employer’s experts included two 
302
 One writer goes so far as to suggest that “[e]xpert testimony is so useful for correcting the substantial 
misperceptions and biases of the jurors or judges--the lay people--who decide sexual harassment cases that this 
testimony should be regarded as necessary for the just adjudication of sexual harassment claims.” Donna 
Shestowsky, “Where Is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual 
Harassment Trials,” 51 Stan.L.Rev. 357, 359 (1999).
303
 See “’CSI effect’ has juries wanting more evidence,” USA Today, August 5, 2004, at p.1.
304 628 F.Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). See generally Vicki Schultz, “Telling 
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases 
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,” 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Zimmer, Sullivan, Richards, & 
Calloway, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (5th ed. 2000), at 278-280 (& 
citations).
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 In his separate opinion Judge Cudahy complained: “Perhaps the most questionable aspect of the majority opinion 
is its acceptance of women's alleged low interest and qualifications for commission selling as a complete 




noted feminist scholars306 who might have been expected to be on the opposite side of the
litigation.
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was reportedly the longest trial in the history of the 
Seventh Circuit, generating more than 20,000 transcript pages of testimony.307  “Each side called 
numerous expert witnesses, some of whom contributed book-length reports to the trial 
record.…”308 And in the process Sears “had created, and prevailed with, a potent new defense for 
employers in Title VII cases.”309
For years it was gospel among most liberals and progressives that an activist Supreme 
Court was a good thing.  But as the Warren Court gave way to the Burger Court and then the 
Rehnquist Court, views changed dramatically. The weapon of the social science expert could be, 
and has now certainly been, turned against civil rights plaintiffs.310 “Hired guns” can be pointed
in any direction.
The fair and proper use of social science evidence would require that both litigants have 
relatively equal access to such experts,311 to related resources, and to skilled counsel. This is not 
always (or even often) the case. Particularly in criminal cases (and certainly where defendant is 
indigent) it is not likely the defense will be able to retain either a testifying expert or one who 
may be consulted for purposes of challenging the testimony of the government’s expert.312 Not 
surprisingly, the most dramatic increase in guilty verdicts has been documented where the 
prosecution expert is not countered by a defense expert.313
306
 Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg, an associate professor of history at Barnard College specializing in American Women's 
history, and Juliet Brudney, a consultant and writer on employment issues involving women. 628 F.Supp. at 1307-
1308.
307
 Zimmer, Sullivan, Richards, & Calloway, supra, at 278.
308 Id. (quoting Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, “Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and 
the Sears Case,” 66 Tex.L.Rev. 1629, 1636-1637 (1988)).
309
 Zimmer, Sullivan, Richards, & Calloway, supra, at 278.
310
 Along similar lines, one writer has argued that if rape trauma syndrome evidence is admitted when offered by the 
prosecution to establish guilt, defendants must be permitted to offer evidence that an alleged victim did not exhibit 
indicia of the syndrome to establish innocence (which might necessitate a compulsory psychiatric examination of the 
victim). Robert R. Lawrence, “Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings,” 70 Virginia L. Rev. 1657, 1702 (1984). At least 
one court has agreed. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (1989).
311 Professor Marilyn Berger has argued that judges should consider “whether both sides to the controversy have 
reasonably comparable access to scientific authorities” in deciding to admit expert testimony. Symposium on 
Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983).
312 See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, C.J.., dissenting). 
313
 Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 133, 159 (1989).
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In sum, as the First Circuit put it in a case involving expert eyewitness identification 
testimony, there is good reason to avoid imposing upon the parties “the time and expense 
involved in a battle of experts.”314 This is particularly so given alternative ways to educate jurors 
and improve the accuracy of decision-making. Perhaps the most obvious is  through use of 
specialized jury instructions. Judge Easterbrook has suggested that judges in identification cases
inform jurors of the rapid decrease of accurate recollection, and the problem of 
suggestibility, without encountering the delay and pitfalls of expert testimony. Jurors are 
more likely to accept that information coming from a judge than from a scholar, whose 
skills do not lie in the ability to persuade lay jurors (and whose fidgeting on the stand, an 
unusual place for a genuine scholar, is apt to be misunderstood). Altogether it is much 
better for judges to incorporate scientific knowledge about the trial process into that 
process, rather than to make the subject a debatable issue in every case.315
Obviously the matters of what instruction to give, under what circumstances it is to be 
given, and how it is to be phrased are not inconsequential and must be resolved.  But jury 
instructions on eyewitness identification have worked quite well in some jurisdictions,316 and 
314
 United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir. 1979). As another court cautioned,
The result [of admitting psychological evidence offered by defendant] must necessarily be a "battle of 
experts" concerning the validity of the expert evidence. This would consume substantial court time and cost 
both parties much time and expense. Much of the trial would focus on the tangential issue of the reliability 
of the expert evidence rather than the central issue of what the defendants did or did not do. The 
inevitability of a "battle of the experts" in this type of case is clear. In so subjective a field as psychiatry, 
the experts are bound to differ. The parties will spend untold time and money locating experts and 
preparing to cross-examine opposing experts. Court time will then be spent presenting the experts. With so 
much attention paid to the expert testimony, it is likely that the attention of the jury will be similarly 
diverted.
New Jersey v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508,519,  443 A.2d 1020, 1025 (1982). Such battles also engender cynicism about 
the courts, leading observers to wonder 
whether or not one or more of these experts have been compromised by the people who hired them to 
testify, since it's hard to look at one set of facts and see such divergent opinions and determinations drawn 
from the opposing sides from those facts. This is particularly true when applying the same theoretical 
criteria to those facts and where the only apparent difference is the desired outcome each side was able to 
find an expert to support. … Such expert presentations, in a very real way, do not facilitate but rather, 
complicate the cognitive skills of the fact-finder that are absolutely essential when searching for truth.
Ronald B. Aldrine, “Forensic Testimony: What Judges Want,” 24 Pace L. Rev. 215, 218-219 (2003). The perception 
of the courtroom expert as a “hired gun” has become quite prevalent. The District Attorney character in Barry 
Reed’s popular novel THE INDICTMENT, for example, cynically defines an expert witness as “a guy who’s fifty 
miles from home with slides.”  Id. , at p. 35.
315
 United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119-1120 (7th Cir. 1999) (concurring). 
316
 For a compelling argument in favor of judicial instructions over expert testimony, see Walker & Monahan, 
“Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law,” 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 592-598 (1987). For several 
empirical studies of the effect of such instructions, see See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, “Juries and Expert 
Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,” 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 133, 164-166 (1989). 
Cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification go back at least to Untied States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552 (D.C.Cir. 1972). In Massachusetts, a defendant who fairly raises the issue of mistaken identification is entitled 
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similar instructions (drafted with the assistance of social scientists317) could be devised, for 
example, to assist jurors  in understanding the way a victim of abuse might respond in particular 
circumstances.
IV. Conclusion
to an instruction on the factors relevant to reliability. See generally Liacos, Brodin & Avery, HANDBOOK OF 
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE §10.3.3, at 698-701 (7th ed. 1999). It is crafted as follows:
 “One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crime. The Government has the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential 
that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before 
you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
"Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its value depends on the 
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable 
identification later.
"In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following:
"Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
"Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the offense will be 
affected by such matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness was, how 
good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.
"In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his perception through the use of his senses. 
Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of sight but this is not necessarily so, and he may 
use other senses.
"Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the offense was the product of 
his own recollection? You may take into account both the strength of the identification, and the 
circumstances under which the identification was made.
"If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. 
You may also consider the length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the next 
opportunity of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
"You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of 
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant 
alone to the witness.
"You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to make an identification of 
defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his identification at trial.
"Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make 
a reliable observation on the matter covered in his testimony.
"I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime 
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, 
you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not 
guilty."
Com. v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311, 391 N.E.2d 889, 897-898 (1979). Specific instructions may also be 
provided regarding the decreased reliability of so-called cross-racial identifications. See Com. v. Hyatt, 419 Mass. 
815, 818-819, 647 NE2d 1168, 1171 (1995); State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457 (1999) (mandating 
instruction).
317
 Judge Easterbrook noted that the pattern instructions of both the Federal Judicial Center and the Seventh Circuit 
were formulated with such assistance. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1119-1120 (7th Cir. 1999) (concurring).
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“It is a fundamental principle of our system of criminal justice that we do not convict 
people of crimes on the basis of statistics or models; it appears equally that we do not 
attempt to determine whether someone has been a victim of crime on the same basis.” 318
“In the final analysis, the more that courts permit experts to advise the jury based on 
probability, classifications, syndromes and traits, the more we remove from the jury its 
historic function of assessing credibility.  While a criminal may be facile with his denials 
and explanations and a child may be timid and halting, we entrust to the wisdom of the 
twelve men and women who comprise the jury the responsibility to sort between the 
conflicting versions of events and arrive at a proper verdict.” 319
Social scientists have made undeniably important contributions to our understanding of 
human behavior, and mental health professionals perform an invaluable service to patients every
day of their professional lives. But a courtroom is not a sociology class, and a trial is not a 
therapy session. The task of litigation is dispute resolution, determining guilt in criminal cases 
and liability in civil matters. The players (judge, jury, lawyers, witnesses) are assigned narrowly 
defined roles, and the data employed in the process must pass through evidentiary filters 
designed to minimize distortion and maximize the accuracy of the fact-finding. The goal of the 
entire enterprise is to ascertain the truth while at the same time avoiding “unjustifiable expense 
and delay.” 320
Because the fact-finders are amateurs (lay jurors), they will sometimes need help from 
specialists. But before such a person testifies it must be demonstrated that the jurors truly need
assistance on the matter, that the witness is qualified to assist them, and that the theories and 
methodologies employed by the witness are valid and reliable. Where the “assistance” amounts 
to little more than telling the jurors which witness to believe, the expert has intruded into the 
very area where the laypersons reign supreme. And where the jurors will likely be confused, 
distracted from the main issues, or unduly impressed by and focused upon the expert’s pedigree 
or confidence level, such testimony should be avoided. It is submitted that all of this argues
against the admission of behavioral evidence, particularly of the syndrome variety. 
There can be no denying the prevalence of horrific crimes in our society, particularly 
against children. A casual perusal of the morning newspaper provides chilling confirmation of
the magnitude of the problem. There is equally no denying the great difficulties prosecutors face 
when attempting to prove abuse: 
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 Com. v. Deloney, 59 Mass. App. 47, 59, 794 N.E.2d 613, 623 (2003).
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Often these cases pit the word of a traumatized child against that of an adult. 
Child sexual abuse typically occurs in private, when the abuser is confident that there will 
be no witnesses. Therefore, the child victim is usually the only eyewitness. The 
prosecution's case is severely hampered if the court finds the child to be too young to be a 
witness or incompetent to testify. Even if the child does testify, several factors often limit 
the effectiveness of this testimony. The child's cognitive and verbal abilities may not 
enable her to give consistent, spontaneous, and detailed reports of her sexual abuse. A 
child who must testify against a trusted adult, such as a parent or relative, may experience 
feelings of fear and ambivalence, and may retract her story because of family pressures or 
insensitivities in the legal process. 
Prosecutors face another dilemma when offering the child victim as a witness if 
the child has delayed reporting the abuse. Jurors may interpret delayed disclosure as 
evidence of fabrication, especially if defense counsel suggests this conclusion during 
cross-examination of the child. Further, jurors may hold misconceptions that the child has 
memory deficits, is suggestible, cannot distinguish between fact or fantasy, or is likely to 
fabricate sexual experiences with adults. These problems are compounded by the lack of 
corroborative physical or mental evidence in many child sexual abuse cases.321
Yet the daunting challenge in these and other prosecutions (notably rape and battering) 
can only explain the temptation for prosecutors to offer, and courts to admit, evidence of dubious 
reliability, helpfulness, and probative value. It certainly cannot justify the admission of testimony 
carrying a misleading scientific cache that may undercut the accused’s presumption of 
innocence322 and result in a wrongful conviction (and sometimes the consequent exoneration of 
the actually guilty party). It is not only Daubert but fundamental principles of evidence doctrine
that demand considerably more skepticism than has been shown towards this mode of proof.
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 Lisa R. Askowitz, “Restricting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: 
Pennsylvania Takes it to the Extreme,” 47 U.Miami L.Rev. 201, 201-03 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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 It has been observed, for example, that “[m]ore and more, the biggest consumers of the battered woman 
syndrome over the last several years are prosecutors who are using it to elude the character evidence rules in their 
prosecutions of alleged batterers.” Faigman, “The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations of the 
Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution,” 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 661, 674 (2000). See also Newkirk 
v. Kentucky, 937 S.W.2d 690, 695-696 (Ky. 1997); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 1995); Com. v. 
Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 184, 602 A.2d 830, 838 (1992).
